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INTRODUCTION

Xenophon and His Socrates

Christopher Bruell

The following remarks are intended to lend support to the view that Xenophon’s account of Socrates deserves more respectful attention from those interested in Socrates than it often receives today. The demonstration of such a proposition is too great a task in this context. But I will try to create a predisposition in its favor (or on behalf of open-minded consideration of it) in two ways: first, by considering in a very general way what might be responsible for the current neglect of Xenophon’s account; and, then, by giving a brief summary of the contents of the Memorabilia, the longest of Xenophon’s four Socratic writings and the one to which this volume is devoted.

1. Far more obviously than Plato, Xenophon calls attention in his writings to his own relationship with Socrates. He claims frequently, Plato only once, to have been present at the Socratic conversations he reports. He often comments, in his own name, on Socrates’ words and deeds and on his life as a whole, something Plato never does; and he sometimes talks of the impression they made on him in particular. In accord with this, he calls his longest Socratic work “Memorabilia,” that is, “Recollections,” his recollections of Socrates; there is no parallel to this in the Platonic dialogues. One might add that whereas the dialogues, with the

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possible exception of the *Laws* (and the *Epinomis*), are devoted entirely to Socrates—Plato himself being mentioned only three times, almost in passing—Xenophon’s works include not only the *Education of Cyrus*, devoted to the founder of the Persian empire, but also the *Anabasis of Cyrus*, whose real hero, the rescuer of almost ten thousand Greeks from extreme peril in the heart of the Persian empire, is Xenophon himself.

All of this would seem to justify an expectation on our part of finding in Xenophon’s works an account of his association with Socrates. But this expectation, if not entirely disappointed, is fulfilled in a surprising way. Xenophon recounts only two episodes in what must have been a complex friendship of some duration. The first was a conversation that took place in the presence of Cri-to’s son, Critobulus, a lazy, fun-loving, and spendthrift youth, whom Socrates, despite or perhaps in part because of these qualities, liked to spend time with:

"Tell me, Xenophon," he said, "didn’t you hold Critobulus to be one of the moderate rather than the rash human beings, and one of those with forethought rather than senseless and reckless?"

"Certainly," said Xenophon.

"Well, hold now that he is hotheaded and heedless in the extreme. He would even make somersaults into daggers and leap into fire."

"And what did you see him doing," said Xenophon, "that you have formed such judgments about him?"

"Did he not dare to kiss the son of Alcibiades, who is most fair and in his bloom?" he said.

"But if that is the reckless deed," said Xenophon, "in my opinion, I, too, would endure this risk."

"You wretch!" Socrates said. "And what do you think you would suffer after kissing someone beautiful? Would you not immediately be a slave rather than free, spend a lot for harmful pleasures, be in great want of leisure for attending to anything noble and good, and be compelled to take seriously what even a madman would not take seriously?"

"Heracles!" said Xenophon. "What a terrible power you ascribe to a kiss."

"And do you wonder at this?" said Socrates. "Don’t you know
that poisonous spiders not even half an obol in size crush human beings with pain and drive them from their senses merely by touching them with their mouths?"

"Yes, by Zeus!" said Xenophon. "For spiders inject something through their sting."

"You fool!" said Socrates. "Do you think that when those who are beautiful kiss they don't inject anything, just because you don't see it? Don't you know that this beast that they call beautiful and in bloom is so much more terrible than spiders that, while spiders inject something when they touch, it (even when it does not touch, but if one just looks at it) injects even from quite far away something of the sort to drive one mad? ... But I counsel you, Xenophon, whenever you see someone beautiful, to flee without looking back."

Xenophon often comments favorably on the effectiveness of Socratic exhortations. For some reason, he refrained from doing so in this case.

The second episode is recounted not in the Socratic writings proper, but in the Anabasis. Xenophon had received a letter from a friend inviting him to accompany the friend on an expedition being organized by Cyrus, the younger brother of the then Persian king. Xenophon took the letter to Socrates and consulted with him about the trip. Socrates was worried that association with Cyrus might get Xenophon into trouble with Athens, since Cyrus was thought to have given enthusiastic assistance to Sparta in its recent war with Athens. So Socrates advised Xenophon to go to Delphi to consult with the god about the trip. Xenophon went to Delphi, and he put a question to Apollo: to which of the gods should he sacrifice and pray in order to make the journey he intended to make in the noblest and best manner and to come back safely, having acted in a noble manner. When Xenophon returned to Athens with Apollo's answer, Socrates blamed him for not having asked first whether it was better for him to make the trip or not; instead, Xenophon had made the chief decision himself and had asked only about the means. As a result, Socrates was compelled to advise Xenophon to proceed with the trip in accordance with the god's instructions.

The account of his association with Socrates that Xenophon conveys through these stories is somewhat surprising in any case. It is
all the more surprising for its apparent inconsistency with the impression conveyed by the features of his Socratic works we have mentioned: the stories seem to indicate that Xenophon did not place very great weight on his relationship with Socrates, even that he took it lightly. But perhaps that impression was in need of qualification or correction. More precisely, what the stories indicate is that Xenophon was not entirely receptive to Socrates' advice. Beyond that, as his life as a whole also serves to suggest, Xenophon did not regard the Socratic life—the philosophic life pure and simple—as a model for him to follow in every respect. It is safe to assume that he expected the same to be true of many of his readers as well.

This consideration may help to explain another feature of Xenophon’s Socratic works: the almost total absence from them of philosophic protreptic, exhortations to philosophize of the sort found in abundance in the Platonic dialogues. In their place, we find—in Xenophon’s Symposium—a witty and lighthearted but no less telling critique of the Socratic circle, or at least of some of its most conspicuous members. (The very terms “philosophy,” “philosophers,” “philosophize,” occur very infrequently in the Socratic writings.) Xenophon had a precise understanding of what the absence of philosophic protreptic entails. In the fourth book of his Memorabilia, he presents a caricature of such a protreptic. It is a caricature because its object, the boy to be converted to philosophy, is about as unfit for philosophy as a nature can be. Nevertheless, the presentation of this defective case provides some basis for figuring out what a nondefective protreptic might require. An appeal to the potential convert’s concern for justice, followed by a thoroughgoing critique of his conscious or unconscious conviction that he knows what justice is, would appear to play a very large role here. Now Xenophon refers rather frequently in his Socratic works to the Socratic examination of justice; but he gives us relatively few examples of it. More generally, he does little to bring the Socratic treatment of justice to life before our eyes and ears: there is no Xenophontic counterpart to Plato’s Republic or Gorgias.

Perhaps with such differences in mind, an admirer of Xenophon from former times distinguished between the sublimity of Plato and the “natural and simple genius” of Xenophon, “comprehended by
so few and so little relished by the vulgar.”¹ It is tempting to un-
derstand this comment in the light of a somewhat mischievous re-
mark of Montesquieu: “Human beings, rogues individually, are en
masse very decent people: they love morality; and . . . I would say
that this is seen admirably well in the theater. One is certain to
please the people with the sentiments that morality avows, and one
is certain to shock them by those it reproves.”² But one must think
of the higher, the more sublime, rather than the low manifestations
of the disposition described by Montesquieu—of Glaucon and Ad-
eimantus rather than Babbitt. If philosophy itself is the true op-
posite of vulgarity, then prior to falling in love with philosophy in
the proper way, the future philosophers themselves cannot be en-
tirely free of vulgar concerns and tastes; a philosophic protreptic
would therefore have to appeal to those concerns, if only for the
sake of leading its addressees beyond them; and in doing so, it
would inevitably partake of the vulgarity it seeks to cure. Xen-
ophon’s abstaining, or his having his Socrates abstain, from any se-
rious protreptic effort thus has the perhaps incidental advantage of
enabling him to present a Socrates remarkably free of vulgarity of
this sort. To put this another way, Xenophon does not bend very
much to make the better part of his readers like the Socrates he
presents—and, for this very reason, they may, if they come to like
him at all, like him all the more.

But Xenophon does make accommodations to a different version
of vulgarity, going much farther in this respect than Plato does. In
seeking to convince not only the better part but also the vast ma-
jority of his readers that Socrates’ conviction on a capital charge
was absurd, Xenophon uses arguments of a sort that any suffi-
ciently clever lawyer might use if confronted with such a jury. In
particular, he goes as far as he can to present Socrates as an ordi-

¹Shaftesbury, Characteristics (Indianapolis, Ind., 1964), 1: 166–67.
as a vulgar one: "The majority, as it seems, define as good men those who are their benefactors" (Hellenica VII.3.12). He goes even farther by having his Socrates, in his ordinariness, profess a number of kindred opinions—for example, the view that certain mercenary relations deserve the name of friendship. Xenophon's Socrates says to an acquaintance on a certain occasion, "On account of the present bad state of affairs, good friends can now be purchased quite cheaply." Xenophon's better readers cannot help noticing such vulgarity; and, remote as we believe we are today from the needs that dictated its use, they cannot help being offended by it. Too refined to tolerate Xenophon's obvious vulgarity, they are not refined enough to observe the quiet evidence of his delicacy and good taste.

2. The Memorabilia is divided into thirty-nine chapters, which fall into a number of parts. I will go through these sections more or less in order, feeling free, however, to skip around from time to time. In the first two chapters (I.1–2), Xenophon takes up directly, and refutes, the twofold charge on which Socrates was convicted and put to death. The refutation of the impiety charge requires, in Xenophon's view, at least the apparent denial that Socrates was concerned with natural philosophy—that is, with the investigation of the nature of all things, in particular the state of the cosmos and the necessities by which each of the heavenly things comes into being. And while Xenophon gives a number of indications, both in the Memorabilia itself and in his other Socratic writings, that Socrates was indeed engaged in natural philosophy, together with information regarding the manner of his philosophic activity, the bulk of the Memorabilia is silent on this subject. It shows us Socrates not in his philosophic activity proper but in his relations with students, relatives, companions of various sorts, fellow citizens, and others, expressing views on personal as well as economic and political matters. Or it shows us something of what it means to be a philosopher by showing how philosophy affects a number of matters and relations with which we too are concerned. And it was perhaps Xenophon's interest in the question of philosophy as a way of life—as well as his cautious reluctance to say very much about

3Compare Leo Strauss, Xenophon's Socrates (Ithaca, N.Y., 1972).
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Socrates' philosophic activity proper—that gave his recollections or *Memorabilia* this form.

The refutation of the corruption charge requires Xenophon to take up not only Socrates' own undoubted law-abidingness but his effect on his young companions. Socrates himself was of the opinion that those of his companions who accepted what he himself approved of would be good friends to him and to each other throughout their lives. Xenophon gives us some evidence, in the *Symposium* especially, for doubting whether this was always the case—at least as far as some of those most *eager* to accept what Socrates approved of were concerned. On the other hand, some partial nonaccepters, if Xenophon himself is a representative of this class, might have been quite good friends to Socrates. This question reminds us of Xenophon's other great hero, Cyrus. After conquering all of western Asia and elevating his friends almost to the peak of power, wealth, and honor, Cyrus paused to reflect on his own situation. He thus came to the realization that he had no enemies so dangerous to him as those very friends; and he took precautions commensurate with the danger. But even if Socrates' expectation was always borne out, were those who were good friends to him and to each other always good friends to the city as well? Xenophon admits that Socrates made his companions more attached to him than to their nearest and dearest: would this not have held true also with regard to their attachment to the city? According to another suggestion that Xenophon conveys through his *Education of Cyrus*, Socrates was put to death for alienating the affections of the young.

Even if we leave this question aside, a problem would still be caused by the facts that the Socratic circle could not have been limited to those fully willing and able to accept what Socrates approved of, and that not every nonaccepter or partial accepter could be expected to be a Xenophon. At the minimum, Socrates' companions must have included, at most if not all times, some youths who were still only potential philosophers and who, therefore, could not yet fully accept what they did not yet fully understand. Beyond that, could even Socrates know in advance which among the gifted and well-disposed youths had all that the philosophic life requires?
Do the proper disposition and the necessary intellectual gifts always coincide? Could Socrates always avoid associating even with clearly unpromising cases? Did he always wish to avoid this?

The troubles these questions point to, both individually and taken together, were bound to crop up and did crop up—most conspicuously in the cases of Critias and Alcibiades, notorious political criminals who were, at one time or another, closely associated with Socrates. In his treatment of these cases, Xenophon dutifully tries to follow the line laid down by his Socrates: Critias and Alcibiades became bad only after *leaving* Socrates' company and even, partially at least, as a result of leaving it; their criminality is bound up entirely with their rejection of Socrates' teaching and example—it is certainly not due to any quasi acceptance of that teaching. Xenophon goes so far as to divide Socrates' companions into two classes: the bad ones like Alcibiades and Critias (only those two names are given in this context) and the good ones like Crito and Hermogenes (seven of these names are given), men who did not abandon Socrates and who, throughout their lives, never did or were even accused of doing anything bad. But this line of argument succeeds a little too well. It makes us wonder why Socrates would ever have wanted to associate with the "baddies" to begin with. That is, it leads us toward raising the questions we have already raised. Xenophon gives, in his *Symposium*, a beautiful illustration of the problem by contrasting Hermogenes, one of the aforementioned "goodies," with a man named Charmides, who must be classed with the "baddies," since he was later to become a quasi partner in crime of Critias. Both Hermogenes and Charmides were guests at the banquet described in the *Symposium*, along with Socrates, Critobulus, and others. It will suffice to mention one episode of a more fully drawn characterization and comparison. Sometime after the drinking had commenced, Critobulus was flaunting his extreme infatuation or love for the boy Socrates had criticized him for kissing, in the conversation recounted earlier. Hermogenes took offense and took Socrates to task regarding Critobulus' disgraceful condition: "I think it is out of character, Socrates, for you to overlook the fact that Critobulus has been made so senseless by love." Socrates defended himself by saying that Critobulus' condition predated his own association with him. In fact, Critobulus was already
far gone in love when his father, Socrates' companion Crito, turned him over to Socrates to see whether Socrates could help. "And he is already much better: hitherto he stared at the boy stonelike, like those who look at Gorgons, and stonelike, he never left him. But now I have already seen him blink!" Charmides had been listening to this exchange, which concluded with some Socratic remarks about the dangers of kissing. "Why is it, Socrates," he asked, "that you scare us, your friends, away from the beautiful, while you yourself I saw in the grammar school—yes, by Apollo—when you were both searching for something in the same book, head against head, bare shoulder against the bare shoulder of Critobulus?" To which Socrates replied, "So that is why I have felt pain in that shoulder for more than five days and seem to have some sting in my heart, as if bitten by a beast. But now, Critobulus, I declare publicly, before these many witnesses, that you are not to touch me before your beard is as full as the hair on your head." To come back to the Memorabilia, Xenophon indicates there that Socrates had a rather high regard for Charmides. The wish to associate with natures like his would, by itself, account for Socrates' willingness to teach politics, as Xenophon grants, even in the course of his response to the corruption charge, that he did.

The six chapters that follow (I.3-7, II.1) suggest a reason for the apparent inconsistency noted by Charmides between Socrates' words and deeds: Socrates was exceptionally continent and could therefore safely permit himself temptations others could not. This part of the Memorabilia is devoted to showing how Socrates, through conversation and example, benefited his companions especially with regard to their becoming pious and continent. It features a number of exhortations to continence with respect to bodily pleasures—including the one addressed to Xenophon himself. Moreover, as Xenophon tells us, Socrates showed himself still more continent in his deeds than in his speeches. So impressive, not to say oppressive, is this continence that we are led increasingly to wonder what it is for. To put the problem as one of the exhortations does, continence is the foundation of virtue: it is not virtue itself. Returning for a minute to Xenophon's Symposium, we see that one of the ways in which the guests at that elegant banquet entertained themselves was by stating, each in turn, what he was most proud
of and then defending his boast or claim. The occasion, needless to say, did not require that those boasts be entirely serious. Socrates, for example, claimed to be proud of his skill as a pimp. But Antisthenes, one of Socrates’ most ardent admirers and an extremely poor man, claimed to be proud of his wealth. When his turn came to defend this apparently absurd boast, he explained that he meant the wealth he possessed in his soul, wealth he had acquired from Socrates. As his longish statement makes clear, he understood by this “wealth” nothing so much as the extreme Socratic continence. Later in the evening, Socrates found an occasion to chastise Antisthenes playfully. He accused Antisthenes, who claimed to love him, of loving his beautiful body rather than his soul. In the same context, the fact emerged that Socrates did his best, by the use of one pretext or another, to avoid conversing with Antisthenes. In the Memorabilia, Xenophon stresses what Socrates, in the Symposium, called his bodily beauty: his continence and kindred qualities. Nevertheless, in various ways, he allows us glimpses of other things.

For example, Socrates had a number of conversations with a sophist named Antiphon, which Xenophon includes in the section we are discussing. “Do you think,” Socrates asked on one of these occasions, “anything is more responsible for my not being enslaved to stomach or sleep or lust, than that I have other things more pleasant than these that delight not only in their use but also by providing hopes that they will benefit always?” And on another he said, “Accordingly, Antiphon, just as another is pleased by a good horse or a dog or a bird, so I myself am even more pleased by good friends, and if I possess something good I teach it, and I introduce them to others from whom, I believe, they will receive some benefit with a view to virtue. And reading in common with my friends, I go through the treasures of the wise men of old which they wrote and left behind in their books; and if we see something good, we pick it out; and we hold that it is a great gain if we become beneficial (or friends) to one another.” Hearing this, Xenophon says, he thought Socrates to be blessed.

In the two chapters that follow this section (II.2–3), Socrates gives advice to individuals who have difficult relatives to deal with. In each case, Socrates has a connection with the parties concerned and thus a personal stake in the good behavior he urges. One of the
addressee is Socrates' eldest son, Lamprocles, who is angry with his mother and is therefore acting, or in danger of acting, improperly toward her. In order to put his wife's harshness in some perspective, Socrates asks Lamprocles, "Which do you think is more difficult to bear, the ferocity of a beast or of a mother?" "For my part, I think that of a mother, at least one such as this." "Then has she ever yet done you any harm by biting or kicking, such things as many have suffered already from beasts?" "But, by Zeus, she says things that one wouldn't for all one's life wish to hear." "Do you think it is harsher for you to hear what she says than it is for the actors when they say the most extreme things to one another in the tragedies?" Lamprocles responds that the actors easily bear the harsh words they have to listen to since they know they are spoken with no ill will. "And you, knowing very well that, when your mother speaks to you, she not only intends no harm but also wishes for you more good than for anyone else—knowing this you are angry?" The conversation of which these exchanges are a part is the only example given by Xenophon (or Plato) of an attempt on Socrates' part to educate his own children. In presenting the two chapters containing Socrates' conversations about relatives, Xenophon abstains from any introductory comments and thus avoids speaking of Socrates' deeds generally as distinguished from his speech.

The next seven chapters (II.4–10) concern friendship. According to Xenophon, the Socratic conversations or speeches reported in this section were useful with regard to the acquisition and use of friends, encouraged self-examination as to the amount of one's worth to one's friends, and gave instruction as to what sort of friends are worth acquiring. Socrates also attempted to bring relief to those of his friends who were in some difficulty or other. Where the difficulty was caused by ignorance, he attempted to cure it using his judgment; when it was caused by want, by teaching his friends to assist one another. To give one of the examples Xenophon furnishes of these efforts, a friend of Socrates was being eaten out of house and home because the wars, both civil and foreign, that had severely curtailed his income had also added to his burdens a large number of female relatives to support. Socrates' advice was simple: why don't you put them to work making something that can be sold? But in order to get that advice accepted, he had to
relieve his friend of the foolish scruple or notion that free women (society ladies, one can say) ought not to engage in commercial activity. Once Socrates had succeeded in enlightening him, the advice was accepted and acted upon with great success. The ensuing harmony in the friend's home was, as he later reported to Socrates, disturbed only by the ladies' complaint that now the man was the only idle member of the household. Here, too, Socrates was able to be of help: 'Then you aren't telling them the speech of the dog. For they say that, when the animals could speak, the ewe said to her master, 'You do an astonishing thing in giving us, who provide you with wool and lambs and cheese, nothing other than what we ourselves get from the earth, while you give the dog, who provides you with nothing of the sort, a share of your very own food.' And that when the dog heard this he said, 'Yes, by Zeus, for I am the one who in fact saves you sheep so that you are neither stolen by human beings nor seized by wolves, since indeed if I were not to guard over you, you would not even be able to graze out of fear that you might perish.' '' Thus, according to Socrates, even the sheep acquiesced in the more honorable treatment for the dog. As this chapter reminds us, Xenophon and his Socrates were willing to use the term "friend" rather loosely. It could thus be applied to a number of different sorts of people with whom Socrates had relationships of various kinds. This fact, together with the attention given in the section on friendship to the question of what sort of friends are worth acquiring, makes us wonder what sort of friends Socrates himself thought most worth acquiring. An answer has already been indicated in Socrates' remarks to the sophist Antiphon and elsewhere. A more explicit statement comes later on in the Memorabilia when Xenophon explains what Socrates meant when he said, as he often did, that he was in love with someone: manifestly, he was not longing for those whose bodies were in bloom but those whose souls were naturally fit for acquiring virtue, that is, those who were quick at learning whatever they turned their minds to and remembered what they learned and desired all the sorts of learning relevant to the noble management of household and city and, in general, the good use of human beings and human affairs.

The emphasis in the friendship section as a whole on utilitarian
considerations makes us wonder, in turn, about the possible elements of Socratic friendship other than utility, even utility of the sort pointed to in the remarks to Antiphon. The answer to this question is not without its relevance to the answer to the other one: what sort of friends Socrates thought worth acquiring. And in this connection, we might note that after explaining as he does what Socrates meant when he said he was in love with someone, Xenophon seems to go out of his way to show how much time Socrates spent with a certain brainless beauty. (We can also recall here his liking for Critobulus.) In one of the friendship chapters, Socrates distinguishes between friendships acquired through the use of "love charms" and those acquired through conferring benefits. Later on in the Memorabilia, he admits to being a master in the use of such charms. Or, as he says in the chapter in which they are first mentioned, he is erotic and therefore strives mightily, with his whole being, to be loved by those he loves, longed for by those he longs for, and to have those he desires to be with, desire to be with him.

Xenophon gives four examples in the friendship section of Socrates' attempts to relieve the difficulties of his friends. There are indications, as we have to some extent already seen, that some or all of these efforts took place against the background of the awful suffering brought to Athens, to the vast majority of Socrates' fellow citizens, by the latter part of the Peloponnesian War and its aftermath. Xenophon gives us no report of a Socratic attempt to relieve the distress of his city, unless one or more of the conversations reported in the seven chapters he places next (III.1-7) constitute such an attempt. Socrates speaks in these conversations to actual or potential or aspiring military and political leaders of the city—in one case giving advice with regard to the current distress, in another urging a capable man not to shrink from playing a (greater) public role. In his general introduction to the conversations in question, however, Xenophon claims no more for them than that they benefited the individuals addressed—individuals whom he characterizes as "those longing for the noble things," that is, for public honors—by making them take the care or make the effort appropriate to such longing. These conversations explore, in an extremely thorough way, what political or military leadership calls for and
therefore, in particular, whether what it calls for is of benefit to the leader himself. Socrates seems to indicate that some doubts are in order on that score; surely, he himself never sought political leadership. Yet in a conversation that took place in an earlier section, he had chastised a companion of his who wished to live an entirely unpolitical life—the life of one who is a foreigner in every land—so as to avoid the burdens that come with sharing political responsibility. The companion believed that he was following a path that led to happiness precisely because it avoided both ruling on the one hand and slavery on the other. Socrates said on that occasion, "If the path avoids human beings as well, just as it avoids both ruling and slavery, you might have a point," and he pointed out the dangers to which the weak in general and foreigners in particular are exposed. The only real choices are ruling or being ruled or voluntarily serving the rulers. Or, as Socrates put it when asked on another occasion why he had married the most difficult of all women past, present, and future, "I have acquired her because I want to make use of and associate with human beings, knowing well that if I can endure her, I will keep company with all other human beings with ease."

The seven chapters that follow the section on politics (III.8–14) do not seem to belong to a single group. The most significant are probably the first two, where we are told what Socrates said about certain characteristic themes. For example, Socrates called kings and rulers not those who possess the scepter or those chosen by any chance group or by lot or those who have gotten where they are by force or fraud but those who know how to rule. This remark admits of a number of different interpretations. Left to his own devices, Socrates would enlarge on it in the most innocent way. But if someone objected that it is possible for a tyrant not to obey the knowers, those who speak correctly, Socrates said, "How indeed would it be possible for him not to obey since a penalty is laid down if someone doesn't obey the one who speaks well; for in whatever matter one doesn't obey the one who speaks well, he will no doubt err, and in erring be penalized." If someone persisted in the objection, saying that it is possible for the tyrant to kill the one who thinks well, Socrates said, "But do you think that one who has killed the best of his allies is free from penalty, or that he suffers
some chance penalty? For do you think the one who does this would be preserved, or rather, that he would quickly perish?" And, in general, as Xenophon tells us later on, Socrates treated those who objected to what he said differently from those who listened in silence. "If someone contradicted him on some subject... , he led the whole argument back to its hypothesis... . Thus the truth became manifest to the objectors themselves. But whenever he went through an argument on some subject by himself, he kept to the path of the opinions most generally agreed upon, considering that manner of argument to be the safe one."

Seven of the last eight chapters of the *Memorabilia* (IV.1–7) are devoted to Socratic education. They show first how Socrates attracted the attention of certain types of potential students and then how he led one student in particular through the successive stages of Socratic instruction. While the demonstration of Socratic instruction undoubtedly tells us much about Socrates as an educator, as well as about his views on various matters, in reading it one must take into account the fact that the individual Xenophon chooses to be the model student in this demonstration is Euthydemus, the brainless beauty referred to earlier. Xenophon begins his treatment of Socratic education by telling us that Socrates did not approach everyone, that is, every type of person, in the same way. And he distinguishes for us a certain number of types. At the top are the good natures, whose characteristics we have already mentioned. In the next place come those of some natural gifts who, on account of these, think they have no need of education and look down on it. Skipping to last place, we find those who believe that they have already received the best education and pride themselves on their wisdom. Euthydemus belongs to this class. To use the distinction mentioned earlier but introduced in the text in the context of the demonstration of Socratic instruction, Euthydemus is the nonobjector par excellence. In one of the chapters of this section, he is replaced as Socrates' interlocutor by the world-famous sophist Hippias. Hippias had come upon Socrates when the latter was pointing out to some people how difficult it is to find a teacher of justice, while teachers of shoemaking, carpentry, smithing, or horsemanship are so ready to hand. Their conversation began in this way. Hippias said, "You are still saying the same things, Socrates,
that I heard you saying long ago." And Socrates replied, "What is more terrible than this, Hippias, not only do I always say the same things, but I say them about the same subjects. You, perhaps, due to your great learning, never say the same things about the same subjects." "By all means, I try always to say something new." "Even about the things you understand? For example, if someone asks you how to spell Socrates—how many letters and which ones—do you try to say different things at different times? Or to those who ask regarding numbers whether twice five is ten, don't you give the same answer now as you did before?" As Xenophon shows in this way, the change of interlocutors did not significantly affect the quality of discussion.

The last chapter of the Memorabilia (IV.8) returns to the theme of Socrates' condemnation and death and reports some of Socrates' reflections as those events approached. He was clearly attached to life, which he felt he had lived to the fullest; but, especially given his age, he seemed to feel that it was not a bad time for him to die. We might be disturbed by the manner of his death—by its injustice, which it was after all part of the intention of the Memorabilia to establish. In his Apology of Socrates, where Xenophon takes up again parts of the last chapter of the Memorabilia from a somewhat different point of view, he shows what he and his Socrates would have thought of such a reaction. Among those present at the trial was Apollodorus, whom Xenophon characterizes as "an ardent lover of Socrates and otherwise a naive fellow." After Socrates' condemnation, Apollodorus said to him, "But for me, Socrates, the hardest thing to bear is that I see you dying unjustly." Socrates, stroking Apollodorus' head, said, "Dearest Apollodorus, would you have preferred to see me dying justly?" And, for only the second time in Xenophon's Socratic writings, where he has caused us to laugh more than a few times, Socrates laughed.
Translator’s Note

Amy L. Bonnette

In translating Xenophon I have aspired to attain the greatest accuracy and consistency possible in consonance with clear English usage. I admire the sentiments voiced by an older generation of translators who freely expressed their great respect for Xenophon. Edward Spelman’s introduction to his translation of Xenophon’s *Anabasis* in 1909 offers us a brief account of Xenophon and his works, in that tradition.

Xenophon was an Athenian; his Father’s Name Gryllus. All that we know of him ‘till he attended Cyrus in his Expedition, is, that he was a Disciple of Socrates. If, to have been a disciple of that great Man was an Instance of his good Fortune, the Improvement he made of that Education is an Instance of his Merit; and, indeed, nothing less than the happiest Disposition, the best Education, and the greatest Improvement of both, could render Xenophon that universal Man we find him in his Writing: his Cyropaedeia shews him to have possessed, in a sovereign degree, the Art of Government; his Expedition of Cyrus shews him a compleat General; his History, an entertaining, an instructive, and a faithful Historian; his Panegyric of Agesilaus, an Orator; and his Treatise of Hunting, a Sportsman; his Apology for Socrates, and his Account of his Manner of conversing, shew that he was both a Friend and a Philosopher; and all of them, that he was a good Man. This appears remarkably in his preserving Byzantium from being plundered by his Soldiers, who, having gained no other Reward of the dangerous Expedition they had been engaged in, but their Preservation, were not only strongly tempted
to plunder that Town by the hope of making their Fortunes, but justly provoked to it by the disingenuous Behaviour of the Lacedaemonian Governor; yet these two lawless Passions, Avarice, and Revenge, the Authority, and Eloquence of Xenophon quite subdued.¹

Sarah Fielding’s introduction to her 1778 translation of the Memorabilia, which she entitled the Memoirs of Socrates, gives sound general reasons for approaching Xenophon’s work with respect, however odd that work may sometimes appear to us.

That the memoirs of Socrates, with regard to the greatest part, are held in the highest estimation, is most certain; and if there are some passages which seem obscure; and of which the use doth not so plainly appear to us at this distance of time; and from the dissimilarity of our customs and manners; yet, perhaps, we might not do amiss, in taking Socrates himself for our example in this particular, as well as in many others; who being presented by Euripides, with the writings of Heraclitus, and afterwards asked his opinion of their merit: “What I understand, said he, I find to be excellent; and therefore believe that to be of equal value, which I do not understand.” And, certainly . . . this candour is more particularly becoming us in the perusal of the works of ancient authors; of those works which have been preserved in the devastation of cities, and snatched up in the wreck of nations: which have been the delight of ages; and transmitted as the great inheritance of mankind, from one generation to another; and we ought to take it for granted, that there is a justness in the connexion, which we cannot trace; and a cogency in the reasoning, which we cannot understand.²

Today, translators have an even more compelling reason for treating Xenophon’s works with the care that they deserve: we have a renewed access to Xenophon’s thought through the writings of Leo Strauss, which look beyond the disarming simplicity of Xenophon’s Anabasis;” in The Classics—Greek and Latin (New York, 1909), 5: 325.

² “Xenophon’s Memoirs of Socrates with the Defence of Socrates before His Judges, 3d ed. (Dublin, 1778), vi.
phon’s prose in order to reveal how his works can help us to understand life’s most important questions, and hence why it is worth the considerable effort it takes to read them adequately. Reading of this sort requires careful attention to detail, and it was with the reader’s need for such attention in mind that I undertook this translation. I have been particularly aware of the need to mark important terms in Socratic philosophy by rendering them consistently with the same English words, or by noting when a deviation from this practice is required. Similarly, I have tried to preserve the order of Xenophon’s arguments and his careful wording of lists.

In spite of the care taken, I must repeat the standard translator’s warning that for those who wish to make an adequate study, reading this translation is no substitute for reading the original. At best a translation may provide a degree of access for those who cannot avoid such a compromise for now. To begin with, much of Xenophon’s great charm is bound to be lost in the transition from ancient Greek to English. Moreover, as readers familiar with ancient Greek will know, a strictly literal translation into English is not really possible. To mention only one difficulty, English depends more heavily on word order to convey meaning, and therefore some sacrifice of Greek sentence structure is a necessity. In spite of the obstacles, the most competent translator would notice every subtlety in the original and then adequately reproduce it. I am aware of instances in which I have failed in this regard, and I suspect that there are many more that have entirely escaped me. In Sarah Fielding’s words, “It may perhaps be objected, ‘That candour alone is not sufficient for the present occasion;’—to which it can only be

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3 For Strauss’s work on Xenophon see the suggested readings on pp. xxvii–xxviii.
4 For arguments supporting the general approach to translation that I adopt, see the introduction to The Republic of Plato (New York, 1968), xi–xii, by Allan Bloom, who set a standard for English translation of the classics, and Thomas Pangle’s introduction to The Laws of Plato (New York, 1980), ix–x. Beyond important terms, which are indicated in the notes, I have been as consistent as I thought reasonable in the translation of all words; but I did not think it desirable to note every deviation. Those interested in closely observing any particular word should consult the index of C. M. Cloth and M. F. Kellogg (see note 8 below). The reader will also note that transliterated Greek is provided for certain terms. The macron (˘) is used to indicate the long vowels eta and omega in transliteration.
answered, That something was to be done;—and, that no pains hath been spared, to do it as well as possible.\(^5\)

B. G. Teubner Press has kindly granted me permission to use Karl Hude’s fine reading and compilation of the manuscripts as the basis of this translation.\(^6\) As is the case with most of the ancients, we do not have any single manuscript of the *Memorabilia* that we know to be perfect. Although many variations are not very important—spelling changes or evident omissions, for example—occasionally differences arise that may significantly alter the meaning of the text. When this occurs or when Hude adopts a later editorial correction of the manuscripts, I inform the reader in a footnote. The endnotes are of a more secondary nature, indicating alternate translations of words or passages, offering historical information, or providing references to other works for comparison.

Only I can be held responsible for the inevitable errors in what follows, but much that is worthwhile in it has been the result of consultation with others. This project was a collaborative effort with Christopher Bruell, who offered extensive guidance throughout and made substantial revisions to the draft. In addition, my work has benefited greatly from attending his seminars. I am also very much indebted to James Nendza for patiently correcting a number of errors, particularly in the early stages of the translation. I thank in addition Wayne Ambler, Robert Bartlett, and In Ha Jang, for suggesting many improvements; Michael Grenke and Joseph Lane for their research on the notes; Sandra MacDonald and Joanne Scibilia for their administrative advice and assistance; and Kay Scheuer and Marian Shotwell for ensuring the manuscript was in shape for publication. I am grateful also to Boston College and its Department of Political Science for sponsoring this project and extending me the use of their fine research and computer facilities, and to the Earhart Foundation for generous funding, which made the work possible.

Finally, I would like to point the reader to works I have found

\(^5\)Memoirs, vii.

\(^6\)Xenophontos Apomnēmoneumata (= Xenophontis Commentarii) (Stuttgart, 1934; reprint, 1985). Note that I do not follow Hude’s paragraphing; instead I begin a new paragraph with each numbered section. The manuscripts have no paragraph markings.
particularly useful in studying this text. Those who know some Greek may be assisted by J. R. Smith's annotated edition of the *Memorabilia*, C. M. Cloth and M. F. Kellogg's valuable index of words in the *Memorabilia*, and F. G. Sturz's impressive four-volume Latin lexicon to Xenophon (which may be helpful even to those without much knowledge of Latin for its cross-references to the rest of Xenophon's works). As I indicated above, Leo Strauss is responsible for reviving the study of Xenophon as a philosopher in this century, after a relatively brief period of neglect among scholars. He wrote two books dealing with Xenophon's Socratic writings: *Xenophon's Socrates* (treating the *Memorabilia*, *Symposium*, and Apology of Socrates) and *Xenophon's Socratic Discourse: An Interpretation of the "Oeconomicus."* Since these works themselves can be rather difficult, the assistance offered in Christopher Bruell's review "Strauss on Xenophon's Socrates" is indispensable. It can be of help also to read the books just mentioned in conjunction with Strauss's other work on Xenophon, including *On Tyranny: An Interpretation of Xenophon's Hiero* and "The Spirit of Sparta or the Taste of Xenophon," which is a particularly revealing piece on Xenophon's *Constitution of the Lacedaimonians*. Of additional interest are two posthumously published pieces: an article entitled "Xenophon's Anabasis," which provides valuable information on Xenophon's manner of writing, and a series of lectures on the "problem

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7 *Xenophon Memorabilia* (Boston, 1903; reprint, New York, 1979).
of Socrates,"16 treating the varying portraits of Socrates found in Aristophanes, Xenophon, and Plato. It is instructive to compare the approach taken in the latter with that of A. E. Taylor in his book Socrates.17 In addition, I should mention Bruell’s chapter introducing Xenophon as a political philosopher in the third edition of Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey’s History of Political Philosophy.18 Obviously, this is by no means a comprehensive list of the many fine scholarly works on Xenophon. For an extensive bibliography one may consult Donald R. Morrison’s Bibliography of Editions, Translations, and Commentary on Xenophon’s Socratic Writings, 1600–present.19 I offer merely what I have found to be a sound path on which to begin to appreciate this marvelous book, and fruitful places to return to along the way.

16 In The Rebirth of Classical Political Rationalism: An Introduction to the Thought of Leo Strauss, ed. Thomas Pangle (Chicago, 1989).
17 Socrates (Boston, 1951; reprint, Westport, 1975).
19 Bibliography of Editions, Translations, and Commentary on Xenophon’s Socratic Writings, 1600–present (Pittsburgh, 1988).
Xenophon
Memorabilia
[1] I often wondered by what possible speeches those who indicted Socrates persuaded the Athenians that he deserved death from the city. For the indictment against him was something like the following: Socrates commits an injustice by not believing in the gods in which the city believes and by bringing in new and different divine things (daimonia); he commits an injustice also by corrupting the young.

[2] To begin with, then, what possible evidence did they use to show that he did not believe in the gods in which the city believed? For he visibly sacrificed often at home and often at the common altars of the city; and it was not difficult to see him using divination. For it had been widely bandied about that Socrates said that the divine thing (to daimonion) gave him signs; and, in my opinion, it is especially for this reason that they accused him of bringing in new divine things (daimonia).

[3] But he brought in nothing newer than others who consult (chreisthai) birds of omen, sayings, portents, and sacrificial victims because they believe in divination. For seekers of divination suppose not that the birds or those they meet by chance know what

*Two of the manuscripts identify the author as "Xenophon the rhetorician" (Xenophontos rhetoros).
is advantageous for them, but that the gods signal what is advantageous through them; and Socrates held the same.

[4] However, while the majority say that they are both turned back and turned forward\textsuperscript{12} by the birds and by those they meet, Socrates spoke just as he judged, for he said that the divine thing (\textit{to daimonion}) gave him signs. And he told many of his companions to do some things and not to do others on the grounds that the divine thing (\textit{to daimonion}) had given a sign. And it was advantageous for those who obeyed\textsuperscript{13} him, while those who did not obey regretted it.

[5] And yet who would not agree that he wished to appear to his companions as neither a simpleton nor a boaster? But he would have been held by opinion to be both these things if it had been apparent that in fact he was lying when he told them that things appeared to him as though from a god. It is clear, then, that he would not have foretold these things unless he trusted that he was speaking the truth. But who would trust anyone in these matters other than a god? And trusting in gods, how could he hold that there are no gods?

[6] Moreover, he also did the following with regard to his friends.\textsuperscript{14} He advised regarding the necessary things that they also act as he held best. But concerning things whose outcomes were not clear, he sent them to seek divination about whether they should be done.\textsuperscript{15}

[7] And he said that those intending to manage households and cities nobly\textsuperscript{16} are in need of divination in addition. For, with regard to becoming skillful as a builder, a smith, a farmer, a ruler of human beings, a reviewer of such work,\textsuperscript{17} an arithmetician, a household manager, or a general, he held that things of this sort are all matters of learning and attainable by means of human judgment.

[8] But what is most important in these things, he said that the gods reserve for themselves—and none of these things is clear to human beings. For, to the one who has nobly planted a field, it is not clear who will reap from it; nor to the one who has nobly built a house is it clear who will inhabit it; nor to the skilled general is it clear whether to lead the army is to his advantage; nor to the skilled statesman\textsuperscript{18} is it clear whether to preside over the city is to his advantage; nor to the one marrying a beautiful\textsuperscript{19} woman in or-
der to be happy is it clear whether he will be grieved because of her; nor to the one who has obtained by marriage relatives who are powerful in the city is it clear whether he will be deprived of his city because of them.

[9] And he said that those who think that there is nothing divine (daimonion) in matters of this sort and that they are wholly within the realm of human judgment are crazy (daimonan). And he said that those are crazy also who consult divination concerning matters the gods gave to human beings to decide by learning—for example, if one should inquire into whether it is better to take on a chariot someone who understands or does not understand how to drive, or whether better to take on a ship someone who understands or does not understand how to pilot, or into things that can be known by counting, measuring, or weighing. He believed that those who seek to ascertain such things from the gods do what is unlawful. And he said that what the gods permit to be done by those who have learned, one should learn, but that what is not clear to human beings one should try to ascertain from the gods through divination, for the gods give signs to those toward whom they are gracious.

[10] Moreover, he was always visible. For in the early morning he used to go on walks and to the gymnasia, and when the agora was full he was visible there, and for the remainder of the day he was always where he might be with the most people. And he spoke for the majority of the time, and it was possible for anyone who wished to hear him.

[11] But no one ever saw Socrates doing, or heard him saying, anything impious or unholy. For he did not converse about the nature of all things in the way most of the others did—examining what the sophists call the cosmos; how it is, and which necessities are responsible for the coming to be of each of the heavenly things. But he even showed that those who worry about things of this sort are foolish.

[12] First, he examined whether they came to worry about such matters because they held that they already knew the human things

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5In place of echei, "how it is," two of the manuscripts have the alternate reading ephu, "how it arose," "how it grew," or "how it is by nature."
sufficiently, or whether they believed that they were acting properly in disregarding the human things and in examining the divine things (daimonia).

[13] And he wondered whether it was not visible to them that it is impossible for human beings to find these things out, since he thought that even those who most pride themselves on speaking about them do not hold the same opinions as one another but are disposed toward one another like madmen.

[14] For, among madmen, some have no terror even of what is terrible, while others are frightened even by what is not frightening; and some are of the opinion that it is not shameful to do or say anything whatsoever, even in a crowd, while others are of the opinion that one should not even go out among human beings; and some honor neither temple nor altar nor any other divine thing (theios), while others behave piously toward even rocks and chance pieces of wood and beasts; and, among those who are anxious about the nature of all things, some are of the opinion that being is one thing only, and others that it is an infinite multitude; and some that everything is always moving, and others that nothing ever moves; and some that everything comes to be and perishes, and others that nothing ever comes to be or perishes.

[15] And he examined also the following about them. Just as those who learn human matters believe that they will do what they learn both for themselves and for anyone else they wish, so, too, those who seek out the divine things (ta theia) hold that after they understand the necessities responsible for each thing coming to be they will make winds, rains, seasons, and anything else of the sort they need whenever they wish. Or they do not even hope for such a thing, but it is enough for them merely to understand in what way each of the things of this sort comes to be.

[16] These, then, are the sorts of things he said concerning those who involved themselves in such matters. But he himself was always conversing about human things—examining what is pious, what is impious, what is noble, what is shameful, what is just, what is unjust, what is moderation, what is madness, what is courage, what is cowardice, what is a city, what is a statesman, what is rule over human beings, what is a skilled ruler over human beings, as well as about the other things, knowledge of which he believed
makes one a gentleman (noble and good),32 while those who are ignorant of them would justly be called slavish.

[17] Now, in the sphere of things in which it was not visible how he thought, it is no wonder that the jurors erred in judging him. But isn’t it a wonder that they didn’t take to heart what everyone knew?

[18] He once presided in the demos,33 having become a member of the Council34 and having sworn the councilors’ oath, which contains “giving counsel according to the laws.”35 At that time the demos desired to put to death all nine generals—Thrasyllus and Eras pinides and those with them—with one vote, contrary to the laws.36 He did not want to put the question to vote, although the demos grew angry with him and many powerful individuals threatened him as well. But he thought more highly of keeping his oath than of gratifying the demos contrary to what was just and protecting himself against those who threatened him.37

[19] For in fact he held that the gods attend to human beings not in the way that the many38 held. For they think that the gods know some things and do not know others. But Socrates believed that the gods know all things—what is said, what is done, and what is silently deliberated—and that they are present everywhere and give signs to human beings about all human matters.

[20] And so I wonder at how the Athenians were ever persuaded that Socrates was not moderate concerning the gods, since not once did he say or do anything impious concerning the gods, but he said and did regarding the gods the sorts of things that if someone were to say or do them he would be and be held to be most pious.

~ Chapter 2 ~

[1] It appears to me a wonder also that some were persuaded that Socrates corrupted the young. To begin with, in addition to what has been said, he was the most continent39 of all human
beings in matters of sex and appetite. Then, he had the greatest endurance with regard to winter, summer, and all labors. Moreover, he had educated himself to have such measured needs that, although he possessed very little, he quite easily had what was enough for him.

[2] How, then, being himself of this sort, would he have made others impious, lawbreaking, gluttonous, incontinent with regard to sex, or soft with regard to labor? Instead, he rid many individuals of these things, after making them desire virtue and providing them with hopes that if they attended to themselves they would be gentlemen (noble and good).

[3] And yet, he never promised at any time to be a teacher of this. But by visibly being so himself, he made those who spent time with him hope that by imitating him they would come to be of the same sort.

[4] Furthermore, he did not himself neglect his body or praise those who did. He disapproved of excessively working out after overeating, but approved of sufficiently working off as much as the soul received with pleasure. For he said that this state was sufficient for health and did not hinder attending to one's soul.

[5] Moreover, he certainly was neither fussy nor boastful, whether about clothing, shoes, or any other way of life. Nor did he make his companions lovers of wealth. For he rid them of the other desires, on the one hand; and on the other, he did not demand wealth from those who desired him.

[6] He held that, in refraining from this, he was attending to his freedom. And he called those who take pay for their association enslavers of themselves, because of its being necessary that they converse with those from whom they took their pay.

[7] He marveled if someone professing to teach virtue would demand money and not hold it the greatest gain to have acquired a good friend, but would be afraid that one who had become a gentleman (noble and good) would not show the greatest gratitude toward one who had done him the greatest good deeds.

[8] Now Socrates never professed to teach anything of the sort to anyone. But he trusted that those of his companions who were receptive to what he himself approved of would be good friends to him and to one another for their whole life. How, then, could
such a man corrupt the youth? Unless, that is, attending to virtue is corruption.

[9] "But, by Zeus," the accuser said, "he made his companions look down on the established laws, by saying that it is foolish for the rulers of the city to be established in office by lot," when nobody would want to use a pilot chosen by lot or a builder or a flutist or anyone for any other task of the sort, although far less harm is caused when mistakes are made in them than when they are made concerning the city." He said that speeches of this sort induced the young to have contempt for the established regime and made them violent.

[10] I, for my part, think that those who train themselves in good sense and hold that they will be competent to teach the citizens what is advantageous are least likely to become violent, since they know that enmities and risks attend the use of violence, while through persuasion the same results come about without risk and with friendship. For those treated violently hate as though they have been robbed, but those persuaded are friendly as though they have been gratified. Violence, accordingly, does not come from those who train themselves in good sense. Instead such practices belong to those who have strength without judgment.

[11] Furthermore, one who dares to use violence would need no few allies, but one who is able to persuade needs no one. For even when alone he would believe himself able to persuade. And it least of all happens that such people resort to murder. For who would wish to kill rather than to deal with (chrēsthai) someone alive and obedient?

[12] "But," said the accuser, "after they became Socrates' associates, Critias and Alcibiades harmed the city the most. For Critias was the most thievish, violent, and murderous of all in the oligarchy, and Alcibiades the most incontinent, insolent, and violent of all in the democracy."

[13] If those two harmed the city in some way, I, for my part,
will not defend them. But I will describe how their companionship with Socrates was.

[14] For these two men were by nature the most honor-loving of all the Athenians. They wished that all affairs might be conducted through themselves and that they might become the most renowned of all. They knew that Socrates lived in a most self-sufficient manner on the least amount of wealth, was most continent in regard to all the pleasures, and in arguments dealt (chresthai) as he wished with all who conversed with him.

[15] Since these two saw these things and were of the sort I mentioned before, would anyone say that they yearned for his association because they desired the life of Socrates and the moderation that he had, or because they held that if they associated with him they would become most competent in speech and action?

[16] For my part, I believe that if a god had offered them either to live their whole life just as they saw Socrates live, or to die, these two would have chosen rather to die. And they made this clear by their actions. For as soon as these two believed themselves superior to their companions, they immediately bolted from Socrates and engaged in political affairs, which was precisely the reason they had yearned for Socrates.

[17] Now perhaps someone might say in response that Socrates should not have taught his companions political affairs before he taught them to be moderate. I, for my part, do not deny this. But I see that all teachers both show themselves to students—how they themselves do what they teach—and convince them by speeches.

[18] I know that Socrates too showed himself to his companions to be a gentleman (noble and good) and that he conversed most nobly about virtue and the other human things. And I know that these two also were moderate as long as they were companions of Socrates—not because they were afraid they would be penalized or beaten by Socrates, but because they thought at the time that this was the superior way to act.

[19] Now perhaps many of those who claim to philosophize would say that one who is just would never become unjust, nor would the moderate one become insolent, nor would anyone who had learned anything else that can be learned ever lose that knowledge. But I, for my part, do not reach the same judgment about
these matters. For I see that, just as those who do not train the body are unable to do bodily work, so also those who do not train the soul are unable to do the work of the soul. For they are able neither to do what they should nor to refrain from what they should.

[20] Indeed this is why fathers, even if their sons are moderate, nevertheless keep them away from wicked human beings, as if association with the good is training in virtue, while association with the wicked is its destruction. There is witness for this also among the poets, one of whom says, "You will learn noble\textsuperscript{59} things from those who are noble; but if you mingle with those who are bad, you will utterly destroy even the intelligence that you have,"\textsuperscript{60} and another says, "Yet a good man is bad sometimes and noble at other times."\textsuperscript{61}

[21] I, too, am a witness to these things. For I see that, just as those who do not practice forget verses composed in meter, so also forgetfulness occurs in those neglecting the speeches that teach. And when someone forgets the speeches that admonish, he has forgotten also what the soul experienced when it desired moderation. As he has forgotten this, it is no wonder that he forgets moderation as well.

[22] I see also that those who have been drawn to the love of drink and those who have become involved in love affairs are less able to attend to what they should and to refrain from what they should. For many—even those who are able to be sparing with wealth before they fall in love—are no longer able once they have fallen in love. And once they have lavishly spent their wealth they no longer refrain from gains they used to refrain from because they held them to be shameful.

[23] Why, then, could not one who was previously moderate be again immoderate, and one previously able to do just things be again unable?\textsuperscript{62} For in my opinion, at least, all things that are both noble and good are matters of training, and not least of all moderation. For the pleasures growing in the same body together with the soul persuade the soul not to be moderate but instead to gratify themselves and the body as quickly as possible.

[24] Both Critias and Alcibiades, while they kept company with Socrates, were able to overpower their ignoble desires by using him as an ally. But when the two were free of him, Critias, after he went
into exile in Thessaly, kept company there with human beings who dealt in (chresthai) lawlessness rather than justice. Alcibiades, in turn—who, because of his beauty, was hunted by many stately women and, because of his power in the city and among the allies, was pampered by many human beings who were able to flatter, as well as honored by the demos, with whom he easily held the first place—neglected himself, just as athletes in gymnastic contests who easily win first place neglect their training.

[25] Things of this sort befell these two, and they were also inflated because of their birth, conceited due to being rich, puffed-up by power, and fussed-over by many human beings; and, having been corrupted by all these things, they were also away from Socrates for a long time. Why is it a wonder if they became arrogant?

[26] If the two of them struck false notes in some way, then, the accuser blames Socrates for this; but does Socrates deserve no praise in the accuser's opinion for the fact that when they were young and likely to be most lacking in judgment and continence he rendered them moderate?

[27] Surely other matters are not decided in this manner. For what master of the flute or master of the cithara or other teacher who has made his students competent is blamed if they appear worse after they have gone to others? And what father, if his son is moderate when he spends time with one person but later becomes wicked when he is in the company of another, blames the first? Does he not rather praise the first all the more insofar as his son appears worse when he is with the second? But fathers themselves are companions of their sons, and they are not blamed when their sons strike false notes if they themselves are moderate.

[28] It would have been just to decide likewise about Socrates too. If he himself were to do something low, he would have been suitably held by opinion to be wicked. But if he himself were continually moderate, how could he justly be blamed for the badness that was not in him?

[29] Moreover, even if he himself were to do nothing wicked but were to praise those whom he saw taking low actions, he would have been justly censured. Now then, when he perceived that Critias was in love with Euthydemus and was attempting to use (chresthai) him the way those do who enjoy bodies for sex, he tried
to deter\textsuperscript{72} [him] from this by claiming that it is illiberal and unbecoming for a man who is a gentleman (noble and good) to beseech his beloved—to whom he wishes to appear very worthy—in the manner of beggars, acting the suppliant and begging that he grant things that are also not at all good.

[30] Since Critias did not listen to things of this sort and was not deterred, it is said that Socrates said—with many others present as well as Euthydemus—that in his opinion Critias had a swinish passion in desiring to move against Euthydemus like piglets against stones.

[31] As a consequence Critias also hated Socrates, so that he still bore it in mind against\textsuperscript{73} him when as a member of the Thirty he became legislator along with Charicles;\textsuperscript{74} and he wrote into the laws that one is not to teach an art of speeches,\textsuperscript{75} threatening him and not having any way to attack him, but bringing to bear against him what the many censure the philosophers collectively for and slandering him before the many.\textsuperscript{76} For I myself never heard this from Socrates; nor did I perceive anyone else who claimed that he heard it.

[32] But the matter became clear. For when the Thirty were killing many citizens—and not the worst of them—and turning many to the commission of injustice, Socrates said somewhere that it would be a wonder, in his opinion, if someone who became a herdsman over a herd of cattle and made the cattle fewer and worse didn’t agree that he was a bad cattle-tender, and still more a wonder if someone who presided over a city and made the citizens fewer and worse were not ashamed and didn’t think himself a bad president over the city.

[33] When this was reported to them, Critias and Charicles called Socrates, showed him the law, and forbade him to converse with the young. Socrates asked the two of them whether inquiries were permitted if he was in some way ignorant about the orders given. The two of them said that they were.

[34] “Then, for my part,” he said, “I am prepared to obey the laws. But so that I don’t inadvertently break the law in some way out of ignorance, I wish to learn clearly from you whether, when you bid that one refrain from the art of speeches, you do so holding that this art goes with what is spoken correctly or with what is spoken incorrectly. For if it goes with what is spoken correctly, it
is clear that one must refrain from speaking correctly. But if it goes with what is spoken incorrectly, it is clear that one must attempt to speak correctly."

[35] And Charicles, becoming angry with him, said, "Socrates, since you are ignorant, we give you the following orders that are easier to learn: don’t converse with the young at all!"

And Socrates said, "Now then, lest there be any ambiguity as to whether I am doing something other than the orders given, define for me up to what age one should hold that human beings are young."

And Charicles said, "For as long as they are not permitted to be members of the Council on the grounds that they are not yet sensible. So don’t you converse with those younger than thirty years!"

[36] "If I am buying something," he said, "and the seller is less than thirty, may I not ask how much he is selling it for?"

"Yes, this sort of thing," said Charicles, "but in fact, you, Socrates, are accustomed to ask questions most of whose answers you know. So these you are not to ask."

"And should I also then not answer," he said, "if some youth should ask me whether I know, for example, where Charicles lives, or where Critias is?"

Charicles said, "This sort of thing, yes."

[37] But Critias said, "However, you will have to refrain, Socrates, from the following: from shoemakers, builders, and smiths; indeed I think that they are already worn out from being bandied about by you."

"Then," said Socrates, "should I not also refrain from what follows upon these—both the just and the holy and the other things of this sort?"

"Yes, by Zeus," said Charicles, "and from herdsmen! Or else be on your guard that you, too, do not make the cattle fewer."

[38] And from this it became clear that they were angry with Socrates because his speech about the cattle had been reported to them.

So the sort of companionship Critias had with Socrates and how they were disposed toward each other has thus been told.

[39] For my part, I would say that no one receives any education from someone who does not please him. Critias and Alcibiades did
not associate with Socrates—for as long as they did associate with
him—because he pleased the two of them. But right from the start
the two of them had set out to preside over the city. For even while
they were still companions of Socrates they did not attempt to con-
verse with any others more than with those most deeply engaged
in political affairs.

[40] For it is said that before Alcibiades was twenty years of
age he had the following sort of conversation about laws with
Pericles, who was his guardian as well as the one presiding over
the city.

[41] "Tell me, Pericles," he said, "would you be able to teach
me what law is?"

"By all means," said Pericles.

"By the gods, teach it then," said Alcibiades, "for when I hear
certain ones praised as law-abiding men, I think that someone who
does not know what law is would not justly obtain this praise."

[42] "But you do not desire anything hard, Alcibiades, in wishing
to know what law is," said Pericles. "For all things are laws
that the assembled multitude has approved and written, pointing
out what should and should not be done."

"Do they hold that one should do good things or bad things?"

"The good, by Zeus, lad," he said, "and not the bad."

[43] "What if it is not the multitude, but the assembled few who
write what one should do, as is the case wherever there is oligar-
chy? What is this?"

"Everything," he said, "is called law that the overpowering part
of the city, upon deliberation, writes that one should do."

"So even if a tyrant who overpowers the city writes for the citi-
zens what they should do—this too is law?"

"Even what the ruling tyrant writes," he said, "this too is called
law."

[44] "But what is violence and lawlessness, Pericles?" he said.
"Is it not when one who is stronger compels one who is weaker—
not by persuasion but by the use of violence—to do whatever is in
his opinion best?"

"In my opinion, at least," said Pericles.

"And whatever the tyrant writes and compels the citizens to do
without persuading them—this is lawlessness?"
"In my opinion," said Pericles. "For I take back what I said about what the tyrant writes without persuasion being law."

[45] "And what the few write, without persuading the many but overpowering them, shall we say that this is violence or shall we not say it?"

"Everything, in my opinion," said Pericles, "that one compels someone to do without persuading him, whether he writes it or not, is violence rather than law."

"And whatever the whole multitude writes without persuasion, when it overpowers those having wealth, would be violence rather than law?"

[46] "Alcibiades," said Pericles, "we too were quite clever indeed at things of this sort when we were your age. For we too practiced such things and made precisely the sort of sophisticated arguments that you, in my opinion, are now practicing."

And Alcibiades said, "Would that I could have been your companion at that time, Pericles, when you were at your cleverest."

[47] As soon as they supposed themselves to be superior to the other citizens, they no longer came to Socrates. For he did not please them anyway; and if they did come to him they were annoyed by being refuted regarding their errors. Rather, they became engaged in the city's affairs, which was why they had in fact come to Socrates.

[48] However, Crito was an associate of Socrates, as were Chairephon, Chairecrates, Hermogenes, Simmias, Cebes, Phaidondas, and others who kept company with him, not in order to become public speakers or lawyers, but in order that, by becoming gentlemen (noble and good), they might be able to deal with (chrēsthai) their household, domestic servants, relatives, friends, city, and citizens, in a noble manner. And none of these, either when young or old, did anything bad or received blame.

[49] "But," said the accuser, "Socrates taught his companions to abuse their fathers by persuading them that he made them wiser than their fathers, and by claiming that by law someone who has

1Following the reading in two manuscripts, the translation departs from Hude by leaving out the phrase "in these matters," which modifies "cleverest" in the other manuscripts.
convicted him of insanity is permitted to hold even his father in bonds, using this as evidence that it would be lawful for one who is more ignorant to be held in bonds by one who is wiser.'

[50] Socrates thought that someone who holds another in bonds on account of ignorance would also himself justly be held in bonds by those who understand what he himself does not. And for such reasons he often examined how ignorance differs from madness. And as for the mad, he thought that it would be an advantage, both to themselves and to their friends, for them to be held in bonds; and as for those who don't understand what they should, it would be just for them to learn from those who do understand.

[51] "But," said the accuser, "Socrates caused not only fathers but also other relatives to be in dishonor among his companions, saying that it is not relatives who benefit those who are ill or on trial, but the physicians in the one case and those who understand how to plead a case at trial in the other."

[52] The [accuser] said that he said, also regarding friends, that it is of no benefit that they be well intentioned unless they will also be able to benefit; that he claimed the only ones deserving of honor are those who know what they should and are able to explain it; and that, by persuading the young that he himself was the wisest and most competent to make others wise, he so disposed his companions that in their eyes the rest were nothing compared to him.

[53] I, for my part, know that he in fact said these things about fathers and other relatives and friends. In addition, he said that when the soul (the only thing in which good sense comes to be) departs from the body of the human being most closely related to them, they remove and carry the body off as quickly as possible.

[54] And he said that, even while each person is alive, he himself removes and permits another to remove from his own body (which is what he loves most of all) whatever is useless and of no benefit. At least they remove their own nails and hair and calluses. And they permit the physicians to remove these things by cutting and burning accompanied by labor and pain; they even think that they should thank and pay them for it. They also spit saliva from their mouths as far away as they can, because when it is in them it does them no benefit but, much to the contrary, harm.

[55] He said these things, then, not to teach one to bury one's
father while still alive or to cut oneself up in pieces. But by dis­playing that what lacks sense lacks honor, he urged attentiveness to being as sensible and beneficial as possible, so that if someone wished to be honored—whether by a father, brother, or by anyone else—he would not neglect them, in reliance on the fact that he was related to them, but attempt to be beneficial to those by whom he wished to be honored.

[56] The accuser said that he also would pick out the most wicked passages from the poets held in the highest opinion and, using them as witnesses, teach his companions to do be doers of mischief and skilled at tyranny—such as the verse from Hesiod “No work is disgraceful, but idleness is disgraceful.” According to the accuser he said that in this the poet bids one to refrain from no work, however unjust or shameful, but to do even these for gain.

[57] But since Socrates thoroughly agreed that being a worker is both beneficial for a human being and good, and that being an idler is harmful and bad, and that working is good and idleness bad, he said that those who do something good both work and are good workers, but those who play dice or do something else wicked and unprofitable he called idlers. Seen in this light, the verse “No work is disgraceful, but idleness is disgraceful” would be correct.

[58] And the accuser said that he often recited the passage from Homer about Odysseus:

If he should meet with some king and an outstanding man, standing beside him he restrained him with gentle words: “Amazing fellow (daimonie), it is not fitting for you to be afraid as if you were a coward, but you yourself be seated and seat the rest of the people.” But if he saw a man who was one of the demos and found him shouting, he struck him with his scepter and upbraided him by word: “Amazing fellow (daimonie), sit still and listen to the words of others who are your betters. You are unfit for war and feeble, never of any account either in war or in council.”

And the accuser said that he explained these verses as meaning that the poet praised the beating of members of the demos and the poor.
[59] But that is not what Socrates meant: for [if he had] he would have thought also that he himself must be beaten. Instead he said that the ones who should be checked by every means, even if they happen to be very rich, are those who are not beneficial either in speech or in deed, nor competent to bring aid if it should be needed either to army or to city or even to the demos itself—especially if they are even bold in addition.

[60] However, Socrates was visibly the opposite of these things, since he was both well disposed toward the demos and a lover of human beings. For though he had many who desired him, both fellow countrymen and foreigners, he never demanded any pay for his company but ungrudgingly assisted all from what he had. Some of them, after taking a small portion from him for free, sold it to others for a great sum and were not well disposed to the demos as he was, for they did not want to converse with those who had no wealth to give.

[61] But, as for Socrates, he furnished the city adornment vis-à-vis the rest of human beings far more than Lichas (who is renowned in this regard) did for the city of the Lacedaimonians. For while Lichas had dinner parties for strangers who were staying in Lacedaemonia during the festival of the Gymnopaedia, Socrates throughout all of his life spent his own possessions benefiting all those who wished in the most important matters. For he sent his companions away after rendering them better.

[62] In my opinion, Socrates—since this was the sort he was—deserved honor from the city rather than death. One would find this out by examining the matter also according to the laws. For, according to the laws, the penalty is death if someone is visibly stealing or taking clothes or purse-snatching or breaking into a home or selling free people into slavery or robbing temples. But he above all human beings refrained from these things.

[63] Moreover, he was never the cause of a war ending badly or of civil strife or of treason or of any other bad thing for the city.

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8 One manuscript has "benefiting those who wished in all the most important matters" instead of "benefiting all those who wished in the most important matters." "In the most important matters" (ta megista) might also be translated as "to the greatest extent."
Nor, in private life, did he ever deprive any human being of goods or involve anyone in bad things. Rather, no one ever even accused him of the things mentioned.

[64] How, then, could he be subject to the indictment? Instead of not believing in the gods, as was charged in the indictment, he was visibly serving the gods more than the other human beings were. And instead of corrupting the young, as the one who brought the indictment accused him, he was visibly ridding his companions of desires when they had wicked ones, and turning them toward desiring the noblest and most magnificent virtue, that by which both cities and households are well managed. And since this is what he did, how is it that he did not deserve great honor from the city?

~ Chapter 3 ~

[1] I shall now write down as much as I recall of how in fact, in my opinion, he used to benefit his companions, partly by showing himself in deed as the sort of person he himself was, and partly by conversing also. On the one hand, then, with regard to the gods, he was visible acting and speaking just as the Pythia\(^2\) tells those who ask how they should behave concerning sacrifices or paying service to ancestors or anything else of the sort. For the Pythia replies that they would behave piously by behaving in accordance with the law of the city. And Socrates himself both behaved in this way and so advised the others; and he held that those behaving in some other way were working to no purpose and frivolous.

[2] And he used to pray to the gods that they give him the simply\(^3\) good things, on the grounds that the gods have the noblest knowledge about what sort of things are good. And he held that those who pray for gold or silver or tyranny or anything else of the sort pray no differently than\(^4\) if they should pray for a game of dice, a battle, or any of the other things as to which it is visibly unclear how they will turn out.
He did not believe that, by performing small sacrifices from his small possessions, he fell short of those performing many and large sacrifices from their many and large possessions. For he said that for the gods, too, it would not be noble if they were gratified more by the large sacrifices than by the small ones—for what gratified them would frequently be what came from the wicked rather than from the good; and life would not be worth living for human beings if what came from the wicked were more gratifying to the gods than what came from the good. Rather, he held that the gods are most gratified by the honors from those who are most pious. And he praised also this verse: "According to one's capacity offer sacrifices to the immortal gods." Also regarding friends and foreigners and one's way of life generally, he said that "to act according to one's capacity" is noble advice.

If he was of the opinion that he received some sign from the gods, he could no more be persuaded to act contrary to the signs than if someone should persuade him to take a blind guide who did not know the way on a trip instead of one who could see and did know the way. And he denounced the folly of others who did something contrary to the signs from the gods because they were on their guard against losing their reputation among human beings. He himself looked down on everything human in comparison to counsel from the gods.

He educated both his soul and his body in a regimen such that one using it would live confidently and securely and would not lack resources regarding the expense it required—unless there were some divine intervention (daimonion). For he was so frugal that I do not know if anyone could work so little as not to take in what was enough for Socrates. For he used as much food as he could eat with pleasure, and he came to it so prepared that his desire was the relish for his food. And every drink was pleasant to him because he did not drink unless he was thirsty.

And if he ever wanted to go to dinner when he had been invited, he quite easily guarded against what for most takes the

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*One manuscript has "when he himself could see and knew the way" (autou blepontos kai eidotos) rather than "instead of one who could see and did know the way" (anti blepontos kai eidotos)."
most work: guarding against filling oneself beyond satiety. And he advised those unable to do this to be on their guard against things that persuade one to eat when not hungry and drink when not thirsty. For, in fact, he said that these are the things that ruin stomachs, heads, and souls.

[7] He said jokingly that he thought that Circe too made [men into] pigs by entertaining [them] with many such things at dinner; and that Odysseus was spared becoming a pig due to Hermes' warning, as well as to his own continence and his refraining from touching things of this sort when he was satiated.

[8] These were the sorts of things he used to say with a playfulness accompanied by seriousness. On the other hand, he advised that one steadfastly refrain from sex with those who are beautiful. For he said that it is not easy when one touches these sorts to be moderate. In fact, after he perceived once that Critobulus the son of Crito had kissed the beautiful son of Alcibiades, he asked Xenophon in Critobulus' presence:

[9] "Tell me, Xenophon," he said, "didn't you hold Critobulus to be one of the moderate rather than the rash human beings, and one of those with forethought rather than senseless and reckless?"

"Certainly," said Xenophon.

"Well, hold now that he is hotheaded and heedless in the extreme. He would even make somersaults into daggers and leap into fire."

[10] "And what did you see him doing," said Xenophon, "that you have formed such judgments about him?"

"Did he not dare to kiss the son of Alcibiades, who is most fair and in his bloom?" he said.

"But if that is the reckless deed," said Xenophon, "in my opinion, I, too, would endure this risk."

[11] "You wretch!" Socrates said. "And what do you think you would suffer after kissing someone beautiful? Would you not immediately be a slave rather than free, spend a lot for harmful pleasures, be in great want of leisure for attending to anything noble and good, and be compelled to take seriously what even a madman would not take seriously?"

[12] "Heracles!" said Xenophon. "What a terrible power you ascribe to a kiss."

"And do you wonder at this?" said Socrates. "Don't you know
that poisonous spiders not even half an obol in size crush human beings with pain and drive them from their senses merely by touching them with their mouths?"

"Yes, by Zeus!" said Xenophon. "For spiders inject something through their sting."

[13] "You fool!" said Socrates. "Do you think that when those who are beautiful kiss they don’t inject anything, just because you don’t see it? Don’t you know that this beast that they call beautiful and in bloom is so much more terrible than spiders that, while spiders inject something when they touch, it (even when it does not touch, but if one just looks at it) injects even from quite far away something of the sort to drive one mad? And perhaps ‘loves’ are called ‘archers’ because those who are beautiful inflict wounds even from afar. But I counsel you, Xenophon, whenever you see someone beautiful, to flee without looking back. And I counsel you, Critobulus, to go into exile for a year. For perhaps in that length of time your sting might just barely heal."

[14] So indeed he also thought that those who were not out of danger regarding sex ought to have sex with the sort whom the soul would not accept unless the body were in great need, and who would provide no trouble when it was in need. But, with regard to these matters, he himself was visibly so prepared as to refrain more easily from those who are most beautiful and most in bloom than do others from those who are most ugly and most out of bloom.

[15] Concerning, then, meat and drink and sex, he was equipped in this way, and he thought that he would have no less sufficient pleasure and far less pain than those who involved themselves greatly in these matters.

~ Chapter 4 ~

[1] If any, making a judgment on the basis of what some people write and say about him, hold that Socrates was best at turning human beings toward virtue but incompetent to lead them to it,
let them test whether he was competent to make his companions better after they examine not only what he asked in refuting those who thought they knew everything, in order to chasten them, but also what he passed his day saying to those who spent their time with him.

[2] I shall say first what I heard him say once when he was conversing about the divine (to daimonion) with Aristodemus, nick-named "the Small." Upon observing that the latter neither sacrificed to the gods when he was not engaged in a battle, nor consulted (chresthai) divination, but even ridiculed those who did these things, he said, "Tell me, Aristodemus, are there any human beings you admire for wisdom?"

"Certainly," he said.

[3] And he said, "Tell us their names."

"Well, for epic poetry it is Homer whom I especially admire, for dithyrambs, Melanippides, for tragedy, Sophocles, for sculpture, Polycleitus, and for painting, Zeuxis."

[4] "Who, in your opinion, is more deserving of admiration, makers of senseless and motionless images or makers of animals with sense and activity?"

"Far more, by Zeus, makers of animals, if indeed these come to be not in some chance way, but by design."

"As between things the purpose of whose existence is obscure and things whose existence is visibly beneficial, which do you decide to be works of chance and which of design?"

"It is fitting that the things whose coming into being is beneficial are works of design."

[5] "So then, does it seem to you that the one who made human beings from the beginning included for their benefit the means by which they have each of the perceptions: eyes so that they can see what can be seen, and ears so that they can hear what can be heard. Moreover, of what benefit would smells have been to us unless noses were included? And what perception would there have been?

¹Hude questions "when he was not engaged in a battle." It is deleted in one manuscript and replaced in some others by "when he was contriving."

²The translation here interprets oukoun to mean "so then, does it seem," as do the manuscripts, rather than following Hude's "doesn't it seem to you, then." The difference depends on speculation as to the placement of an accent mark.
of sweet and sharp and all the pleasures of taste, unless the tongue
had been put in as a judge of these things?

[6] "In addition to these things, don't the following also resem­
ble in your opinion works of forethought: that sight, since it is
weak, is gated by eyelids, which are thrown open whenever there
is any need to use sight but closed shut during sleep; that eyelashes
have been implanted as strainers so that winds cause no harm, and
that eyebrows jut out like a cornice over the eyes so that sweat
from the head does no ill; that our hearing receives all sounds with­
out ever being filled up; that the front teeth of all animals are such
as to cut and the molars are such as to grind what is received from
the front teeth; that the mouth through which animals bring in
what they desire is positioned near the eyes and noses, but, since
what is passed off is disagreeable, its paths are diverted, and it is
carried away as far as possible from the senses. Are you perplexed
as to whether these things, which have been made with such fore­
thought, are works of chance or design?"

[7] "No, by Zeus," he said, "but when one examines them in
this way at least these things very much resemble the contrivance
of some wise craftsman who loves animals."

"And what about implanting an erotic desire110 for begetting off­
spring, an erotic desire for rearing them up in the females who
bring them forth, and a very great longing for life and a very great
fear of death in those who are reared?"

"By all means,111 these too resemble contrivances of someone
who planned that animals exist."

[8] "And do you, in your own opinion, have some sense?"
"If you ask a question, at any rate, I will answer."
"Do you think that no sensible being exists anywhere else? And
that, even though you know that the composition of your body has
grasped a small portion of the great amount of earth that exists,
and a little bit of the great amount of water that exists, and that
your body no doubt has been composed with you containing a
small portion of each of the other great things. Are you, then, of
the opinion that intelligence alone exists nowhere and that you by
some good chance seized hold of it, while—as you think—those
surpassingly large and infinitely numerous things are in such an
orderly condition through some senselessness?"
"By Zeus, for I do not see those in authority, as I see the craftsmen of what comes to be here."

"Nor do you see your own soul, which is in authority over your body: so that, in this way, at least, it is possible for you to say that you do nothing by design but everything by chance."

And Aristodemus said, "I, for my part, Socrates, do not look down upon the divine (to daimonion), but I believe that it is too magnificent to need my service in addition."

"Accordingly," he said, "the more magnificent a thing is that deems it worthwhile to serve you, so much the more should it be honored."

"Know well," he said, "that, if I held that gods worried at all about human beings, I would not neglect them."

"Why then, don't you think that they do worry? To begin with, of all the animals, it is only human beings that they made stand upright. And upright posture makes one able to see more before one, gaze more at the things above, and suffer less that is bad. And they implanted sight, hearing, and a mouth. And then, while they gave feet to the other animals who walk, these permit them only to travel; on human beings they also included hands, which produce most of those things whereby we are happier than they.

Moreover, although all animals have a tongue, they made only the tongue of human beings such as to articulate the voice, by touching the mouth now here and now there, and to signal to one another all that we wish. And, in addition, what about their giving sexual pleasures that are limited to a certain time of year for the other animals, while they provide these to us continually up until old age?

Nor was it enough for the god to attend only to the body, but—and this is the greatest thing—the soul he implanted by nature in human beings was also the best. For, to begin with, what other animal's soul perceives the existence of gods, who put in order the greatest and noblest things? What tribe other than human beings serves gods? What sort of soul is more adequate than the human to guard against hunger or thirst or cold or heat or to aid against sickness or to train so as to increase strength or to labor with a view to learning or more adequate to remember what one hears or sees or learns?
"For is it not very clear to you that human beings live their lives like gods in comparison to the other animals, since by nature they are best both in their body and in their soul? For someone having the body of a cow and the judgment of a human being would not be able to do what he wished. Nor would beings possessing hands but lacking prudence derive any advantage. But you don't think that the gods attend to you, even though you have obtained both of these most valuable things? But what will they have to do, so that you will hold that they worry about you?"

"When they send—as you say that they send to you—counselors regarding what one should and should not do."

"When," he said, "they indicate something to the Athenians who make inquiries through divination, aren't you of the opinion that they are making indications to you as well; or when they give signs by sending marvels to the Greeks, or to all human beings? Or do they select out only you and put you aside in neglect?

"Do you think that the gods would have implanted in human beings the opinion that they are competent to do good and bad, if they were unable to do it; and that human beings, deceived the whole time, would never have perceived this? Don't you see that the most ancient and the wisest of human things—cities and nations—are the most pious toward the gods, and that the most sensible ages in life are the most attentive to the gods?

"My good fellow," he said, "observe that even the intelligence existing in you manages your body as it wishes. You, then, should think also that the sense in everything arranges all the things as is pleasing to itself, and not that your eye is able to reach over many stadia, but that the eye of the god is unable to see everything at the same time; nor that your soul is able to worry both about matters here and about matters in Egypt and in Sicily, but that the good sense of the god isn't competent to attend to all things at the same time.

"If, then, by serving the gods, too, you should try out whether they want to give you some counsel concerning what is not clear to human beings—just as by serving human beings you recognize those who want to serve in return, and by gratifying you recognize those who gratify in return, and by taking counsel you
Memorabilia

observe those who are sensible—you will recognize that the divine (to theion) is so great and of such a sort as to see all things at the same time and to hear all things and to be present everywhere, and that they attend to all things at the same time.”

[19] In my opinion by saying these things he made his companions refrain from the unholy, unjust, and shameful things, not only when they were seen by human beings, but even when they were in solitude, since they believed that nothing they might do would ever escape the notice of gods.

~ Chapter 5 ~

[1] Now if surely continence, too, is both a noble and good possession for a man, let us examine whether in saying the following sorts of things he prompted any movement toward it. “Men, if we were at war and wished to elect a man under whom we would be most apt to be saved ourselves and to overpower our enemies, would we elect someone whom we perceived to be not equal to resisting his stomach or wine or sex or labor or sleep? How indeed could we think that such a one would either save us or conquer our enemies?

[2] “And if we wished at the end of life to entrust someone with educating our male children, attentively guarding our maiden daughters, or preserving our wealth, would we believe that the one who is incontinent is trustworthy in these matters? Would we entrust an incontinent slave with cattle, storerooms, or supervision of work? Would we want to accept such a person as a servant or purchaser even if we got him for free?

[3] “Moreover, if we would not accept even a slave who is incontinent, is it not worthwhile to guard against becoming a person of this sort oneself? For in fact the incontinent one is not harmful to others on the one hand and beneficial to himself on the other—as it is opined that the greedy enrich themselves by seizing the wealth of others—but rather he does mischief to others and still
worse to himself, if at any rate to ruin not only one's own household but also both body and soul is to do the greatest mischief.

[4] "Who would be pleased to have a person of this sort as a companion, knowing that he enjoys sauce and wine more than friends and cherishes women prostitutes more than comrades? Ought not every man, believing that continence is the foundation of virtue, be equipped with this first in his soul?

[5] "For who, without this, would either learn anything good or train himself in a manner worth mentioning? And who would not be shamefully disposed with regard to both his body and his soul when he is enslaved to pleasures? In my opinion, by Hera, a free man should pray not to obtain a slave of this sort, and one enslaved to such pleasures should beseech the gods to obtain good masters. For only in this way would such a person be saved."

[6] In saying things of this sort he displayed himself to be still more continent in his deeds than in his speeches; for he overpowered not only the pleasures that come through the body but also the pleasure that comes through wealth, holding that the one who accepts wealth from one he meets by chance establishes a master over himself and subjects himself to a slavery as shameful as any.

~ Chapter 6 ~

[1] It is worthwhile in his regard also not to omit his conversations with Antiphon the sophist. For Antiphon, wishing to draw his close companions away from him, once approached Socrates when they were present and said the following.

[2] "Socrates, I, for my part, thought that those who philosophize should become happier. But you, in my opinion, have reaped from philosophy just the opposite. You live, at any rate, a way of life such as no slave would abide from a master. You eat and drink the poorest food and drink, you wear a cloak that is not only poor but the same one during summer and winter, and you are continuously without shoes or tunic.
[3] “Moreover, you do not take in wealth—a thing that both delights in its acquisition and makes those who possess it live more freely and pleasantly. If, accordingly, you too dispose your companions as do teachers of other work as well, who show their students to be their imitators, you should hold that you are a teacher of unhappiness.” And Socrates replied to this:

[4] “In my opinion, Antiphon, you have supposed me to live so painfully that I am persuaded you would rather die than choose to live as I do. Come now, let us examine what you have perceived to be hard in my life.

[5] “Is it that those who accept money are under necessity to produce what they are paid for, but that by not receiving it I am under no necessity to converse with whomever I do not wish? Or do you deem my way of life poor in the belief that I eat less healthy things than you do, or things that provide less strength? Or is it that my regimen is harder to procure than yours because it is more rare and costly? Or that what you furnish yourself is more pleasant for you than what I furnish myself is for me? Don’t you know that the one who eats most pleasantly has the least need of relish, and the one who drinks most pleasantly least desires drink that is not at hand?

[6] “Regarding cloaks, you know that those who change them do so for reasons of cold and heat, and that they put on shoes so that they will not be prevented from walking due to what pains their feet. Now then, have you ever perceived me more than another remaining inside because of the cold, fighting with someone over a spot in the shade because of heat, or not going wherever I wish because of pain in my feet?

[7] “Don’t you know that when those whose bodies are naturally weakest practice they become stronger at what they practice and more easily bear it than the strongest who does not practice? And don’t you think that, by always practicing patient endurance of the things that chance to befall my body, I bear all things more easily than you who does not practice?

[8] “Do you think that anything is more responsible for my not being enslaved to stomach or sleep or lust than that I have other things more pleasant than these that delight not only in their use but also by providing hopes that they will benefit always? More-
over, this at any rate you know: that those who do not think that they are doing well do not experience delight, but those who believe that they are nobly progressing, either in farming or seafaring or whatever else they chance to be working at, are delighted on the grounds that they are doing well.

[9] "Then, do you think that the pleasure from all these things is as great as that from believing that one is becoming better and acquiring better friends? I, for my part, spend my life holding these things. And if indeed it should be necessary to benefit friends or city, is there more leisure to attend to them in my present way of life or in the one that you deem blessed? And who would go on a campaign more easily, a person unable to live without a costly way of life, or one for whom what is at hand is enough? And who would surrender more quickly to a siege, the person needing what is hardest to find, or the one who has enough when he makes use of what is easiest to obtain?

[10] "You seem, Antiphon, like one who thinks that happiness is luxury and extravagance. But I, for my part, hold that to need nothing is divine (theios), that to need as little as possible is nearest to the divine, and that what is divine is best, and what is nearest to the divine is nearest to what is best."

[11] Again Antiphon once said to Socrates in a conversation: "Socrates, I, for my part, hold that you are just, but not in any way wise. And in my opinion you even recognize this yourself. At any rate, you demand no money in exchange for associating with you. And yet if you thought that your cloak or your house or any other of your possessions were worth money, you would not only not give it to anyone for free but you wouldn't even take less for it than it is worth.

[12] "Surely it is clear that if you thought as well that associating with you were worth anything, you would exact no less money for this too than it is worth. Just, then, you may be, in that you do not deceive on account of greed, but not wise, since what you understand is worthless."

[13] And Socrates replied to this: "Antiphon, among us it is held that youthful bloom and wisdom are nobly bestowed, or shamefully bestowed, in like fashion. For if someone wishes to sell his youthful bloom for money to whoever wishes it, they call him a
prostitute; but if someone makes a friend of one whom he recognizes to be a lover who is both noble and good (a gentleman), we hold that he is moderate. Similarly, those also who sell wisdom for money to whoever wishes it they call sophists just as if they were prostitutes; but we hold that whoever makes a friend by teaching whatever good he possesses to someone he recognizes as having a good nature—this one does what befits a gentlemanly (noble and good) citizen.

[14] “Accordingly, Antiphon, just as another is pleased by a good horse or a dog or a bird, so I myself am even more pleased by good friends, and if I possess something good I teach it, and I introduce them to others from whom, I believe, they will receive some benefit with a view to virtue. And reading collectively with my friends, I go through the treasures of the wise men of old which they wrote and left behind in their books; and if we see something good, we pick it out; and we hold that it is a great gain if we become friends with one another.” When I heard these things, I formed the opinion that he himself was blessed and that he led those who heard him to gentlemanliness (nobility and goodness).

[15] And again Antiphon once questioned him about how he could believe that he made others fit for political affairs, since he himself did not engage in political affairs—if indeed he understood how. He said, “In which case, Antiphon, would I more engage in political affairs, if I engaged in them alone, or if I should attend to there being as many as possible competent to engage in them?”

~ Chapter 7 ~

[1] Let us examine whether, also by turning his companions away from boasting, he turned them toward being attentive with

*One manuscript has “beneficial to one another” (ophelimoi) instead of “friends with one another” (philoi).
respect to virtue. For he was always saying that there is no more noble path to a good reputation\textsuperscript{118} than by becoming good at the thing for which one wishes to have a good reputation. And he taught in the following way that he was speaking the truth.

[2] “For let us ponder,” he said, “what someone should do who wishes to have a reputation as a good flute player when he is not. Should he not imitate the good flute players in the externals of their art? And first, since these both possess beautiful (kalos) equipment and lead about many followers, he too should do these things. Then, since many people praise them, he too should furnish himself with many who praise him. Moreover, he should never take up the work or he will immediately be proved ridiculous, and not only a bad flute player but also a human being who is a boaster. And indeed, since he has gone to great expense without any benefit at all, and in addition has a bad reputation, will he not live a laborious, profitless, and ridiculous life?

[3] “In like manner, let us reflect on what would happen to someone who is not a good general or pilot but wishes to appear to be one. Would it not be painful if, desiring to be opined as competent to do these things, he was not able to persuade—but would he not be even more wretched if he did persuade? For it is clear that one who does not understand how to be a pilot or a general—if established in the office—would utterly destroy those whom he least wished to destroy and would himself come out of it in a shameful and bad way.”

[4] Likewise, he declared it unprofitable to be opined as rich, courageous,\textsuperscript{119} and strong when one is not these things in fact. For he said that these people are assigned tasks beyond their power, and if they are opined to be competent, they would not obtain sympathy when they are unable to do them.

[5] And he called no small cheat anyone who would deprive another of money or equipment, taking it by persuasion, but he called by far the greatest cheat the one who, although not worthy, deceives others through persuasion that he is competent to lead the city. And so, in my opinion, he turned his companions away from being boasters by saying things of this sort\textsuperscript{120} in conversation.
Book II

Chapter 1

[1] In my opinion, also by saying such things, he turned his companions toward training themselves to be continent in their desire for meat and drink, and in regard to lust, sleep, cold, heat, and labor. When he recognized once that one of his companions was too undisciplined in such respects, he said, “Tell me, Aristippus, if you should have to take and educate two youths, one so that he would be competent to rule, and the other so that he would not even lay a claim to rule, how would you educate each? Let us examine it, if you wish, beginning from sustenance, as it were from the elements.”

And Aristippus said, “Indeed, in my opinion, sustenance is the beginning. For no one would even be alive unless he were sustained.”

[2] “So then, the wish to take food, when the time comes, is likely to be present in both?”

“It is likely,” he said.

“So which of them would we accustom to choose doing what is urgent over gratifying his belly?”

“The one being educated for ruling, by Zeus, so that the city’s affairs not be left undone in the course of his rule,” he said.

“So then,” he said, “the ability to endure being thirsty when they wish to drink should also be added to the same one?”

“Certainly,” he said.
[3] "And to which would we add continence in regard to sleep, so as to be able to go to bed late or rise early or stay awake all night should there be any need?"

"This too should be added to the same one," he said.

"And what about being continent in regard to sex," he said, "so as not to be prevented on this account from taking action should there be any need?"

"This too should be added to the same one," he said.

"And what about not fleeing from one's labors but willingly enduring them? To which of them should we add this?"

"This too should be added to the one being educated to rule," he said.

"What about learning whatever learning there is that would be serviceable for overpowering one's adversaries? In which would it be more fitting to include this?"

"Far more, by Zeus, in the one educated for rule," he said. "In fact, there is no benefit from the other things without such learning."

[4] "So then, in your opinion, is the one educated in this way less likely to be captured by his adversaries than the rest of the animals? For surely some animals are baited by appetite—some even that are quite shy are nevertheless captured when drawn to the bait by the desire to eat—while others are ensnared by drink."

"Certainly," he said.

"So then, do still others, like quail and partridges, fall into nets due to lust, when they are carried toward the sound of the female by the desire and hope for sex, ceasing to take dangers into account?"

He assented to this as well.

[5] "So then, is it shameful, in your opinion, for a human being to suffer the same things as the most senseless of beasts? As for instance adulterers who enter the women's quarters, knowing that the adulterer risks both suffering what the law threatens and being ensnared and being dealt with insolently once caught; and even though bad and shameful things of such magnitude hang over the adulterer, and though there are many who would release him from his sexual desire in safety, he is carried nevertheless into risky situations—isn't this already the mark of someone who is altogether unhappy?"
"In my opinion, at least," he said.

[6] "And isn't it a mark of great neglect, in your opinion, that the many are untrained for cold and heat, although the majority of the most necessary activities for human beings take place under the open sky, like those of war and of farming, and not the least important of the others?"

He assented to this as well.

"Then, in your opinion, must the one who is going to rule train himself to bear easily these things too?"

"Certainly," he said.

[7] "So then, if we put those who are continent in all these things in the order of those fit for rule, shall we put those unable to do these things in the order of those who will not even lay a claim to rule?"

He assented to this as well.

"So, what about this? Since in fact you know the order of the tribe of each of these two individuals, have you before now ever examined in which of these orders you would justly put yourself?"

[8] "Indeed I have," said Aristippus. "And in no way at all do I put myself in the order of those who wish to rule. In fact, in my opinion, it is quite senseless that it not be enough for a human being to furnish himself with what he needs, although this is a lot of work, but instead to take on the additional task of procuring also for the rest of the citizens what they need. And, while doing without many of the things he wishes for himself, after having presided over the city he undergoes a penalty unless he accomplishes everything the city wishes. How is this not great senselessness?

[9] "For cities in fact think they deserve to deal with (chrēsthai) their rulers just as I deal with my house servants. For I think I deserve having my servants furnish me with provisions in abundance, while themselves laying hold of none of them; and cities think that their rulers should procure for them as many goods as possible, while themselves refraining from all of them. And so the ones I, for my part, would set among those fit for rule, after educating them in this manner, are those who wish to have many troubles themselves and to provide such troubles to others. I put myself, however, in the order of those who wish to live as easily and as pleasantly as possible."
And Socrates said, “So do you wish that we examine also this: which live more pleasantly, the rulers or the ruled?”

“Certainly,” he said.

“‘To begin, then, with the tribes we know, in Asia the Persians rule, while the Syrians, Phrygians, and Lydians are ruled; and in Europe the Scythians rule, while the Maiotians are ruled; and in Libya the Carthaginians rule, while the Libyans are ruled. So which of these do you think lives more pleasantly? Or of the Greeks—among whom you belong yourself—which live more pleasantly in your opinion, those who overpower or who are overpowered?’”

“But I, for my part, do not put myself in the order of slaves either,” said Aristippus. “Rather, in my opinion, there is a certain middle road between these, which I try to travel, neither through rule nor through slavery, but through freedom; and this road especially leads to happiness.”

“Well,” said Socrates, “if this road that carries you neither through rule nor through slavery doesn’t go through human beings either, perhaps you would be saying something. If, however, while you are among human beings you will think you deserve neither to rule nor to be ruled and you won’t serve the rulers willingly, I think you see that the stronger both collectively and privately understand how to make the weaker lament and to deal with (chrēsthai) them as slaves.

“Or are you unaware that the stronger cut down grain and trees after others have sown and planted them, and that they besiege in every way those who are weaker but do not want to serve them, until they persuade them to prefer slavery to being at war with those who are stronger? In addition, don’t you know that in private life the courageous and powerful reap profit from those who lack courage and are powerless, whom they enslave?’”

“But in order not to suffer these things,” he said, “I, for my part, in fact don’t confine myself to any regime but am a stranger everywhere.”

Socrates said, “Quite a clever trick, what you’re saying now! For, ever since Sinis, Sciron, and Procrustes died, is no one any longer unjust to strangers? But now those who live as citizens in their fatherlands even lay down laws so they won’t suffer injustice, and acquire other friends to aid them in addition to the so-
called necessary ones, and throw up defenses around their cities, and acquire arms to ward off those who are unjust, and, in addition to these things, equip themselves with other allies from outside—and still, those who possess all these things nevertheless suffer injustice.

[15] "But you, who has none of these things and who spends a good deal of time on the highways where people suffer injustice the most and who is weaker than any of the citizens in whatever city you reach and who is the sort of person most attacked by those who wish to do injustice, nevertheless, you think that because you are a stranger, you won’t suffer injustice? Or do you take heart because cities announce to you that it is safe to come and go? Or is it also because you think that you would be the sort of slave who is not profitable to any master? For who would want to have a human being in his household who does not want to labor, while taking delight in a very costly way of life?

[16] "But let us also examine this: how masters deal with (chres-thai) household servants who are of this sort. Don’t they moderate their lust by hunger, prevent their stealing by shutting them out from wherever there is anything to take, keep them from running away by putting them in bonds, and drive away their laziness with the compulsion of blows? Or what do you do when you observe that one of your household servants is of this sort?"

[17] "I punish him with everything bad," he said, "until I compel him to serve as a slave. But, Socrates, how do those educated in the kingly art—which you, in my opinion, hold to be happiness—differ from those who suffer bad things out of compulsion, at least if they are going to suffer hunger, thirst, cold, sleeplessness, and all the other toils willingly? I, for my part, don’t know what difference it makes whether the same skin is willingly rather than unwillingly beaten, or, in general, whether the same body is willingly or unwillingly besieged with all things of this sort, except that the one who gladly endures what is painful lacks sense as well."

[18] "What then, Aristippus?" Socrates said. "Isn’t it your opinion that the willing sufferings differ from the unwilling ones in ways such as these: someone who is willingly hungry could eat whenever he should wish, and someone who is willingly thirsty
could drink, and likewise regarding the other things; but it's not possible for someone suffering these things under compulsion to cease from them whenever he wishes? Secondly, the one who suffers hardship willingly delights in thinking with a view to a good hope, like those who hunt beasts toil with pleasure in hope of a catch.

[19] "And while those sorts of rewards for one's labors are of little worth, what about those who labor so that they may acquire good friends or that they may subdue their enemies, or so that by becoming powerful in their bodies and souls they may manage their own house nobly and treat their friends well and do good deeds for their fatherland? Surely one should know that these both labor for such things with pleasure and take delight in living, since they admire themselves and are praised and emulated by others.

[20] "Moreover, easy and immediate pleasures suffice neither to produce good condition in the body, as the gymnastic trainers say, nor to produce any understanding worth mentioning in the soul; but acts of attention exercised with endurance enable one to attain noble and good works, as the good men say. Hesiod too says somewhere, 'It is easy to choose badness even in abundance; the road is smooth, and it lies very near. But immortal gods have placed sweat before virtue. The path to it is long and steep and rough at first. But if ever one arrives at the peak, then the going is easy, although it was hard.' Epicharmus is a witness, as well, in the following: 'The gods sell us all good things at the price of our labor.' And in another place he says, 'Wicked one, do not yearn for soft things, lest you have hard ones.'

[21] "And Prodicus the wise declares a similar view of virtue in his treatise about Heracles—the very one he displayed most widely—when he says something like the following, insofar as I recall. For he says that when Heracles was starting to enter ado-

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*a"Thinking" (phronon) is the reading of most of the manuscripts. Hude adopts the reading ponon, rendering the translation "delights in laboring with a view to a good hope" in place of "delights in thinking with a view to a good hope."*

*b"Know" (oistha) is the reading of the manuscripts. Hude adopts Stobaeus' reading "think" (oiesthai).*

*cOne manuscript has "fool" (môros) in place of "wicked one" (ponêros).*
lescence from childhood—when youths, since they are already becoming their own rulers, make clear whether in life they will take the road through virtue or that through vice—going out to a quiet spot, he sat down perplexed as to which of the roads he should take.

[22] "And two tall women appeared to him to be approaching. One of the two was becoming to look at and freeborn in nature. For adornment her body had purity, her eyes modesty, her bearing moderation, and she had white clothing. The other had been fed to the point of being fleshy and soft. She was prettied up so that her complexion seemed to appear whiter and rosier than its reality, and so that her bearing seemed straighter than its nature. Her eyes were wide open, and she was wearing the clothes in which her bloom would be most conspicuous. She looked down at herself frequently, looked around to see if anyone else was looking at her, and frequently looked at her own shadow.

[23] "When they came nearer to Heracles, the one spoken of first went on in the same manner, but the other, who wished to reach Heracles first, ran to him and said, 'I see, Heracles, that you are perplexed as to which road you should take in life. If you befriend me, I will lead you to the most pleasant and easiest road; you will not miss the taste of any delight, and you will live your life without experience of the hard things.

[24] "'First, you will worry neither about war nor about business. Instead, you will roam about examining what delightful food or drink you might find, what delight you might see or hear, what pleasant things you might smell or touch, which favorites would especially delight you in associating with them, and how you might sleep most comfortably, and how you might obtain all these things with the least trouble.

[25] "'And if ever any suspicion should arise that the sources

*The manuscripts read "body" (sōma). Hude reads "complexion" (chrōma) or "skin" with Stobaeus. Cf. Oeconomicus X.2, where the gentleman Ischomachus criticizes his young wife for the use of cosmetics. "Purity" (kathareiotēti) might also be translated as "cleanliness."

**"Roam about" follows the reading diesel adopted by Hude. The manuscripts vary.
of these things will be scarce, but have no fear that I might lead you to procure these things for yourself by means of labor and hardship of body and soul. Instead, you will use whatever methods others use to accomplish these things and refrain from nothing gainful. For I, for my part, furnish my companions with the license to derive benefit from wherever they may.'

[26] "And Heracles, after hearing these things, said, 'Woman, what is your name?'

"'My friends call me Happiness,' she said, 'but those who hate me nickname me Vice.'

[27] "At this point the other woman approached and said, 'I too have come to you, Heracles, since I know those who begot you and that nature of yours, having observed it in your education. Therefore, I have hope: for you, that if you should take the road toward me, you will become an exceedingly good worker of what is noble and august; and, for me, that I will appear still far more honored and more distinguished for good things. I shall not deceive you with preludes about pleasure. But I shall truthfully describe the disposition the gods have made of the things that are.'

[28] "'For without labor and attentiveness the gods give human none of the things that are good and noble. But if you wish the gods to be gracious to you, you must serve the gods; if you want to be cherished by your friends you must do good deeds for your friends; if you desire to be honored by some city, you must benefit the city; if you think you deserve to be admired by all Greece for your virtue you must attempt to be the cause of good for Greece; if you wish the earth to bear you fruit in abundance, you must serve the earth; if you think you must become rich from cattle, you must be attentive to the cattle; if you set out to increase yourself through war and wish to be able to make your friends free and subdue your enemies, you must learn the warlike arts themselves from those who understand them, as well as practice how one must use them. And if you wish to be powerful also in your body, you must accustom your body to serve your judgment, and you must train with labors and sweat.'

'One manuscript has "If ever any suspicion on the part of the city arises concerning where these things come from . . ."
"And Vice interrupted her and said—as Prodicus tells it—'Reflect, Heracles, how hard and long is the road to the delights that this woman describes for you. But I shall lead you to an easy and short road to happiness.'

"And Virtue said, 'Wretch! What good thing do you have? Or what pleasant thing do you know, not wanting to do anything for the sake of these things? You do not even await the desire for pleasures but rather fill yourself up with everything before desiring it, eating before you are hungry, drinking before you are thirsty. In fact, in order to eat pleasantly you contrive gourmet cooks; in order to drink pleasantly you furnish yourself with costly wines and in summer run around seeking ice; and in order to sleep pleasantly you furnish yourself not only with soft bedclothes but couches and rockers for your couches. For you desire sleep not because of your labor but because you have nothing to do. And you compel [yourself to have] sex before you are in need, contriving all sorts of things and treating (chrēsthai) men as women. Insolent at night and asleep during the most useful part of the day, this is the way you educate your friends.

Although you are immortal, you have been cast out from among the gods and are dishonored by good human beings. You have not heard the most pleasant of all sounds, praise of yourself. And you have not seen the most pleasant of all sights, for you have never seen any noble work of your own. If you should say anything, who would trust you? If you should need anything, who would supply you? And what person of good sense would dare to be among your worshippers, who are powerless in their bodies when young and senseless in their souls when they become older, who are comfortably sustained,\(^8\) without labor through youth, and pass a miserable and laborious old age, who are ashamed by what they have done and weighed down by what they are doing, and who run through pleasures in their youth and lay up the hard things for old age.

But I am a companion of the gods, and a companion of good human beings. No noble work, divine or human, comes into

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\(^8\)"Sustained" or "reared" (trephein) is the reading of the manuscripts. Hude adopts the emendation "borne" (pherein).
being without me. I am honored most of all among gods and among those human beings by whom it is fitting to be honored; for I am a cherished coworker for artisans, a trusted guardian for masters of households, a well-disposed assistant for household servants, a good helper for the labors of peace, a reliable ally for the works of war, and an excellent partner in friendship.

[33] "'Among my friends the enjoyment of food and drink is pleasant and trouble free, for they refrain from these until they desire them. More pleasant sleep is available to them than to those who do not toil. And when they lose sleep they are not annoyed, nor on this account are they remiss in taking the actions they should. The young delight in praise from their elders, while the old exult in honors from the young. They recall their former actions with pleasure and are pleased when they do well in present ones, being, because of me, dear to gods, cherished by friends, and honored by fatherlands. And whenever their allotted end comes, they do not lie without honor and forgotten but thrive remembered in hymns sung through all time. When you have worked hard at such things, Heracles, child of good parents, it is possible to possess the most blessed happiness.'

[34] 'Prodicus managed the education of Heracles at the hands of Virtue more or less in this way. He, however, decorated his judgments with wording even grander than I used just now. So it's worthwhile for you, Aristippus, with these things in mind, to try to worry somewhat also about the future things of your life.'

Chapter 2

[1] When he perceived once that his eldest son, Lamprocles, was angry with his mother, he said, "Tell me, child, do you know any human beings who are called ungrateful?"

"I do indeed," said the youth.

"Have you observed, then, what they do that makes people call them this name?"
"I have," he said, "for they call ungrateful those who have been well treated but do not return the favor when they can."

"So then, are the ungrateful numbered among the unjust in your opinion?"

"Yes, in my opinion," he said.

[2] "Now have you ever yet examined whether, in the same way as opinion holds it to be unjust to enslave friends but just to enslave enemies, it is also unjust to be ungrateful to friends but just to be ungrateful to enemies?"

"Yes, indeed," he said. "And, in my opinion, someone who is well treated, whether by a friend or by an enemy, is unjust if he does not try to return the favor."

[3] "So then, if this is in fact the case, would ingratitude be something purely and simply unjust?"

He agreed.

"Accordingly, the better someone is treated without repaying the favor, the more unjust he would be?"

He assented also to this.

"Now whom," he said, "could we find receiving from any source benefactions greater than children receive from their parents? Their parents cause them to come from nonbeing to being, so as to see as many noble things and to share in as many good things as the gods provide human beings. And what is more, these things are in our opinion so completely worthwhile that more than anything we all flee from leaving them behind; and cities have fashioned the death penalty against the greatest injustices on the grounds that there is no fear of a greater bad thing to stop the injustice.

[4] "Moreover, surely you don't suppose that human beings beget children on account of sex, since the streets as well as the houses are full of those who will release one from this. And it is visible that we examine also from what sort of women we might get the best offspring, and it is with these we come together to produce offspring.

[5] "And the man in fact sustains the woman who will produce offspring for him, and he provides his future children in advance with all things that he thinks will benefit them for life, and these things in the greatest abundance of which he is capable. While the
woman, after she conceives, bears this burden, weighed down, taking risks concerning her life and sharing the sustenance by which she too is sustained; and after she carries it to term with much labor and brings it forth, she sustains and attends to it, even though she has not been previously well treated by it, and even though the newborn does not recognize the one by whom it is well treated; nor can it even signal what it needs, but she by guessing attempts to fill it with what affords both advantage and delight, and she sustains it for a long time, enduring labor both day and night without knowing what gratitude she will receive for these things.

[6] "And it is not enough for them only to sustain the children, but also, when in their opinion their children are competent to learn something, the parents teach them whatever they themselves have that is good for one's life. And they go to expense to send them to someone else when they think that one will be more competent to teach certain things. And they attend to doing everything so that their children might become as good as possible."

[7] The youth said in reply to this, "But even if she has done all these things and very many others besides, no one could endure her harshness."

And Socrates said, "Which do you think is more difficult to bear, the ferocity of a beast or of a mother?"

"For my part," he said, "I think that of a mother, at least one such as this."

"Then has she ever yet given you any harm by biting or kicking, such things as many have suffered from beasts?"

[8] "But, by Zeus," he said, "she says things that no one, upon his whole life, would wish to hear."

"And you," said Socrates, "how many hard-to-endure troubles do you think you provided her, both by your voice and by your deeds from your childhood on, when you were peevish both day and night; and how much grief did you cause when you were sick?"

"But," he said, "never did I either say or do anything to her that made her ashamed."

[9] "What then?" he said. "Do you think it is harsher for you to hear what she says than it is for the actors when they say the most extreme things to one another in the tragedies?"
"But I think they bear it easily since in the case of these speakers they do not think that the one who refutes does so in order to inflict a penalty, nor that the one who threatens does so in order to do any harm."

"And you, knowing very well that, when your mother speaks to you, she not only intends no harm but also wishes good for you more than for anyone else—knowing this, you are angry? Or do you hold that your mother intends you harm?"

"Surely not," he said. "That I do not think."

[10] And Socrates said, "And so, though her intention toward you is good and she attends to you as best she can so that you will regain health when you are sick and so that you will lack nothing you need, and, in addition to these things, she prays to the gods for many good things on your behalf and fulfills her vows—you assert that she is harsh. For my part, I think that if you cannot bear such a mother you cannot bear the good things.

[11] "And tell me," he said, "do you think you should serve anyone else, or are you prepared to try to please no human being, nor to obey either a general or other ruler?"

"By Zeus, for my part, I think one should," he said.

[12] "And so," said Socrates, "you wish to please your neighbor too so that he will kindle your fire when you need it and become an accomplice for your good and come to your aid with good intent from close by should you happen to falter?"

"I do, for my part," he said.

"What about a travel companion, a shipmate, or someone else you might meet? Would it make no difference to you whether he becomes friendly or hostile? Or do you think that one must also be attentive regarding good intent from these?"

"I do, for my part," he said.

[13] "Then you are prepared to be attentive toward these, but you don't think you must serve your mother who loves you most of all? Don't you know that the city, as well, attends to and brings to trial no other form of ingratitude but overlooks those who are well treated and do not return the favor. But if someone does not serve parents, the city sets down a penalty against him and, after deeming him unfit during scrutiny, will not allow him to rule on the grounds that the sacrifices he offers on behalf of the city would
not be piously offered, nor would anything else he did be nobly or justly done. And, by Zeus, if someone even fails to decorate the tombs of his parents after they have died, the city reviews this too when it subjects its rulers to scrutiny.

[14] "So you, child, if you are moderate regarding the gods, you will beseech them to forgive you if you have in any way neglected your mother, lest they too not want to treat you well because they hold that you are ungrateful. And regarding human beings, you will watch out lest when they perceive you neglecting your parents they all dishonor you and then you find yourself bereft of friends. For should they suppose that you are ungrateful to your parents, no one would hold that the favor will be returned him after he has treated you well."

~ Chapter 3 ~

[1] Once, when he perceived that there was a quarrel between Chairephon and Chairecrates, who were brothers to each other and acquaintances of his, he said upon seeing Chairecrates, "Tell me, Chairecrates, surely you too do not belong to the sort of human beings who hold that wealth is more useful than brothers, even though wealth lacks sense while a brother has it, and wealth is in need of assistance while a brother is able to assist, and, in addition to these things, you possess rather a lot of wealth but only one brother.

[2] "This also is a wonder: if someone should believe that brothers are a loss to him because he does not possess their property too, but not believe that his fellow citizens are losses because he does not have theirs too. But, in the latter case they are able to calculate that it is better for one to hold enough property while dwelling securely with many than to have risky possession of all the property of the citizens while living a solitary way of life. Yet when it comes to their brothers, they are ignorant of this same fact.

[3] "In addition, while those who can buy household servants
do so in order to have partners in work, and while they acquire friends on the grounds that they need allies, at the same time they neglect their brothers, as though friends come to be from citizens but not from brothers.

[4] "And yet, to have been born from the same parents is a great foundation for friendship, as is to have been reared together, since even in the beasts a certain longing comes to be for those they were reared with. And, in addition to these things, other human beings also honor those with brothers more than those without, and attack them less."

[5] And Chairecrates said, "Socrates, if the quarrel is not a great one, perhaps one should bear with the brother and not flee from him for the sake of petty matters. For, just as you too say, a brother, who is the sort he should be, is a good thing. When, however, he is deficient in every way and completely the opposite, why should someone attempt the impossible?"

[6] And Socrates said, "Chairecrates, is Chairephon able to please no one, just as he is unable to please you? Or is he in fact quite pleasing to some?"

"It is for this very reason, Socrates," he said, "that he deserves my hatred—that he is able to please others, but, wherever he is in my presence, he is everywhere a loss, rather than a benefit, both by deed and by speech."

[7] "Is it the case, then," said Socrates, "that just as a horse is a loss for someone who lacks understanding but attempts to deal with (chresthai) it, so too a brother is a loss whenever someone without understanding tries to deal with him?"

[8] "But how could I," said Chairecrates, "lack understanding of how to deal with (chresthai) a brother, since I understand both how to speak well of someone who speaks well of me and how to treat well someone who treats me well? However, I would be able neither to speak well of nor to treat well someone who tries to annoy me in speech and in deed; nor will I even try."

[9] And Socrates said, "You make wondrous statements indeed, Chairecrates. In the case of a dog, if one were serviceable for your flocks and fond of your shepherds but harsh toward you when you approached him, you would neglect to get angry and try to render him gentle by treating him well; yet, in the case of your brother,
you assert that he would be a great good if he were as he should be toward you; and while you agree that you understand how to act and speak well, you do not attempt to contrive a way for him to be as good as possible for you.”

[10] And Chairecrates said, “I am afraid, Socrates, that I do not have great enough wisdom to make Chairephon be as he should toward me.”

“And yet in my opinion,” said Socrates, “one need contrive nothing at all complex or new\textsuperscript{33} with regard to him, but with what even you yourself understand I think he could be won over to think highly of you.”

[11] “Hurry up and tell me,” he said, “if you have perceived that I understand some love charm that I am unaware that I know.”

“Tell me,” he said, “if you wished to prevail upon some acquaintance of yours to invite you to dinner whenever he makes sacrifices, what would you do?”

“It is clear that I myself would make a start of the practice by inviting him when I make a sacrifice.”

[12] “And if you wished to turn one of your friends toward attending to your property when you go out of the country, what would you do?”

“It is clear that I would attempt to attend to his property first whenever he goes out of the country.”

[13] “And if you wished to have a stranger receive you whenever you go to his country, what would you do?”

“It is clear that I would also receive him first whenever he should come to Athens. And if I wished him to accomplish eagerly for me the business for which I came, it is clear that I myself would have to do this too for him first.”

[14] “Then have you been hiding all along the fact that you understand all the love-charms among human beings?” he said. “Or do you hesitate to make the first move lest you appear shameful if you treat your brother well first? And yet a man is thought (\textit{dokein}), at any rate, to deserve the most praise if he anticipates his enemies in treating them badly and his friends in doing them good deeds. Accordingly, if, in my opinion, Chairephon were more capable than you of leading toward this friendship, I would have tried to persuade him to make the attempt first to make you his
friend. But now, in my opinion, it is rather you, if you would take
the lead, who would accomplish this.”

[15] And Chairecrates said, “You say something strange and not
at all in character, Socrates, when you bid me to lead the way al­
though I am the younger. In fact, among all human beings the
opposite is held, that the elder is to lead in everything, both in
speech and in deed.”

[16] “How do you mean?” said Socrates. “For isn’t it held eve­
rywhere that the younger is to stand aside in the street when an
elder meets him, and when sitting to stand up, and to honor him
with the soft couch, and when speaking to yield? Do not hesitate,
my good fellow,” he said, “but attempt to make the man gentle
and very soon he will listen to you. Don’t you see how honor­
loving and freeborn he is? For while you would capture wicked
human sorts only if you should give them something, you would
especially prevail upon noble and good (gentlemanly) human be­
ings by dealing with (chrēsthai) them in a friendly manner.”

[17] And Chairecrates said, “What, then, if he does not become
any better when I do these things?”

“What else,” said Socrates, “other than that you will risk dis­
playing yourself as a good person who loves his brother, and him
as a common person undeserving of good treatment? But I do not
think that any of this will come to pass. For I hold that, as soon as
he perceives that you are challenging him to enter this contest, he
will be very eager to win the victory by surpassing you in good
treatment, both in speech and in deed.

[18] “For at present,” he said, “you two are disposed just as a
pair of hands that the god made for helping each other to grasp,
but that give up on this and turn toward hindering each other, or
like a pair of feet which have been made by divine (theios) dispen­sation for working with each other but neglect this and get in each
other’s way.

[19] “Wouldn’t it be great ignorance and unhappiness to use for
harm things made for benefit? And yet, in my opinion, the god
made a pair of brothers to be even more beneficial to one another
than a pair of hands, a pair of feet, a pair of eyes, or any of the
other things he begot as brethren for human beings. For hands
could not do at the same time things that are more than a fathom34
apart, if they should need to; feet could not go to places even a fathom apart at the same time. And eyes, which are thought (dokein) to reach over the greatest distance, could not among things still nearer see those in front and behind them at the same time. But when a pair of brothers are friends they can act at the same time for each other's benefit, even though they are separated by a great distance.

-- Chapter 4 --

[1] I also heard him once conversing about friends; he said such things as, in my opinion at least, might be especially beneficial to someone regarding the acquisition and treatment (chrēsthai) of friends. For he said that he heard from many people that a sure and good friend is the best of all possessions. But he said that he saw the many attending to anything rather than the acquisition of friends.

[2] For he said that he saw them attentively acquiring houses, fields, slaves, grazing animals, and furniture, and trying to preserve what they had, but as for a friend—which they say is the greatest good—he said that he saw the many worrying neither about how to acquire nor about how to preserve the ones they had.

[3] But even in the case of illnesses of friends and household servants, he said that he saw some bringing doctors to their household servants and attentively furnishing them with other things for their health, while taking little heed of their friends; and, should both die, he saw them vexed about their household servants and believing their death a loss, while thinking themselves no worse off for the death of their friends; and he saw them allowing none of their other possessions to be left unattended or unguarded, while neglecting their friends who were in need of attention.

[4] Again, in addition to these things, he said that he saw that the many knew the number of their other possessions even when they had very many of them, while, though they had few friends,
they were not only ignorant of their number but even when they attempted to count them for those who inquired, they included some among their friends whom they later excluded. This was the extent to which they worried about their friends.

And yet on comparison, which of the other possessions wouldn’t a good friend appear far superior to? For what horse or what ox team is as useful as a good friend? What slave is so well intentioned and constant? Or what other possession is so universally useful?

For the good friend orders himself to remedy every deficiency of his friend, both in private equipment and in collective actions: should there be a need to treat someone well, he lends support, and if any fear disturbs him, he comes to his aid—sometimes helping him with expenditures, other times helping him with actions, and sometimes helping him persuade, other times using force, delighting them the most when they do well, and setting them right the most when they falter.

Whatever services the hands do for each, whatever eyes can foresee, whatever the ears hear beforehand, and whatever the feet carry out—a friend falls short of none of these in doing good deeds. And frequently a friend suffices for doing for his friend the things that one could not have done, seen, heard, or carried out for oneself. But nevertheless, while some try to care for 37 trees for the sake of their fruit, most are lazy and remiss in their attention to that possession that bears the most fruit and is called a friend.

I once heard another speech of his too, which in my opinion turned the listener toward reviewing how much he himself was worth to his friends. For when he saw that one of his companions neglected a friend oppressed by poverty, he questioned Antisthenes in front of the one neglecting him, as well as many others.

“Antisthenes,” he said, “are friends worth certain amounts
just as household servants are? For I suppose among household
servants, one is worth two mina, another not even a half-mina,
another five mina, and another even ten. And Nicias the son of
Niceratus is said to have purchased an overseer for his silver
mines at the cost of a talent. I am examining this," he said,
"whether, just as household servants, so friends too have a worth."

to have a certain person my friend rather than two mina, while
another I would not value at even a half-mina, another I would
choose before ten mina, and another I would value as my friend
above all wealth and labor."

[4] "So then," Socrates said, "if indeed these things are so, one
would do well (kalōs) to review how much he himself happens to
be worth to his friends, and to try to be worth as much as possible
in order that his friends will be less likely to betray him. For in
fact," he said, "in the light of what I, for my part, frequently hear—
from one that a man who was a friend betrayed him, from another
that a man he thought was his friend chose a mina over him—[5]
I examine with regard to all such cases whether, just as whenever
someone sells a wicked household servant and disposes of him for
whatever price he fetches, so also it might be a temptation to dis­
pose of a wicked friend when it is possible to get more than he is
worth. Good household servants I don't much see being sold nor
good friends being betrayed."

Chapter 6

[1] In my opinion he gave instruction also with regard to test­
ing what sort of friends are worth acquiring when he said things
of the following sort. "Tell me, Critobulus," he said, "if we should

hSome of the manuscripts read "had understanding" (phroneō) in place of "gave
instruction" (phrēnéō).
need a good friend, how would we attempt to conduct our investigation? Should we seek first for one who is the ruler of his appetite as well as of his love of drink, lust, sleep, and laziness? For one overpowered by these couldn’t do what he should either for himself or for a friend.”

“No, by Zeus, he surely couldn’t,” he said.

“So then, should one stay away from one who is ruled by these things, in your opinion?”


“What about the one who is a spendthrift and not self-sufficient,” he said, “but always in need of what belongs to his neighbor; and who, if he gets something, cannot pay it back, but when he doesn’t get it, hates the one who does not give? Wouldn’t he, too, be a harsh friend in your opinion?”

“Certainly,” he said.

“So then, one should stay away from him too?”

“One should indeed stay away,” he said.

[3] “What about the one who is able to make wealth but desires a great deal of it, and for this reason drives a hard bargain and is pleased to get, but does not wish to pay back?”

“In my opinion,” he said, “this one is even more wicked than the previous one.”

“What about the one who, because of his erotic desire for making wealth, provides himself with leisure for nothing other than what he can derive some gain from?”

“One should stay away from him, too, in my opinion; for he would be of no benefit to the one dealing with (chrēsthai) him.”

[4] “What about someone who is factious and wants to provide his friends with many enemies?”

“By Zeus, one should flee from him, too.”

“And if someone has none of these bad qualities but endures being well treated while not worrying at all about doing good deeds in return?”

“This one would be of no benefit either. But, Socrates, what sort shall we attempt to make our friend?”

[5] “Someone, I think, who, as opposed to these, would be
continent in the bodily pleasures and, while easy to live with and easy to bargain with, would happen also to be contentious not to be deficient in the good treatment of those who do him good deeds, so that he is profitable to those who deal with (chrēsthai) him."

[6] "So how would we test someone for these qualities, Socrates, before we deal with (chrēsthai) him?"

"We test sculptors not by making a judgment on the basis of their speeches," he said, "but he whom we see has done beautiful work on past sculptures we trust to do well also on those in the future."

[7] "Are you saying," he said, "that it is also clear that a man who visibly treats his previous friends well would do good deeds for those who become his friends later as well?"

"Yes, for regarding horses, too," he said, "when I see someone using (chrēsthai) nobly the ones he had previously, I think that he would use (chrēsthai) others nobly as well."

[8] "Well then," he said, "how should one make oneself a friend of the one who is, in our opinion, worthy of friendship?"

"To begin with," he said, "one should examine what comes from the gods, whether they advise making him one's friend."

"So what about the one whom in our opinion we should make our friend and whom the gods do not oppose?" he said. "Are you able to say how he should be hunted?"

[9] "By Zeus," he said, "not by following on his heels, as the hare is hunted, nor with deception, as the birds are, nor with violence, as one's enemies are. For it is troublesome to capture an unwilling friend, and it is hard to hold him bound down like a slave. Those who are treated in this way become enemies rather than friends."

[10] "But how are friends hunted?" he said.

They say that there are certain incantations, which those who understand them chant to make friends for themselves of whom-

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1Instead of "easy to live with" (euoikos), three manuscripts have "faithful to his oaths" (euorkos), and another has "good-willed" (eunous).

1"Contentious" or "fond of rivalry" (philoneikos) is the reading of all the manuscripts. Hude adopts the correction "ambitious" or "fond of victory" (philonikos).
ever they wish; and that there are love charms, too, which those
who understand them use on whomever they wish to become be­
loved by them.’’

[11] “Where then might we learn these things?” he said.

“You have heard in Homer what the Sirens chanted to Odysseus,
which begins somewhat as follows: ‘Come here, much-praised
Odysseus, great glory of the Achaians.’ ”

“Did the Sirens,” he said, “hold fast other human beings too,
Socrates, by chanting this incantation with the result that the en­
chanted didn’t depart from them?”

[12] “No, but they chanted in this manner to those who love the
honor accorded to virtue.”

“Are you all but saying that one should chant to each person
praises of the sort that he who hears them will not hold that the
one praising him is ridiculing him?”

“For one would thus be more hateful and drive human beings
away from oneself, if one were to praise a person who knows he
is short, ugly, and weak by saying that he is beautiful, tall, and
strong.”

“Do you know any other incantations?”

[13] “No, but I have heard that Pericles understood many that
he chanted to the city to make it love him.”

“But how did Themistocles make the city love him?”

“Not by chanting incantations, by Zeus, but by attaching some
good to it.”

[14] “In my opinion, Socrates, you are saying that if we are go­
ing to acquire some good friend, we ourselves must become good
at speaking and taking action.”

“Did you think,” said Socrates, “that it is possible even for some­
one who is wicked to acquire good friends?”

[15] “Well,” said Critobulus, “I have seen poor orators who are
friends with good public speakers, and those comrades of men who
are masterful generals who are not competent to be generals.”

[16] “Then also, regarding the subject of our conversation,” he
said, “do you know any who, while not being beneficial them­selves, are able to make those who are beneficial their friends?”

kOne of the manuscripts excludes this oath.
"By Zeus, surely not," he said. "But if one who is wicked is unable to acquire gentlemanly (noble and good) friends, then I have the following concern: whether one who has become a gentleman can readily become friends with gentlemen."

[17] "What disturbs you, Critobulus, is that frequently you see men who perform noble actions and refrain from what is shameful, instead of being friends, engaged in factious strife against one another and dealing with (chrēsthai) one another more harshly than would human beings of no worth."

[18] "Yes," said Critobulus, "and not only do private individuals do this but also the cities that are most attentive to the noble things and least admit the shameful are frequently in a state of hostility with one another.

[19] "When I take these things into account I am quite dispirited concerning the acquisition of friends. For I do not see either that the wicked can be friends with one another. For how could ungrateful, neglectful, greedy, untrustworthy, or incontinent human beings become friends? So, in my opinion at any rate, the wicked are by nature complete enemies rather than friends to one another.

[20] "Moreover, as you say, the wicked would never harmonize with the good in friendship: for how could those who do what is wicked become friends with those who hate such things? And if, in addition, those who train themselves in virtue both engage in factious strife over who will have first place in the cities and hate one another out of envy, who will still be friends? And among what human beings will there be good intentions and trust?"

[21] "But these matters are somewhat complex, Critobulus," said Socrates. "For by nature human beings have, on the one hand, inducements to friendship: for they need one another and have pity and confer benefits as coworkers and, perceiving this, are grateful to one another; and, on the other hand, inducements to hostility: for when they hold the same things to be noble and pleasant, they fight over them, and when they differ in their judgments, they set themselves at variance; and both rivalry and anger are inducements to hostility; and the erotic desire to acquire an excess is ill willed, while envy is hateful."
[22] “Nevertheless, slipping through all these things, friendship unites those who are both noble and good. Because of their virtue, they choose to possess moderate property without labor rather than through war to be lord of all things; and they are able without pain to share their food and drink, though they are hungry and thirsty, and to be continent so as not to pain those it isn’t fitting to, though they are pleased by sex with those in bloom.

[23] “In the sphere of wealth as well, not only are they able to share it lawfully, refraining from being greedy, but they also are able to come to one another’s assistance. They are able to arrange also their rivalry not only painlessly but even advantageously for one another and to prevent their anger from going so far as to become a source of regret. And envy they remove altogether, since they render their own goods the property of their friends and hold those of their friends to be their own.

[24] “Why, then, isn’t it plausible that in the sphere of political honors, as well, the gentlemen (the noble and good) will be partners not only harmless but even beneficial to one another? For those who desire to be honored and to rule in the cities in order to have license to steal wealth, to do violence to human beings, and to experience pleasure would be unjust, wicked, and unable to live in harmony with anyone else.

[25] “But if someone wishes to be honored in a city so that he himself will not be done injustice and can bring just aid to his friends, and so that in ruling he might attempt to do his fatherland some good—on what account would such a one be unable to live in harmony with another of the same sort? Will he be less able to benefit his friends when the gentlemen (noble and good) are with him? Or will he be less able to do good deeds for his city when he has gentlemen as his coworkers?

[26] “But it is clear even in athletic contests that if the best were permitted to make a pact to go against the worse, they would win all the contests and get all the prizes. Now, there they don’t allow them to do this; but since in political affairs, where the gen-

1Some manuscripts have “reconciling” (dialuomēnē) in place of “slipping through” (diaduomēnē).
tlemen (noble and good) are best, no one prevents one from doing good deeds for the city together with whomever one wishes, how can it be unprofitable to engage in political affairs after acquiring the best friends, using them as partners and coworkers in one's actions rather than as antagonists?

[27] "Furthermore, it is clear that if one is at war with someone else, he will need allies, and more of them if it is gentlemen (noble and good) he is placed against. And yet those who want to be allies must be well treated so that they'll want to be eager; but it is far better to treat well the best who are fewer in number, than the worse who are more numerous, for the wicked require many more good deeds than the good.

[28] "But take heart and try to become good, Critobulus," he said, "and when you have become so, attempt to hunt after those who are both noble and good. And, because I am erotic, perhaps even I might be able to assist you in some way in the hunt for those who are both noble and good. For—whatever human beings I desire—loving them, I set out with complete intensity to be loved by them in return, and, longing for them, to be longed for in return, and, desiring to be together with them, to have them desire in return to be together with me.

[29] "I see that you, too, will need these things whenever you desire friendship with certain people. So don't conceal from me those you wish to become friendly with. For because I am attentive to please whoever pleases me, I think that I am not inexperienced in the hunting of human beings."

[30] And Critobulus said, "And yet, Socrates, I have long desired to learn these subjects of learning, especially if this same understanding will suffice for me with a view both to those who are good in their souls and to those beautiful in their bodies."

[31] And Socrates said, "But, Critobulus, it isn't within the scope of my understanding to make the beautiful endure one who puts his hands on them. I am persuaded as well that it was for this reason that human beings fled from Scylla: because she would put her hands upon them. But because the Sirens put their hands upon no one but chanted to all from afar, people say that all endured them and were enchanted on hearing them."
And Critobulus said, "If you have something good for the acquisition of friends, teach, on the understanding that I will not put my hands on them."

"Nor your mouth?" said Socrates. "You will not put it on their mouth?"

"Take heart," Critobulus said, "for I will not put my mouth on anyone’s mouth, either—unless he is beautiful."

"There you go, Critobulus," he said, "saying the exact opposite of what is advantageous. For the beautiful do not endure such things, while the ugly admit them with pleasure even, holding that they are being called beautiful (noble) on account of their soul."

And Critobulus said, "On the understanding that I shall kiss those who are beautiful, and tenderly kiss those who are good, take heart and teach me what pertains to the hunting of friends."

And Socrates said, "Whenever, then, you wish to become the friend of someone, Critobulus, will you allow me to give him the following information against you: that you both admire him and desire to be his friend?"

"Accuse me of it," said Critobulus. "For I know of no one who hates those who praise him."

"Then if I accuse you in addition," he said, "of having good intentions as well toward him, because you admire him, you won’t be of the opinion that you’re being slandered by me?"

"To the contrary," he said, "I myself have good intentions toward those I suppose to have good intentions toward me."

"These things, then," Socrates said, "I will be permitted to say about you to those you wish to make your friends. If, in addition, you will give me license to say of you that you are attentive to your friends and take delight in nothing so much as good friends; that you exult in the noble deeds of your friends no less than in your own and that you take delight in the good things that come to your friends no less than in those that come to you, while you do not grow weary of contriving to bring it about that these things will come to your friends; and that you have formed the judgment that the virtue of a man consists in winning the victory
over his friends in treating them well and over his enemies in treating them badly—I very much think that I would be serviceable to you as a helper in the hunting of good friends.”

[36] “Why,” Critobulus said, “are you telling this to me, as if it weren’t up to you to say whatever you wish about me?”

“By Zeus, it is not, as I once heard from Aspasia. For she said that good matchmaking women are clever at bringing human beings together into marriages by reporting the good things with truth, but that they do not want to lie when they praise. For those who have been deceived hate each other and the matchmaker at the same time. Since I have been persuaded that this is in fact correct, I, for my part, believe that in my praise I am not permitted to say of you anything that is not true.”

[37] “So is this the sort of friend you are to me, Socrates,” Critobulus said, “one who would assist me if I myself have something serviceable for acquiring friends; but, if I don’t, you wouldn’t want to say something you fabricated for my benefit?”

“How, in your opinion, Critobulus, would I benefit you more,” Socrates said, “by praising you falsely, or by persuading you to try to become a good man?

[38] “And if the answer is not visible to you in this way, examine it on the basis of the following. If I should praise you falsely by claiming that you are a good pilot because I wish to make you the friend of a shipowner, and he entrusts his ship to you because he is persuaded by me even though you do not understand how to pilot, do you have any hope that you would not destroy both yourself and the ship? Or if I should falsely persuade the city collectively that it should entrust itself to you on the grounds that you are a master general, juror, and statesman, what do you think you and the city would suffer because of you? Or if privately I should falsely persuade some citizen that he should entrust his belongings to you on the grounds that you really are skilled in managing a household and attentive? If you should be put to the test, wouldn’t you be harmful and appear ridiculous at the same time?

[39] “Instead, the most efficient, safest, and noblest path to being

*Several manuscripts read “there is no benefit” (οπελείν) instead of “they do not want” (εθελείν).*
thought (dokein) to be good at whatever one wishes, Critobulus, is to try to become good at it as well. And when you examine the matter you will find that all those things that are called virtues among human beings are augmented by learning and by practice. I, at any rate, Critobulus, think that we should. But if you judge the matter in some other way, teach me."

And Critobulus said, "But I would be ashamed, Socrates, to contradict these things, for I would be speaking neither nobly nor truly."

~ Chapter 7 ~

[1] Moreover, he tried to cure the perplexities of his friends—those that were due to ignorance, by his judgment, and those due to want, by teaching them to assist one another according to their capacity. I shall tell what I know of him in these matters as well. For when he saw once that Aristarchus was downcast, he said, "You seem to be burdened by something, Aristarchus. You should share your burden with your friends. For perhaps we might even lighten it somewhat for you."

[2] And Aristarchus said, "Indeed, Socrates, I am in great perplexity. For, since the city is in civil strife and many have fled to the Piraeus, so many of my abandoned sisters, nieces, and female cousins have come to me that there are fourteen free persons in my house. But we don't get anything from our land, for the adversary prevails over it, nor from our houses, for there is a scarcity of human beings in the town, and no one is buying furniture. Nor can one borrow money anywhere; but, in my opinion, one is more likely to find it by seeking for it on the street than to get it by borrowing. Now it's a hard thing, Socrates, to look on as one's

*Since the thought of this sentence seems incomplete, Hude suggests adding "act in this way" at the end of the sentence.*
relatives are perishing, but it's impossible to sustain so many in such circumstances."

[3] And so, when Socrates heard these things he said, "'Why is it that Ceramon,\(^63\) who sustains many, not only is able to provide himself and them with provisions\(^64\) but also makes such a surplus that he is even rich, while you who sustain many fear that you will all perish from want of provisions?'"

"Because, by Zeus," he said, "'he sustains slaves, while I sustain those who are free.'"  

[4] "'And which do you think are better,' he said, "'the free by your side or the slaves by Ceramon's?'"

"For my part," he said, "'I think the free by my side.'"

"So then, isn't it shameful," he said, "'that he is well-off from those who are worse,\(^65\) while you are in perplexity although you have those who are much better?'"

"By Zeus," he said, "'for he sustains artisans, while I sustain those who have been freely educated.'"

[5] "'Are artisans, then,' he said, "'those who understand how to make (do) something useful?'"

"Most certainly,'" he said.

"'And so, is barley meal useful?'

"'Exceedingly.'"

"'And what about loaves of bread?'

"'No less so.'"

He said, "'What about cloaks for men and women, and tunics, and mantles and vests?'"

"'These are all exceedingly useful as well,' he said.

"'Then, do those by your side understand how to make none of these?'" he said.

"'Surely all of them, I think.'"

[6] "'Next, don't you know that from a single one of these things, from making barley meal, Nausicydes\(^66\) sustains not only himself and his household servants but in addition many pigs and cows, and he makes such a surplus that he often performs public services at his own expense for the city as well;\(^67\) by making loaves of bread Cyrebus continually sustains his whole household and lives lavishly; while Demeas of Collytus\(^68\) is continually sustained by the
production of mantles, and Menon by the making of wool, and most of the Megarians by the manufacture of vests?"

"By Zeus," he said, "the human beings they have are barbarians whom they have bought so as to compel them to produce what is appropriate (kalōs) for them to produce. The ones I have are free and my relatives."

[7] "Then," he said, "do you think that, because they are free and your relatives, they should do nothing other than eat and sleep? Among others who are free do you see those who live in this manner living better lives, and do you deem them happier than those who are attentive to whatever they understand that is useful for one's life? Or do you perceive that idleness and inattentiveness are beneficial to human beings for learning what it is fitting to understand, for remembering what they learn, for being healthy and strong in their bodies, and for acquiring and preserving what is useful for their life, while being at work and being attentive are not useful for these?

[8] "And did they learn what you say that they understand, on the assumption that these things are not useful for one's life and that they would not be making any of them, or, on the opposite assumption, that they would be attentive to these things and derive benefit from them? For how is moderation fostered more in human beings: through their being idle or through their being attentive to the useful things? And how would they be more just: if they are at work, or if they idly deliberate about their provisions?

[9] "But in fact as it is now, I think, you do not love these women, nor do they love you; for you believe that they are causing you a loss, and they see that you are annoyed on their account. From this situation, there is a risk of greater enmity coming into being and their former gratitude diminishing. But if you preside over them so that they are at work, you will love them when you see that they are beneficial to you, and they will cherish you when they perceive that you are delighted with them; and since it will be more pleasing to recall former good deeds, you [pl.] will augment the gratitude stemming from them and as a result be more friendly and more like a family to one another.

[10] "Now, if they were going to work at something shameful,
death would be more choiceworthy than that. But, as it is, they apparently understand how to do what opinion regards as most noble and most becoming for women. And all work most easily, most quickly, most nobly, and most pleasantly at what they understand. So, don't hesitate to introduce to these women what will profit you as well as them,” he said, “and, as is suitable, they will heed you with pleasure.”

[11] “By the gods,” Aristarchus said, “in my opinion you speak so nobly, Socrates, that—although I would not permit myself to borrow before, because I knew I wouldn’t be able to pay it back after spending whatever I got—now it is best, in my opinion, to endure doing this in order to raise the capital for the work.”

[12] As a consequence of these things, capital was procured, and wool was bought. And the women worked while they ate breakfast and until they ate dinner, and they were merry instead of downcast. And instead of looking suspiciously at each other, they saw each other with pleasure; the women loved him as a protector, and he cherished them as beneficial. At last, coming to Socrates, he described with delight all these events as well as the fact that they were blaming him for being the only one in the house who ate although he was idle.

[13] And Socrates said, “Then you aren’t telling them the speech of the dog. For they say that, when the animals could speak, the ewe said to her master, ‘You do an astonishing thing in giving us, who provide you with wool and lambs and cheese, nothing other than what we ourselves get from the earth, while you give the dog, who provides you with nothing of the sort, a share of your very own food.’

[14] “And that when the dog heard this he said, ‘Yes, by Zeus, for I am the one who in fact saves you sheep so that you are neither stolen by human beings nor seized by wolves, since indeed if I were not to guard over you, you would not even be able to graze out of fear that you might perish.’ It is said that then even the flocks acquiesced in the dog’s being preferred in honor. And so you, too, tell these women that you are, in place of a dog, their guardian and attendant, and that it is due to you that, being unjustly treated by no one, they live securely and pleasantly by their work.”
[1] Once he saw another old comrade after not having seen him for some time and said, "Where do you appear from, Eutherus?"\textsuperscript{73}

"At the end of the war, Socrates," he said, "I returned from abroad; just now, however, I'm coming from this very place. For, because we were deprived of our possessions abroad and because my father did not leave me anything in Attica, I am now compelled to procure my provisions by the work of my body here at home. And, in my opinion, this is better than to beg for something from human beings, especially since I have nothing to borrow against."

[2] "And how long," he said, "do you think your body will be competent to produce your provisions by its wages?"

"By Zeus," he said, "not for long."

"And yet," he said, "when you become older, it is clear that you will need spending money, but no one will want to pay wages for the work of your body."


"So then," he said, "it is better at this point to apply yourself to the sorts of work that will suffice for you also when you are older; and to approach one of those possessing a good deal of wealth who needs someone to help him attend to it; and to be benefited in return when you benefit him by overseeing work and by helping him gather in his harvest, as well as by helping him guard his property."

[4] "It would be hard, Socrates," he said, "for me to endure slavery."

"And yet those who preside in cities and attend to the public property are held not to be more slavish on this account but more free."

[5] "Generally, Socrates," he said, "I don't much permit myself to be liable to be called to account by anyone."

"And yet, Eutherus," he said, "it is not very easy to find work for which one could not be blamed. For it is hard to do anything

\textsuperscript{6}One manuscript has "clearly" (\textit{eudēlon}) instead of "truly" (\textit{alethé}).
in such a manner that one makes no error, and it is hard, even if one does something without error, to avoid meeting up with a senseless judge; indeed, even in the work you say you do now, I wonder if it is easy to come through without reproach.

[6] "So you should try to flee those who are fond of blaming and pursue those with good judgment, and to endure doing the sort of business you are able to do, while guarding against doing those you are not able to, and—whatever you are doing—to attend to doing it as nobly and eagerly as possible. For, in this manner, I think you would least be blamed, find the most aid in your perplexity, and live most easily, with the least risk, and in a way most sufficient for your old age."

~ Chapter 9 ~

[1] And I know that once he also heard from Crito that life was hard in Athens for a man who wished to mind his own business. "For, as it is," he said, "people bring me into the law courts, not because they have been done an injustice by me, but because they hold that I would find it more pleasant to pay money than to have trouble."

[2] And Socrates said, "Tell me, Crito, do you sustain dogs so that they will keep the wolves away from your flocks?"

"Yes, indeed," he said. "For it profits me more to sustain them than not."

"Then wouldn't you sustain a man, too, who would want and be able to keep away from you those attempting to do you injustice?"

[3] "I would do so with pleasure," he said, "if I did not fear that he might turn against me."

"But why don't you see," he said, "that it is far more pleasant

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pOne manuscript has "who are forgiving" (suggnōmonas) in place of "with good judgment" (eugnōmonas).
to derive benefit by gratifying a man such as yourself than by making an enemy of you? Know well that there are men of this sort here who would very much love the honor of dealing with (chrēs-thai) you as a friend.'

[4] And after this, they found Archedemus, who was quite competent at speaking and taking action, but impoverished. For he was not the sort who would make a gain from all things, but he loved the good and said that it was very easy to take from sycophants. So, whenever Crito collected food, oil, wine, wool, or any other farm product useful for one's life, he took some aside and gave it to him. And whenever he performed sacrifices, he would invite him, and he attended to him in all matters of this sort.

[5] And Archedemus, who held Crito's household to be a resource for him, treated him with great respect. And immediately he found out many injustices and many enemies of one of the sycophants who were after Crito, and summoned him to a public trial, in which it had to be decided what he should suffer or pay back.

[6] And this one, who was conscious of many wicked deeds, did everything to be rid of Archedemus. But Archedemus did not let him go until he let Crito alone and gave him wealth.

[7] And after Archedemus accomplished this and other things of the sort, then—in the same way as when a shepherd has a good dog, and the other shepherds wish to stand their herds near him so that they can enjoy the benefit of his dog—many of Crito's friends begged him to provide Archedemus as a guard for them, too.

[8] Archedemus, for his part, was pleased to gratify Crito, and not only was Crito in peace but his friends were as well. And if one of those whom he had made his enemies reproached him that he flattered Crito because he was benefited by him, Archedemus said, 'Which, then, is shameful—to receive benefactions from good human beings and to bestow them in return and thus to befriend this sort, while being at variance with the wicked; or rather to make enemies of the gentlemen (noble and good) by

Instead of "said that it was very easy to take from sycophants," one manuscript has "had a very good nature for taking from sycophants."
trying to do them injustice, while working together with the wicked and trying to befriend them and to deal with \((\text{chrēsthai})\) them instead of the gentlemen?" As a result of this, Archedemus was one of Crito's friends and was honored by the other friends of Crito.

\[\text{Chapter 10}\]

[1] I know that he also had a conversation of the following sort with Diodorus,\(^{81}\) who was a comrade of his. "Tell me, Diodorus," he said, "if one of your household servants runs away, do you attend to recovering him?"

[2] "And, by Zeus, I call on others for help," he said, "proclaiming a reward for his safe return."

"What about if one of your household servants is sick," he said, "do you attend to him and call on physicians to help, so that he doesn't die?"

"Exceedingly so," he said.

"And if one of your acquaintances who is far more useful than your household servants is at risk of perishing because of need," he said, "don't you think that it is worth your while to attend to his coming through safely?"

[3] "And yet you know indeed that Hermogenes\(^{82}\) is not lacking in judgment, and that he would be ashamed not to benefit you in return if he derived benefit from you. And I think it is worth the value of many household servants to have an attendant who is willing and of good intention, constant, competent to do what he is bid, and not only competent to do what he is bid but able to be useful of his own accord and to think and plan ahead.

[4] "The good household managers, moreover, say that one should buy at the time when it is possible to buy for a little something worth a lot. In fact, because of the present state of affairs one can acquire good friends very cheaply."
And Diodorus said, "You speak nobly indeed, Socrates. And bid Hermogenes to come to me."

"By Zeus, not I," he said. "Nor do I hold that it would be nobler for you to invite him than to go to him yourself; nor that it is a greater good for him that these things be done than for yourself."

Thus indeed Diodorus went to Hermogenes. And without spending much he acquired a friend, who made it his work to examine what he might say or do to benefit and delight Diodorus.
BOOK III

~ Chapter 1 ~

[1] That he benefited those who yearned for noble things by making them attentive to what they yearned for—this is what I shall now describe. Once, when he heard that Dionysodorus had come to the city professing to teach how to be a general, he said to one of his companions whom he perceived wished to obtain this honor in the city:

[2] “It is surely shameful, young fellow, for one who wishes to be general in the city to neglect learning how to be one, when it’s possible for him to do so. Indeed he would be penalized far more justly by the city than someone who takes up the work of making statues when he has not learned how.

[3] “For, since the whole city entrusts itself to the general in the risks of war, it is plausible that if he acts correctly great good things will come to pass, and if he acts incorrectly great bad things will come to pass. Wouldn’t someone be justly penalized, then, if he neglected to learn how to be general, while being attentive to being elected one?” By saying such things he persuaded this one to go and learn.

[4] But when he came back after learning, he poked fun at him by saying, “Men, just as Homer said that Agamemnon was majestic, doesn’t this fellow too appear more majestic, in your opinion, since he has learned how to be a general? In fact, just as one who has learned how to play the cithara is a cithara player even if he is
not playing, and one who has learned how to be a physician, even if he is not practicing, is nevertheless a physician, so too this fellow will continue as a general from this point on, even if no one elects him. But the one who does not understand is neither a general nor a doctor, not even if he has been elected by all human beings.

[5] "But, you," he said, "tell us from what point he began in teaching you generalship, so that, in case even one of us should become a squadron commander or company leader, we would have an improved understanding of what pertains to war."

And he said, "He began from the very same point at which he also ended. For he taught me tactics and nothing else."

[6] "And yet," Socrates said, "this is indeed only one of the many parts of generalship. For the general also should be fit to equip his army for war, fit to procure provisions for his soldiers, fit to contrive, fit to work, attentive, fit to endure, shrewd, both friendly and fierce, both straightforward and devious, both fit to guard and thievish, lavish, rapacious, fond of giving, greedy, cautious, ready to attack, and there are many other things both in his nature and in his understanding that the one who is going to be a good general must have.

[7] "It is noble also to be a tactician. For a well-ordered army far surpasses a poorly ordered one, just as stones, bricks, wood, and clay are not useful when thrown down without being put in order; but when the things that don't rot or wear away, the stones and the clay, are put in order on the top and bottom, with the bricks and wood in the middle, as they are put together in building, then a possession worth a lot comes into being—a house."

[8] "But," the youth said, "you have said something quite similar, Socrates. For in war, too, one must order the best troops in the front and rear, and the worst in the middle, so that they will be led by the ones and pushed by the others."

[9] "Fine," he said, "if, that is, he taught you also how to distinguish the good from the bad. But if not, how does what you learned benefit you? For if he bade you to order the most noble silver (money) in the front and rear and the worst in the middle, without teaching you how to distinguish the noble from the counterfeit, it would not benefit you."

"But, by Zeus," he said, "he didn't teach this. So we would need to determine for ourselves who is good and bad."
"Why, then, don’t we examine how we might avoid erring in these matters?" he said.

"That is my wish," said the youth.

"And so," he said, "if we had to seize some money, would we order correctly if we set those most in love with money in front?"

"In my opinion, at least."

"What about those who are going to be at risk? Shouldn’t those most in love with honor be ordered in front?"

"These, at any rate," he said, "are the ones who want to take risks for the sake of praise. Nor indeed is it unclear who they are but, since they are highly visible everywhere, it would be easy to select them."

"But did he teach you tactics only," he said, "or also where and how one should use each of these orderings?"

"Not much," he said.

"And yet many are the contingencies in which it is fitting neither to put in order nor to speak in the same manner."

"But, by Zeus," he said, "he did not make these things clear."

"By Zeus," he said, "then go back and question him again. For if he has this understanding and is not shameless, he will be ashamed after having taken your money to send you away in such a wanting state."

[10] And once when he happened to meet someone who had been elected general, he said, "For what purpose do you think Homer addressed Agamemnon as 'shepherd of the people'? Isn’t it

"The manuscripts and Stobaeus read "easy to select them" (euairetoi). Hude adopts the correction "easy to find them" (eueuretôi).

"Where" (hopoi) is the reading of a number of the manuscripts. Hude reads "in what manner" (hopēi).

"Reading "to speak" (legein), as found in some of the manuscripts, instead of "to lead" (agein), with Hude and most of the manuscripts.
because, just as shepherds should attend to it that the ewes will be safe and have their provisions and that the purpose for which they are sustained will be achieved, so also the general must attend to it that the soldiers will be safe and have their provisions and that the purpose for which they go on campaign will be achieved? And they go on campaign so that through overpowering their enemies they’ll be happier.

[2] “Or why ever did he praise Agamemnon by speaking in this way: ‘He is both, a good king and a strong spearman’? Isn’t it that he would be a strong spearman, not if he contended well alone against the enemy, but if he were responsible for this for the whole army as well; and a good king, not if he presided nobly over his own life alone, but if he were also responsible for the happiness of those over whom he was king?

[3] “For indeed the king is elected not in order to attend to himself nobly, but so that those also who elected him will do well because of him. And all go on campaign in order to have the best possible life, and for this purpose they elect generals, so that they will be their leaders for this.

[4] “So the one who is general should furnish this to those who elected him general. In fact it’s not easy to find anything else more noble than this, or more shameful than its opposite.” And by examining in this way what the virtue of a good leader is, he stripped away the rest but left the making of whomever he leads happy.

~ Chapter 3 ~

[1] I know that he also conversed once in the following way with someone who had been elected to command the cavalry. "Young fellow," he said, "would you be able to tell us why you desired to be cavalry commander? Surely it was not for the sake of riding first among the horsemen. In fact it is the mounted cavalry’s bowmen who are thought to deserve this position. At any rate, they ride in front even of the cavalry commanders."
"You speak truly," he said.
"Moreover, it was not for the sake of being recognized either, since madmen too are recognized by all."
"You speak the truth also about this," he said.
[2] "Was it rather because you think that you would hand the cavalry back to the city having made it better, and if some need for the cavalry should arise you think that in leading them you would be the cause of some good for the city?"
"Yes, indeed," he said.
"It is indeed noble, by Zeus," Socrates said, "if you are able to do these things. The rule to which you have been elected is, I suppose, over both horses and riders?"
"It certainly is," he said.
[3] "Come then, tell us this first, how you intend to make the horses better."
And he said, "But I don't think this is my work. Each, rather, must attend privately to his own horse."d
[4] "How, then, will the cavalry be of any benefit to you," said Socrates, "if some provide you with horses that have such bad feet or bad legs or are so weak or so ill sustained that they cannot follow, and others with horses so ill trained that they won't stay where you order them, or who kick so much that it is not possible even to put them in order? How will you be able to do the city any good in leading such horses?"
And he said, "You speak nobly, and I shall try to attend to the horses as far as I am able."
[5] "What about the horsemen?" he said. "Won't you attempt to make them better?"
"Indeed I will," he said.
"Will you first, then, make them more skilled at mounting their horses?"
"One certainly must," he said, "for in fact should one of them fall off, he would thus more likely be saved."
[6] "What about if they should have to run some risks somewhere? Will you bid them draw the enemy onto the sand, which

"In place of "horse" (hippou), as found in Stobaeus, the manuscripts have "work" (ergou).
is where you are accustomed to ride horses,\textsuperscript{13} or will you try to conduct your practices on the sorts of terrain where the wars will take place?"

"That certainly would be better," he said.

[7] "What about this? Will you pay any attention to their hitting as many as possible from their horses?"

"This too certainly would be better," he said.

"Did you intend also to sharpen the souls of your horsemen and arouse their anger against the enemy, things that make them more stouthearted?"

"If not, at least now I shall try," he said.

[8] "Have you worried at all about how to get your horsemen to obey you? For without this neither horses nor good and stouthearted horsemen are any benefit."

"You speak truly," he said. "But how would someone most turn them in this direction, Socrates?"

[9] "This you surely know—that in every matter human beings most want to obey those they believe to be best. In fact, when sick they obey most whomever they believe to be most skilled as a physician, and on a ship those who sail obey most whomever they believe most skilled as a pilot, and in farming they obey most whomever they believe to be most skilled in farming."

"Yes, indeed," he said.

"It is plausible, then, also in horsemanship," he said, "that the rest will most want to obey whoever most visibly knows what should be done."

[10] "So, Socrates," he said, "if I am clearly the best among them, will this be enough for them to obey me?"

"If, at any rate, in addition to this," he said, "you teach them that obeying you is both more noble and more conducive to their safety."

"And how will I teach this?" he said.

"Far more easily, by Zeus," he said, "than if you had to teach them that bad things are better and more profitable than good things."

[11] "Are you saying," he said, "that, in addition to the rest, the cavalry commander must also attend to being able to speak?"

"Did you think," he said, "that you ought to command the cavalry by silence? Or haven’t you pondered the fact that it is through
speech that we learned all the things that we have learned are most noble according to law, things by means of which we understand how to live; and that if someone learns any other noble thing, he learns it through speech; and that those best at teaching use speech the most; and that those who have the most understanding of the most serious things converse most nobly?

[12] "Or haven't you pondered the following fact, that whenever a single chorus comes from this city, like the one that is sent to Delos,14 not one from anywhere else is a match for it, nor is there an abundance of good men, similar to that here, gathered in any other city?"


"And yet, the Athenians do not surpass others in goodness of voice, nor in size and strength of body, as much as they surpass them in love of honor,15 the thing that especially spurs one toward what is noble and honored."

"This also is true," he said.

[14] "Do you think, accordingly," he said, "that if someone should attend also to the cavalry here, that it too would far surpass the others—in equipage of other arms and horses, in orderliness, and in readiness to take risks against the enemy—if the horsemen held that in doing these things they would obtain praise and honor?"

"It is plausible, at least," he said.

[15] "Then, don’t hesitate," he said, "but try to turn your men toward the things from which both you yourself, and the other citizens through you, will benefit."

"But, by Zeus, I shall try," he said.

\~ Chapter 4 \~

[1] Once when he saw Nicomachides16 departing from the elections for offices, he asked, "Who were the generals elected, Nicomachides?"

And he said, "Why Socrates, aren’t the Athenians just the sort
not to elect me, although I am quite worn out from going on cam­
paign from the service list as well as from serving as company
leader and squadron commander, and have so many wounds from
the enemy?”—and as he said this he undressed and displayed to
him his scars from the wounds—“but instead they elected Antis-
thenes,”17 he said, “who has never gone on campaign as a hoplite18
nor done anything admirable among the horsemen, and who un-
derstands nothing other than how to gather wealth.”

[2] “Well, isn’t this a good thing,” Socrates said, “if, that is, he
is to be competent to procure provisions for the soldiers?”

“Merchants too are competent to gather wealth,” Nicomachides
said, “but they wouldn’t, on this account, have the capacity to be
generals as well.”

[3] And Socrates said, “But Antisthenes is also a lover of vic-
tory,19 which is a suitable attribute for a general. Don’t you see that,
as often as he has sponsored choruses,20 he has won the victory
with all of them?”

“By Zeus,” said Nicomachides, “there is no similarity between
presiding over a chorus and an army.”

[4] “And yet,” said Socrates, “although Antisthenes is experi-
enced in the teaching of neither song nor dance, he was neverthe-
less competent to find those who are best at these things.”

“In the army, too, then,” said Nicomachides, “will he find some
who will put it in order instead of him, and others who will fight?”

[5] “If, at any rate,” Socrates said, “in the contests of war, too,
he discovers and selects those who are best, as he did in the choral
contests, it is plausible that he will bear away the victory in this
field as well. And in all likelihood he would want to spend wealth
more on victory in contests of war—a victory shared with the
whole city—than on a victory in choral contests shared with his
tribe.”

[6] “Are you saying, Socrates,” he said, “that it belongs to the
same man nobly to sponsor a chorus and to be a general?”

“What I, for my part, am saying,” he said, “is that, whatever
someone presides over, if he knows what is needed and is able to
procure it, he will be a good presiding officer, whether it is a chorus
or a household or a city or an army that he presides over.”

that I would hear you say that good household managers would be good generals."

"Come then," he said, "let's review the tasks of each of them so that we may know whether they are the same or differ in some respect."

[8] "By all means," he said.

"Is it, then," he said, "the task of both to prepare the ruled to pay heed to them and to obey?"

"Yes, indeed," he said.

"What about ordering those who are serviceable for doing each thing to do it?"

"This too," he said.

"Moreover, I think it is fitting for both to punish the bad and to honor the good."

"Certainly," he said.

[9] "And as for making their subordinates well disposed—how could this not be noble for both?"

"I think that this too is fitting," he said.

"And, in your opinion, is it or is it not advantageous to both to bring over to their side allies and those who would give aid?"

"Certainly," he said.

"But is it not fitting for both to be fit to guard their property?"

"Exceedingly," he said.

"And so, is it fitting that both be attentive and fond of labor regarding their own tasks?"

[10] "All these things belong similarly to both," he said, "but fighting is no longer a thing belonging to both."

"But enemies, at any rate, arise for both?"

"This much is indeed the case," he said.

"Then is it advantageous for both to prevail over them?"

[11] "By all means," he said, "but what you are disregarding is this: if one should have to fight, what benefit would there be from the art of household management?"

"There, no doubt, the benefit would be in fact greatest," he said, "for the good household manager—who knows that nothing is so profitable and gainful as being victorious in fighting the enemy, nor so unprofitable and costly as being defeated—will eagerly seek out and furnish what is advantageous for victory, and attentively
examine and guard against what brings defeat; and if he sees that his preparation is such as to bring victory he will fight energetically, and, what is not the least of these things, if he is unprepared he will guard against joining battle.

[12] "Nicomachides," he said, "do not hold in contempt men who are skilled at household management. For attending to private affairs differs only in terms of multitude from attending to public ones. Among other very great similarities the greatest one is that neither takes place without human beings, nor is action taken in private affairs through some human beings, in public affairs through others. For those who attend to public affairs don't deal with (chrēsthai) any other human beings than those whom they deal with (chrēsthai) in private affairs when managing their households. And those who understand how to deal with (chrēsthai) these human beings do well (kalōs) both in private and in public affairs; and those who don't understand strike false notes in both."

~ Chapter 5 ~

[1] Once, in a conversation with Pericles, the son of the great Pericles, he said, "I, for my part, have hope, Pericles, that with you as general the city will both be better in matters of war and have a better reputation regarding them, and that it will overpower its enemies."

And Pericles said, "I would wish for what you speak of, Socrates. But I am unable to discern how these things might come about."

"Do you wish, then," said Socrates, "that by calculating about them we examine what is possible at present?"

"I do wish it," he said.

[2] "You know, then," he said, "that the Athenians are no worse off in number than the Boeotians?"

"I do know it," he said.

"And do you think that one could select more good and noble bodies from Boeotia than from Athens?"
“In my opinion, they do not fall short in this way either.”

“And whom do you hold to be better disposed toward themselves?”

“I, for my part, think the Athenians are. For many of the Boeotians, having been subjected to the Thebans’ greed, are ill disposed toward them, but I see nothing of this sort in Athens.”

[3] “Moreover, they are surely the most honor-loving as well as the most affectionate of all—these being not the least of the qualities that spur one to take risks on behalf of both good reputation and fatherland.”

“The Athenians are not blameworthy in these things either.”

“And, as for noble deeds of ancestors—something by which many are exalted and turned toward attending to virtue and becoming stouthearted—no one has more of these or greater ones than Athenians do.”

[4] “What you are saying is all true, Socrates. But you see that ever since the misfortune that befell the thousand with Tolmides in Lebedea, and that with Hippocrates at Delium, the Athenians’ opinion regarding the Boeotians has been humbled on this account, and the high spirit of the Thebans regarding the Athenians has been exalted. As a result, the Boeotians, who before did not dare to range themselves against the Athenians even in their own land without the Lacedaemonians and the other Peloponnesians, now threaten on their own to invade Attica; and the Athenians, who before ravaged Boeotia, when the Boeotians were alone, now fear that the Boeotians will lay waste to Attica.”

[5] And Socrates said, “I perceive that this is the case, but in my opinion the disposition of the city is now more acceptable to a good man who rules it. For confidence implants neglect, easygoingness, and disobedience, while fear makes people more attentive, more obedient, and more orderly.

[6] “And I would make this judgment also on the basis of those who are on ships. For when they fear nothing, they are surely full of disorder. But whenever they are in terror of a storm or enemies, they not only do everything they are bid to do but even keep silent,

*Hude adopts the emendation “high-minded” (megalophronestatoi). “Most affectionate” or “most friendly” (philophronestatoi) is the reading of the manuscripts.*
watching anxiously for further instructions just like members of a chorus."

[7] "But," said Pericles, "if indeed they would now most obey, now would be the time to say how we might turn them toward passionately loving again their ancient virtue, fame, and happiness."

[8] "And so, if we wished them," said Socrates, "to lay claim to wealth that others had, we would show them that it is their patrimony and belongs to them, and it is in this way especially that we would set them on the path to claiming it; but since it is holding first place together with virtue that we wish them to attend to, we must show them that this, in turn, has from long ago belonged most to them, and that by attending to this they would be best of all."

[9] "How, then, would we teach this?"

"I think if we would remind them that they have heard that the most ancient ancestors of theirs of whom we hear were most excellent."

[10] "Are you speaking of the decision about the gods that those around Cecrops made on account of virtue?"

"I am speaking of that and of the rearing and birth of Erechtheus and of the war that came in his time against those from the whole bordering mainland and of the one in the time of the Heracleides against those in the Peloponnese and of all those fought in the time of Theseus, in all of which they were clearly the most excellent of the human beings of their time.

[11] "And, if you wish, what their descendants did later, those who were born not much before us, on the one hand, contesting on their own against the lords of all Asia and Europe up to Macedonia, they acquired power and resources in amounts surpassing what their ancestors had, and accomplished the greatest deeds; and on the other, together with the Peloponnesians, they excelled both on land and on sea. Surely they are in fact said to have far surpassed human beings of their time."

"They are indeed," he said.

[12] "So, accordingly, when many in Greece were migrating elsewhere, they stayed where they were in their own land; and many who were engaged in disputes about justice put themselves
in their hands; and many who were treated insolently by those who were stronger than they were took refuge with them.”

[13] And Pericles said, “Indeed I wonder, Socrates, how the city ever took a turn for the worse.”

“I, for my part, think,” said Socrates, “that, just as some others, who have become easygoing due to their great preeminence and mightiness, fall behind their adversaries, so the Athenians too neglected themselves when they had great preeminence and due to this became worse.”

[14] “What, then,” he said, “could they do at present to recover their ancient virtue?”

And Socrates said, “It is nothing secret in my opinion, but if they would find out the pursuits of their ancestors and pursue them no worse than they did, they would become no worse than they were; alternatively, by at least imitating those who now have first place, and engaging in the same pursuits as they, if they use the same things similarly, they would be no worse than they are; and if they use them more attentively, they’ll be even better.”

[15] “You are saying,” he said, “that gentlemanliness (nobility and goodness) is somewhere far away from the city. For when will the Athenians, who now have contempt for the old beginning with their fathers, revere their elders in the way the Lacedaimonians do? Or when will they, who not only themselves neglect good condition but even ridicule those who attend to it, train their bodies in the same way?

[16] “When will they obey their rulers, who even exult in their contempt for their rulers? And when will they have the same likeness of mind, who instead of working together to one another’s advantage threaten one another abusively and envy one another more than the other human beings; while they disagree most of all in private and public gatherings and prosecute the most cases against one another and choose to gain at one another’s expense in

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1。“Others” (alloi) is the reading of the manuscripts. Hude adopts the emendation “athletes” (athletai).

2。“They” (houtoi) is the reading of most of the manuscripts. Hude adopts the emendation “similarly” (houtos).
this way rather than jointly benefiting one another; and while, using the common property as if it were foreign, they fight in turn over this and take most delight in their abilities in such matters.

[17] "From these things, much mischief and much badness are putting down roots in the city, and much enmity and hatred of one another are arising among the citizens, due to which, I am, for my part, always very afraid lest something bad befall the city that is too great for it to be able to bear."

[18] "Don't at all believe, Pericles," Socrates said, "that the wickedness with which the Athenians are sick is so incurable. Don't you see that they are orderly in naval matters, that they obey those in charge in athletic contests in an orderly manner, and that in choruses their subordination to their teachers is inferior to none?"

[19] "This," he said, "is in fact a wonder: that those sorts obey the rule of the ones in charge, while the hoplites and horsemen, who, as opinion has it, are distinguished among the citizens by their gentlemanliness (nobility and goodness), are the most disobedient of all."

[20] And Socrates said, "But isn't the Council of the Areopagus, Pericles, established from among those who have been approved after scrutiny?"

"Yes, indeed," he said.

"Then, do you know any," he said, "who act more nobly, more lawfully, more augustly, or more justly in their judgment of cases and in all other respects?"

"I cast no blame on these," he said.

"You must not, then, be dispirited on the grounds that the Athenians are not orderly," he said.

[21] "And yet," he said, "in what concerns the soldiers—where there is most need to be moderate, orderly, and obedient to rulers—they pay attention to none of this."

"For perhaps," said Socrates, "those who have the least understanding in these matters rule them. Don't you see that no one who lacks understanding attempts to rule cithara players, members of a chorus, and dancers, nor even wrestlers or pancratists, but all who

h "Mischief" (atēria) is the reading of one manuscript. Another has "perplexity" (aporia), and the rest have "inexperience" (apeiria).
rule over these are able to show where they learned the things they are in charge of. Most of the generals, on the other hand, make things up themselves as they go along. 38

[22] "However, I, for my part, do not hold you, at least, to be of this sort, but I think that you are no less able to say when you began to learn how to be general than when you began to learn how to wrestle. Indeed I think that you have inherited and preserve many things from your father's store of generalship, 39 and that you have collected many things from wherever it was possible to learn something beneficial for generalship.

[23] "I think that you have given to this much anxious thought to avoid being ignorant, unawares, of anything beneficial for generalship, and that if you perceive that you do not know something of this sort, you seek out those who understand these things, sparing neither gifts nor favors in order that you might learn from them what you do not understand and have good helpers in your work."

[24] And Pericles said, "I am not unaware, Socrates, that you say this not because you think that I attend to these things, but because you are attempting to teach me that one who is going to be a general must attend to all of them. Of course, I too agree with you about this."

[25] "Have you observed this, Pericles," he said, "that large mountains lie before our land and reach down to Boeotia, through which there are narrow and steep paths into our land, and that the middle of our land is girded by mountain strongholds?"

"Yes, indeed," he said.

[26] "What about this? Have you heard that the Mysians and Pisidians, because they possess extreme strongholds in the King's land, 40 are able to run down and do great damage to the King's land and to live freely themselves, though they are lightly armed?"

"I have heard this too," he said.

[27] "Don't you think," he said, "that Athenians of nimble age, who were armed with lighter weapons and held the mountains that lie before our land, would be harmful to the enemy and furnish the citizens with a great bulwark for the land?"

And Pericles said, "I think, Socrates, that all these things too are useful."

[28] "Then, if these things please you," said Socrates, "attempt
them, excellent fellow. For whichever of them you may accomplish, it will be both noble for you and good for the city. While, if you are unable to accomplish some one of them, you will neither harm the city nor shame yourself."

~ Chapter 6 ~

[1] When Glaucon, the son of Ariston, attempted to make a public address out of a desire to preside over the city although he was not yet twenty years old, none of his other relatives or friends was able to stop him from being dragged from the speaker’s stand and making himself ridiculous. But Socrates, who was well intentioned toward him for the sake of Charmides, the son of Glaucon, and for the sake of Plato, stopped him all by himself.

[2] For, when he happened to meet him, he first detained him by saying the following sorts of things to make him want to listen. "Glaucon," he said, "do you intend to preside over our city?"

"I do, Socrates," he said.

"By Zeus," he said, "if indeed anything else among human beings is noble, this is. For it is clear that, should you accomplish this, you will be able to obtain for yourself whatever you desire and be competent to benefit your friends; you will raise up your paternal household; you will enlarge your fatherland; you will be famous, first in the city, then in Greece, and perhaps, like Themistocles, even among the barbarians. And wherever you are, you will be gazed at from all sides."

[3] When he heard these things Glaucon was exalted and remained with pleasure. After that, Socrates said, "This, then, is clear, Glaucon, that if you wish to be honored the city must be benefited by you?"

"Certainly," he said.

"By the gods," he said, "don’t keep it a secret, then, but tell us where you will begin to do good deeds for the city."

[4] When Glaucon remained silent, as though examining just
then where he would begin, Socrates said, "Just as you would attempt to make a friend richer if you wished to enlarge his household, will you also try to make the city richer?"

"Certainly," he said.

[5] "Would it be richer, then, if its revenues increased?"

"It's plausible, at any rate," he said.

"Tell, then, the sources and amounts of the city's revenues at present," he said. "For it is clear that you have examined this so that if any of them are in a deficient state you may bring them to full capacity, and if some are being passed over you may provide them in addition."

"But, by Zeus," said Glaucon, "these things I have not examined."

[6] "But if you have passed over this," he said, "at least tell us about the city's expenditures. For it is clear that you also intend to remove those that are superfluous."

"But, by Zeus," he said, "I have not yet had leisure for these either."

"Shall we then," he said, "postpone making the city richer? For how is it possible, at least for one who doesn't know its expenditures and the revenues, to attend to these things?"

[7] "But Socrates," said Glaucon, "it is possible to make the city rich from enemies."

"Exceedingly, by Zeus," said Socrates, "if one is stronger than they; but if one is weaker, one would lose in addition even one's own things."

"You speak truly," he said.

[8] "And so," he said, "the one at least who is going to deliberate regarding whom one should wage war against must know the power both of his city and of its adversaries, so that if that of his city is stronger he may advise it to attempt the war, but if it is weaker than that of the adversaries he may persuade it to be cautious."

"You speak correctly," he said.

[9] "To begin with, then," he said, "tell us the land and sea power of our city, next, that of its adversaries."

"But, by Zeus," he said, "I would not be able to tell you like this off the top of my head."
'But if you have written it down, bring it forth,' he said, 'for it would be very pleasant for me to hear this.'

'But, by Zeus,' he said, 'I have not yet written it down either.'

[10] 'Shall we then,' he said, 'hold off giving advice also regarding war, just now, at least? For, perhaps, due to the magnitude of these matters, and since you are just now beginning your presiding, you have not yet reviewed them. But I know that you have already attended at least to the guarding of the land, and that you know how many guard posts are vital and how many not, and how many guards are sufficient and how many not; and you will advise that the vital guard posts be enlarged, and the superfluous ones removed.'

[11] 'By Zeus,' said Glaucon, 'I, for my part, would remove all of them, because they guard in such a way that what comes from the land is stolen.'

'If one were to remove the guard posts,' he said, 'don’t you think that license to rob will be given also to anyone who wishes? But,' he said, 'have you reviewed this matter by going yourself, or how do you know that they guard badly?'

'I conjecture it,' he said.

'Shall we then,' he said, 'give advice about these matters, too, when we no longer conjecture but already know?'

'Perhaps,' said Glaucon, 'that would be better.'

[12] 'I know that you have not got to the silver mines,' he said, 'so as to be able to say why less revenue proceeds from there now than in the past.'

'No, I certainly haven’t gone,' he said.

'Indeed, by Zeus,' Socrates said, 'the place is said to be oppressive, so that this will be excuse enough for you whenever you may have to give advice about it.'

'I am being made fun of,' said Glaucon.

[13] 'But this, at least,' he said, 'I know that you have not neglected, but you have examined for what length of time the food that comes from the land is capable of continually sustaining the city, and how much in addition is needed annually, so that the city may never come to be in need of this with you unawares, but, knowing it, you would be able to come to the city’s aid and save it by advising it about its necessities.'
"You speak of a huge task," said Glaucon, "if one will have to attend to these sorts of things as well."

[14] "But, indeed," said Socrates, "one would never manage even his own household nobly, unless he knows all its needs and attends to filling them all. But since the city is composed of more than ten thousand households, and it is hard to attend to so many households at the same time, how is it that you haven't first tried to enlarge one, that belonging to your uncle? It needs it. And if you should be able to do this, you will also attempt a larger number. But if you are unable to benefit one, how would you be able to benefit many? Just as if someone were not able to carry one talent, how would it not be visible that he shouldn't even attempt to carry a larger number?"

[15] "But, I for my part, would benefit my uncle's household," said Glaucon, "if he should want to obey me."

"Then," said Socrates, "although you are not able to persuade your uncle, you hold that you would be able to make all the Athenians along with your uncle obey you?"

[16] "Be on your guard, Glaucon," he said, "lest out of a desire to have a good reputation you come into the opposite. Or don't you see how perilous it is for someone to say or do what he doesn't know? Ponder whether, in the case of others whom you know to be of the sort visibly to say and do what they don't know, they obtained praise rather than blame for such things, in your opinion, or were admired rather than held in contempt?"

[17] "And ponder as well the case of those who know both what they say and what they do. And, as I hold, you will find in every work that those who have good reputations and are admired come from those who have the most understanding, while those who have bad reputations and are held in contempt come from the most ignorant.

[18] "So, if you desire to have a good reputation and to be admired in the city, try to achieve, to the greatest extent, knowledge of what you wish to do. For if, after surpassing the others in this, you should attempt to engage in the city's affairs, I would not wonder if you should very easily obtain what you desire."
[1] When he saw that Charmides, the son of Glaucon, was a man worthy of note and far more able than those engaged in political affairs at that time, but was hesitant to approach the demos and to attend to the city's affairs, he said, "Tell me, Charmides, if someone should not want to compete in the contests whose prizes are garlands—although he is competent to win the victory in them and, on account of that, be honored himself and enhance the reputation of his fatherland in Greece—what sort would you hold this man to be?"

"That is clear," he said, "soft and cowardly."

[2] "And if someone," he said, "who is able, by attending to the city's affairs, to enlarge his city and on account of that to gain honor for himself, should hesitate to do this, wouldn't he plausibly be held a coward?"

"Perhaps," he said. "But with regard to what are you asking me these questions?"

"The fact," he said, "that I think you hesitate to attend to them, though you are able and they are matters in which it is necessary for you to participate, since you are a citizen."

[3] "In what sort of work have you observed this ability of mine so as to form these judgments about me?" said Charmides.

"In your associations in which you keep company with those who engage in the city's affairs," he said. "For in fact whenever they consult with you on some matter I see you advising them nobly and, whenever they err in something, censuring them correctly."

[4] "It is not the same thing, Socrates," he said, "to converse in private and to compete among the multitude."

"And yet," he said, "he who is able to count, counts no worse among the multitude than when he is alone; and those who play the cithara best when they are alone prevail also among the multitude."

[5] "But don't you see that awe and fear," he said, "have natural roots in human beings and that they come to one far more in crowds than in private company?"

"In fact I have set out to teach you," he said, "that you, who feel
no awe of those who are most prudent and no fear of those who are strongest, are ashamed to speak among those who are both the most senseless and the weakest.

[6] "Is it the fullers among them or the shoemakers or the carpenters or the smiths or the farmers or the merchants or those who barter in the agora and worry about what they can buy for less and sell for more whom you feel shame before? For it is from all of these that the assembly is composed.

[7] "In what, do you think, is what you are doing different from fearing the amateurs even though one prevails over those who are in training? For, although you easily converse with those who have first place in the city (some of whom have contempt for you), and although you far surpass those who attend to conversing with the city, you hesitate to speak among those who have never yet worried about political affairs and who do not have contempt for you, because you are afraid of being ridiculed."

[8] "What about this?" he said. "Don't those in the assembly frequently, in your opinion, ridicule those who speak correctly?"

"In fact so do the former," he said. "Therefore I also wonder if you, who handle those with ease whenever they do this, think that you will be able to find no way to approach the latter.

[9] "Do not be ignorant of yourself, good fellow, and don't err the way most do: for the many, having set out to examine the affairs of the others, do not turn to taking themselves under review. So don't be easygoing about this, but rather exert yourself to pay attention to yourself. And don't neglect the city's affairs, if due to you they can be in a somewhat better state. For when these things are going well, not only the other citizens but also your friends and, not least, you yourself will benefit.

~ Chapter 8 ~

[1] Aristippus attempted to refute Socrates, just as he himself had been refuted by him earlier. Wishing to benefit his companions, Socrates answered him, not as those who are on their guard lest
their speech somehow become entangled, but as one who has been persuaded that he would thus most be doing what he should.

[2] For he asked him whether he knew anything good, so that if he should say one of the things such as food, drink, wealth, health, strength, or daring, [Aristippus] would then show that the thing mentioned was sometimes bad. But [Socrates], who knew that if something annoys us we are in need of what will stop it, answered after the manner in which it is best also to act.

[3] "Are you," he said, "asking me if I know something good for fever?"

"No, I am not, for my part," he said.

"Rather for ophthalmia?"

"Not that either."

"Rather for hunger?"

"Nor for hunger."

"And yet," he said, "if you are asking me at any rate if I know something that is good for nothing, I neither know it," he said, "nor need it."

[4] And, again, when Aristippus asked him whether he knew anything noble, he said, "Indeed many things."

"So," he said, "are they all like one another?"

"Some are certainly as unlike as possible," he said.

"Then how," he said, "could what is unlike the noble be noble?"

"Because, by Zeus," he said, "a human being noble at wrestling is unlike another who is noble at running. And a shield noble for defense is as unlike as can be to a javelin noble for being violently and swiftly borne."

[5] "You are answering me no differently," he said, "than when I asked you if you knew something good."

"Do you think," he said, "that one thing is good and another noble? Don't you know that all things are noble and good for the same things? For, first, virtue is not something good for some things and noble for other things; next, human beings are said to be noble and good in the same respect as well as for the same things; the bodies of human beings, too, appear noble and good for the same things; and all other things that human beings use are held to be noble and good for the same things—whatever they are useful for."
“Then,” he said, “is even a dung-carrying basket noble?”

“By Zeus,” he said, “and a gold shield is shameful (ugly), if for their own work one should be nobly made, and the other badly.”

“Are you saying,” he said, “that the same things are both noble and shameful?”

“And, by Zeus, I, for my part, am saying,” he said, “that they are both good and bad. For frequently what is good for hunger is bad for fever, and what is good for fever is bad for hunger. Frequently what is noble for running is shameful for wrestling, and what is noble for wrestling is shameful for running. For all things are good and noble for the things for which they are well suited, and bad and shameful for the things for which they are ill suited.”

And when he said that the same houses are both noble and useful, he was educating, at least in my opinion, as to the sort that should be built. He examined it in the following way: “Ought one who is going to have the sort of house he should, contrive that it will be both most pleasant to live in and most useful?”

And this being agreed to:

“Is it pleasant, then, to have one cool in summer and warm in winter?”

When they would assent to this too:

“Accordingly, in houses looking toward the south, does the sun shine into the inner rooms in winter, while in the summer when it travels over us and the roofs, it provides shade? If then it is noble that these things come to be thus, one should build a house higher on the southern side, so that the winter sun won’t be shut out, and closer to the ground on the northern side, so that the cold winds won’t burst in.

“In sum, the most pleasant and most noble dwelling would plausibly be the one where one would have in every season the most pleasant refuge and where one would make one’s belongings most secure. Paintings and embroideries deprive one of more delights than they provide.” Moreover the most becoming place for temples and altars he said to be that which, while being most visible, would be most untrodden; for it is pleasant for those who see it to offer prayers, and it is pleasant for those who are undefiled to approach it.
Again when he was asked whether courage is a thing that is taught or natural, he said, “I think that, just as one body is born stronger than another with regard to its labors, so one soul comes to be by nature more vigorous than another with regard to what is terrible. For I see that those reared in the same laws and customs differ greatly from one another in daring.

“I hold, however, that every nature will be augmented with regard to courage by learning and by practice. For it is clear that Scythians and Thracians would not dare to take up shields and swords to fight against Lacedaimonians. And it is visible that Lacedaimonians would want to compete neither against Thracians with light shields and javelins nor against Scythians with bows.

“I, for my part, also see that, similarly in all other things, human beings both differ from one another by nature and improve greatly by attentiveness. From this it is clear that everyone—those who are naturally better as well as those whose natures are duller—should both learn and practice those things at which they wish to become worthy of note.”

And he did not distinguish between wisdom and moderation but decided that one is both wise and moderate who knows and uses the noble and good things and knows and avoids the shameful ones. And when he was asked in addition whether he held those to be wise and continent who understand what they should do, but do the opposite, he said, “No more than unwise and incontinent: I for I think that all, choosing from among the possibilities the things they think are most to their advantage, do those things; I hold, then, that those who do not act correctly are neither wise nor moderate.”

And he said that justice as well as every other virtue is wisdom. For the just things and all the things that are done through virtue are noble and good. And those who know these things

\*Several of the manuscripts have “incontinent” (akrateis) in place of “continent” (engkrateis).

\*Several of the manuscripts have “untaught” or “stupid” (amatheis) in place of “incontinent” (akrateis).
would not choose anything else instead of them, nor would those who understand them not be able to do them, but err even if they should try. Thus also as regards what is noble and good, the wise do them and those who are not wise are not able to, but even if they try, they err. Since, then, it is through virtue that the just things and all other noble and good things are done, it is clear that justice as well as every other virtue is wisdom.

[6] He said, moreover, that madness is the opposite of wisdom; however, he did not hold that lack of understanding is madness. He reasoned that to be ignorant of oneself and—with regard to the things one doesn’t know—to opine and think that one in fact knows them is nearest to madness. He said that the many, however, assert that those who are mistaken in matters that most fail to know are not mad, while they call mad those who are mistaken in matters the many know.

[7] For if someone thinks that he is so tall that he bends forward when he goes through the gates of the city wall, or so strong that he attempts to lift up houses, or applies himself to another of the things that are clear to everyone that they are impossible, they assert that this person is mad. But those who make a small mistake are not mad in the opinion of the many, but, just as they call strong desire erotic passion, so they also call great derangement of mind madness.

[8] And when he examined envy, whatever it is, he discovered that it is a certain pain, not indeed that which comes at misfortunes of friends nor that at good fortunes of enemies, but he said only those who are distressed by their friends’ doing well feel envy. When some wondered if someone who loved another could be pained by his doing well, he reminded them that many are so disposed to some people that when those people are doing badly they are unable to look the other way but aid them in their misfortune, while they are pained at those people’s good fortune. This, however, would not happen to a sensible man, but those who are foolish always experience this passion.

k"Nor would those who understand them not be able to do them" is the reading of the manuscripts. Hude adopts an emendation, which would be rendered "nor would those who don’t understand them be able to do them."

l"Always" (aei) is the reading of one manuscript; others have "should" or "must" (dei); one manuscript omits the word altogether.
And when he examined leisure, what it is, he said that he discovered that most people are doing something; for even players at checkers and buffoons do something. And he said that these all have leisure, for it is in their power to go to do the things that are better than these. No one, however, has leisure to go from the better things to the worse; and if someone should go, he said lack of leisure afflicts the one who does this, so that he does badly.

He said that kings and rulers are not those who hold the scepters, nor those elected by just anybody, nor those who obtain office by lot, nor those who have used violence, nor those who have used deceit, but those who understand how to rule.

For whenever someone would agree that it belongs to the ruler to command what should be done, and to the ruled to obey, he pointed out that on a ship the one who understands, rules, while the shipowner together with all others on the ship obey the one who understands; and in farming those who possess fields and in sickness those who are sick and in body training those who are training their bodies and all others to whom there belongs something needing attention, if they themselves believe that they understand how to attend to it, [they do so]; but if not, they not only obey those who understand when they are present but even send for them when they are absent, so that by obeying them they may do what they should. And he pointed out that in the spinning of wool even the women rule the men due to the fact that they know how one should work wool, while the men do not know.

And if someone should say in response to these things that it is possible for the tyrant not to obey those who speak correctly, he said, "How indeed would it be possible for him not to obey, since a penalty is laid down if someone does not obey the one who speaks well? For in whatever matter someone does not obey the one who speaks well, he will no doubt err, and in erring be penalized."

And if someone should say that it is possible for the tyrant even to kill the one who thinks well, he said, "But do you think that the one who has killed the best of his allies is free from penalty, or that he suffers some chance penalty? For do you think that the one who does this would be preserved, or rather that he would in this way quickly perish?"
[14] When someone asked him what, in his opinion, is the best pursuit for a man, he answered that it is doing well (eupraxia). And when he asked again if he held that good fortune (eutuchia) too is a pursuit, he said, “For my part, I believe that fortune (tuche) and action (praxis) are complete opposites. For I think it is good fortune for someone who is not seeking it to chance upon (epituch-ein) something that he needs, but I hold that it is doing well (eu-praxia) for someone who has learned and practiced something to do it well (eu poiein), and those who pursue this are, in my opinion, doing well (eu prattein).”

[15] And he said that the best and the dearest to the gods are, in farming, those who do well (eu prattein) in farming affairs and, in medicine, those who do well in medical affairs and, in political life, those who do well in political affairs. And he said that the one who does well in nothing is neither useful nor dear to the gods.

~ Chapter 10 ~

[1] Furthermore, if he ever conversed with any of those who possessed arts and used them for their trade, he was beneficial to these also. For, once when he visited Parrasius the painter and conversed with him, he said, “Parrasius, does the art of painting consist in making likenesses of what is seen? At any rate, you closely imitate bent, stately, dark, light, hard, soft, rough, smooth, young, and old bodies by making likenesses through colors.”


“Moreover, in making as likenesses the beautiful (kalos) forms, you bring together from many what is most beautiful in each, and in this way you make whole bodies appear beautiful, since it is not easy to chance upon a single human being all of whose parts are blameless.”

“We do this indeed,” he said.

[3] “What about this?” he said. “Do you imitate a most persua-
sive, pleasing, loving, longed-for, and passionately beloved thing, the soul's character? Or is this not a thing that can be imitated?"

"'How could a thing be imitated, Socrates, which has neither proportion nor color nor any of the things you just now mentioned—and which is altogether unseen?' he said.

[4] "'Doesn't it come to pass, then,' he said, 'that a human being looks toward some in a friendly or hostile manner?'"

"'In my opinion, at least,' he said.

"'And so, can this much, at least, be imitated in the eyes?'"

"'Yes, indeed,' he said.

"'And, do those who are worried and those who are not, have, in your opinion, similar facial expressions on the occasion of the good things and on that of the bad things that befall their friends?'

"'By Zeus, surely not,' he said. 'For at the good things they are bright, and at the bad ones they are downcast.'"

"'And so,' he said, 'is it possible to make likenesses of these things too?'"

"'Yes, indeed,' he said.

[5] "'Furthermore, the character that is magnificent and liberal or humble and illiberal, that is moderate and sensible or insolent and inexperienced in the beautiful, shines through the facial expression as well as the postures of human beings—whether they are standing still or in motion.'"

"'You speak truly,' he said.

"'And so, these things, too, can be imitated?'"

"'Yes, indeed,' he said.

"'Which likenesses then,' he said, 'do you hold to be more pleasant for human beings to see: those through which the noble and good and cherished characters are visible, or those through which the shameful and wicked and hateful characters are visible?'"

"'There is a great difference, by Zeus, Socrates,' he said.

[6] When he visited the sculptor Cleiton once and conversed with him, he said, 'That the runners, wrestlers, boxers, and pancratists that you make, Cleiton, are beautiful I both see and

m"'Beautiful' (kaloi houts) is an emendation. The manuscripts have 'different' (alloious)."
know. But how do you work into your statues what especially draws the souls of human beings through their sense of sight, namely, the appearance of being alive?"

[7] And when Cleiton, perplexed, did not answer quickly, he said, "Is it by likening what you make to the forms of living beings that you make your statues appear more lifelike?"

"Yes, indeed," he said.

"Do you, accordingly, by making likenesses of what in bodies is pulled up and down by the postures, and what is squeezed together, pulled apart, stretched tight, and relaxed, make them appear more similar to true bodies and more persuasive?"

"Certainly," he said.

[8] "And doesn’t the imitation also of the passions of bodies that are doing something cause a certain joy in those who behold it?"

"It’s plausible, at any rate," he said.

"Should one, then, make likenesses also of the threatening eyes of those who are fighting, and imitate the look of those delighting in the victory they have won?"

"Exceedingly so," he said.

"Then the sculptor must make likenesses of the passions of the soul by means of the form."

[9] When he visited Pistias, the maker of breastplates, after the latter had displayed to Socrates some well-made breastplates, "By Hera," he said, "noble indeed, Pistias, is the invention of the breastplate, which protects the parts of a human being in need of protection but does not prevent the use of one’s hands.

[10] "Yet, tell me, Pistias," he said, "why do you sell your breastplates for more, although you do not make them stronger or costlier than others?"

"Because, Socrates," he said. "I make them better proportioned."

"Is it by measure or by weight that you show their proportion

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"Several manuscripts read "works" or "deeds" (erga) of the soul rather than "passions" (pathē).

"Show" (apodeiknumi) is a correction adopted by Hude; the manuscripts read "display" (epideiknumi).
in placing more value on them?" he said. "For I certainly do not think that you make them all equal or similar, at least if you make them fit."

"But, by Zeus, I do make them fit," he said, "for a breastplate without this is of no benefit."

[11] "As for bodies, at least, of human beings," he said, "are some well proportioned, and others ill proportioned?"

"Certainly," he said.

"How then," he said, "do you make a breastplate that fits an ill-proportioned body well proportioned?"

"In just the way in fact that I make it fit," he said, "for what fits is well proportioned."

[12] "You are saying, in my opinion," said Socrates, "that a thing is well proportioned not in itself, but with regard to the one using it, just as if you should say that a shield is well proportioned for whomever it fits, or a mantle—and this is how it seems to be with everything else by your argument.

[13] "And perhaps something else, too, which is no small good, attaches to fittingness."

"Teach it, Socrates," he said, "if you have something."

"Breastplates that fit," he said, "are less likely to press with their heaviness than those of the same weight that don't fit. For those that do not fit, either hanging wholly from the shoulders or pressing excessively also some other part of the body, become difficult to bear and harsh. But those that fit, dividing their heaviness so that some of it is supported by the collarbones and the tops of the shoulders where they join the collarbone, some by the shoulders, some by the breast, some by the back, some by the stomach, seem almost not like a thing carried but like an appendage."

[14] "You have spoken," he said, "the very thing on account of which I, for my part, hold that those I make are worth the most. Some, however, buy decorated and gold-plated breastplates instead."

"But yet," he said, "if, at any rate, on account of these things they buy ones that do not fit, in my opinion they buy what is bad—decorated and gold-plated though it may be."

[15] "Yet," he said, "since the body does not remain in one po-
sition but sometimes bends and sometimes is straight, how would precisely fitted breastplates fit?"

"There is no way they would," he said.

"You are saying," he said, "that it is not the precisely fitted that fit, but those that do not cause pain in their use?"

"You are saying it yourself, Socrates," he said, "and your grasp of the matter is very correct."

~ Chapter 11 ~

[1] There was a once a beautiful \((kalos)\) woman in the city, whose name was Theodote\(^74\) and who was the sort to keep company with\(^75\) whoever persuaded her. When one of those who were present mentioned her and said that the beauty of the woman surpassed\(^76\) speech; and when he had said that painters, to whom she displayed as much of herself as was noble to display, visited her in order to draw her likeness, Socrates said, "We must go to behold her, for surely it is not possible for those who have merely heard to learn\(^77\) what surpasses speech." And the one who had described her said, "Hurry up and follow."

[2] Thus they went to Theodote and came upon her standing for a certain painter, and they beheld her. After the painter left off, Socrates said, "Men, should we be more grateful to Theodote for displaying to us her beauty, or she to us because we beheld? If the display is more beneficial to her, is it for her to be grateful to us, while if the beholding is more beneficial to us, for us to be grateful to her?"

[3] And when someone said that what he said was just, he said, "She, then, already gains from our praise and will be the more benefited whenever we should report it to more people; while we already desire to touch what we have beheld and will go away rather excited and will long for what we have left behind. From
these things it is plausible that it is we who serve and she who receives service."

And Theodote said, "By Zeus, if this is so, then it is I who should be grateful to you for the beholding."

[4] After this, Socrates—seeing that she herself was adorned in a costly manner and that her mother, who was with her, was dressed and served in no chance manner and that her maidservants were many and good-looking and that not even these were inattentively maintained and that her household was furnished with the other things in abundance—said, "Tell me, Theodote, do you own a farm?"

"Not I," she said.

"How about a household with revenues?"

"Not a household either," she said.

"But some artisans perhaps?"

"Not artisans either," she said.

"Then what source do you have for your provisions?" he said.

"If someone who has become my friend wants to treat me well," she said, "he is my livelihood."  

[5] "By Hera, Theodote," he said, "it is a noble possession indeed, and far better to possess a herd of friends than a herd of sheep, goats, and cattle. But," he said, "do you entrust it to chance whether some friend will light on you, like a fly, or do you yourself contrive something?"

[6] "How could I find a contrivance for this?" she said.

"It belongs much more, by Zeus, to you to do this than to spiders," he said. "You know how they hunt things for their livelihood: for, of course, they weave fine webs and use whatever falls into them for sustenance."

[7] "Are you advising me, too," she said, "to weave some hunting net?"

"No, for you surely shouldn't think that you will hunt so artlessly the prey that is worth the most: friends. Don't you see that even for rabbits, which are worth very little, hunters craft many artifices?"

[8] "For, since they graze at night, they procure for themselves dogs fit for nighttime hunting and hunt them with these. And because they run away when it is day, they acquire other dogs who
find the rabbits out by perceiving through scent the path they take from their grazing ground to their lair. And because they are swift-footed enough to escape by running even when they are visible, they furnish themselves with still other dogs, swift ones, so that they may capture them by following on their heels. And because some of them escape even from these, they set nets up on the paths through which they flee, so that when they fall into them they may become enmeshed.

[9] "So with what thing of this sort," she said, "could I hunt friends?"

"By Zeus," he said, "if instead of a dog you acquire someone who will track and find for you those who love beauty and are rich, and who, after finding them, will contrive to throw them into your nets."

[10] "And what sort of nets," she said, "do I have?"

"To be sure, one that is indeed very entangling: your body," he said. "And in it a soul, through which you learn both how you might gratify with a look and delight with what you say; and that you must receive with gladness one who is attentive but shut out one who is spoiled; and that when a friend is sick, at least, to watch over him worriedly, and when he does something noble to be exceedingly pleased by it along with him; and to gratify with your whole soul the one who worries about you exceedingly. I know very well that you understand how to love, at any rate, in a manner not only soft but also well intentioned; and as to the fact that your friends are best for you, I know that you convince not only by speech but by deed."

"By Zeus," said Theodote, "I, for my part, contrive none of these things."

[11] "And yet," he said, "it makes a big difference to approach a human being according to nature and correctly. For to be sure you would neither take nor hold a friend by violence, but this prey is both captured and kept constant by means of benefaction and pleasure."


^The manuscripts have "best" (aristoi). Hude adopts the emendation "pleasing" (arestoi).
"You must first, then," he said, "require that those who worry about you do the sort of things that they will least regret doing, and then you yourself should make a return by gratifying them in the same fashion. For this way they would most become friends and love for the longest time and confer the greatest benefactions.\[13\]

And you would most gratify them, if you should give of yourself to those who are in need. For you see that even the most pleasant of foods, if someone offers it before there is desire, appears unpleasant and even provokes disgust in those who are satiated; but if someone offers it after inducing hunger, even if it is very common it appears quite pleasant."

[14] "How, then," she said, "would I be able to induce hunger in someone for what I have?"

"By Zeus," he said, "if, first, you neither approach nor offer any reminder to those who are satiated until they stop being full and are in need again. Then, if you offer reminders to those who are in need by means of the most decorous intimacy possible and by visibly wishing to gratify, yet fleeing—until they are most in need. For it makes a big difference to give the same gifts at that point, rather than before they desire them.

[15] And Theodote said, "Why then, Socrates, don’t you become my fellow hunter of friends?"

"If, by Zeus," he said, "you persuade me."

"How, then, might I persuade you?" she said.

"You yourself will seek this out and will contrive it," he said, "if you have some need of me."

[16] "Then visit often," she said.

And Socrates, joking about his own lack of busyness, said, "But Theodote, it is not very easy for me to find leisure, for in fact many affairs both private and public deprive me of leisure. And I also have female friends who will not allow me to leave them day or night, since they are learning love charms and incantations from me."

[17] "Do you understand these things, as well, Socrates?" she said.

"Well," he said, "why do you think Apollodorus here and Antisthenes are never absent from me? And why do you think Cebes
and Simmias\textsuperscript{84} are present from Thebes? Know well that this hasn’t happened without many love charms, incantations, and spells.”\textsuperscript{85}  

[18] “Then lend me the spell,” she said, “so that I might draw it first against you.”

“But, by Zeus,” he said, “I myself do not wish to be drawn to you—but that you come to me.”

“Then I will go to you,” she said. “Only receive me.”

“But I will receive you,” he said, “unless some female dearer than you is inside.”

\~ Chapter 12 \~

[1] When he saw that one of his companions, Epigenes,\textsuperscript{86} was both young and maintained his body badly, he said, “How like a private individual\textsuperscript{87} you maintain your body, Epigenes.”

And he said, “For I am a private individual, Socrates.”

“Not any more in fact than those who are about to compete in the Olympics,” he said. “Or in your opinion is the contest for one’s life\textsuperscript{88} against the enemy—a contest the Athenians may at any time chance to establish—a small one?

[2] “And yet, not a few people die amid the risks of war, or are saved in a shameful manner, due to the bad condition of their body. And many, due to this same thing, are captured alive and after being captured either live the rest of their lives as slaves—if they so chance—in the harshest slavery or, having fallen into the most painful necessities and paid sometimes more than they have, they are in want of necessities for the rest of their lives and live in misery. And many acquire a shameful reputation (doxa) due to the incapacity of their body, because, as opinion has it, they are cowardly.

[3] “Or do you hold in contempt these penalties for bad condition and think that you would easily bear such things? And yet I think that the things that one who attends to the good condition
of his body must endure are much easier and more pleasant than those things. Or do you hold that bad condition is healthier and more useful for other things than good condition? Or do you hold in contempt what comes about due to good condition?

[4] “And yet the things that happen to those who maintain their bodies well are all the opposites of the ones that happen to those who maintain them badly. For those who maintain their bodies well are both healthy and strong. And many due to this are saved in a seemly manner in the contests of war and escape all the terrible things; many bring aid to their friends and do good deeds for their fatherland and due to this are deemed worthy of gratitude, acquire a great reputation, and obtain most noble honors and due to these things live the rest of their life in a more pleasant and more noble manner and leave their children with more noble resources for life.

[5] “One should not, just because the city does not train one at the public expense for the things of war, neglect this in private as well, but attend to it no less. For, know well that you will not be worse off in any other contest or in any action from having your body better equipped. The body is useful for all actions that human beings take; and in all the uses of the body it makes a lot of difference to have the body in as good condition as possible.

[6] “Since, even where, in your opinion, there is least use of the body—in thinking—who does not know that, even here, many greatly falter because their body is not healthy? And forgetfulness, dispiritedness, peevishness, and madness frequently attack the thought of many due to the bad condition of their body, so as to drive out even the sciences.89

[7] “For those whose bodies are in good condition, there is much security and no risk of suffering something of this sort, at least due to the bad condition of the body; and it is plausible rather that good condition, too, is useful for the opposites of the things that occur due to bad condition. And what would anyone with sense not endure for the sake of the opposites of the things mentioned?

[8] “It is also shameful due to neglect to grow old before seeing oneself in the most beautiful (kallistos) and strongest bodily state one might attain. But it is not possible for one who is neglectful to see these things, for they do not want to come to pass spontaneously.”
[1] Once when someone was angry because, when he addressed someone in greeting, he was not addressed in return, he said, "It is ridiculous that, if you met someone with a worse body you wouldn’t be angry, but you are pained because you met by chance someone more boorishly disposed in his soul."

[2] When someone else said that he didn’t take pleasure in eating, he said, "Acumenus teaches a good cure for this." And when the other asked him, "Of what sort?" he said, "To stop eating, and to live more pleasantly, more cheaply, and more healthfully after you have stopped."

[3] Again, when someone else said that the drinking water at his house was warm, he said, "Then whenever you wish to take a bath in warm water, it will be ready for you."

"But, it’s too cold for bathing," he said.

"Then, are your household servants, too, annoyed when they drink it or bathe in it?" he said.

"By Zeus," he said, "I frequently have wondered, rather, at the pleasure with which they use it for both these purposes."

"Which is warmer to drink," he said, "the water at your house or that in the temple of Asclepius?"

"That in the temple of Asclepius," he said.

"And which is colder to bathe in, the water at your house or that in the temple of Amphiaraus?"

"That in the temple of Amphiaraus," he said.

"Ponder, then, on the fact that you run the risk of being more difficult to please than both your household servants and those who are sickly."

[4] When someone was vigorously punishing an attendant, he asked him why he was angry with his servant.

"Because," he said, "although he is most slack, he is a great eater of relishes, and although laziest, a great lover of money."

"Have you ever yet examined, then, which one is more in need of blows, you or your servant?"

[5] When someone was afraid of the trip to Olympia, he said, "Why are you afraid of the trip? Don’t you walk about for nearly
the whole day even at home? And when you travel there, you will walk until breakfast, walk until dinner, and then rest. Don’t you know that, if you would stretch out the walks you take in five or six days you would easily arrive at Olympia from Athens? It is also more delightful to set out early by one day than to arrive late. For to be compelled to prolong the stages beyond measure is hard, while increasing by one the days of travel provides great ease. It’s better, then, to hasten in setting out rather than on the road.”

[6] When another said that he was worn out from having traveled a long way, he asked him if he carried a burden as well.

“No, by Zeus, I did not, except for my cloak,” he said.

“And did you travel alone,” he said, “or did your attendant follow too?”

“He followed,” he said.

“Was he empty-handed,” he said, “or carrying something?”

“By Zeus, he was carrying the bedding and the other equipment,” he said.

“And how,” he said, “has he emerged from the journey?”

“In my opinion,” he said, “better than I have.”

“Then, what if you had to carry his burden?” he said. “How do you think you would have fared?”

“Badly, by Zeus,” he said. “Or, rather, I wouldn’t even have been able to convey it.”

“How, then, in your opinion, has a man trained himself, who is so much less able to labor than his slave boy?”

~ Chapter 14 ~

[1] Whenever some of his dinner companions brought a small amount of relish and others brought a large amount, Socrates bid the slave boy either to place the small amount at the common disposal or to distribute a portion of it to each. Then those who brought the large amount were ashamed not to join in partaking of what was placed in common and not to place their own in return.
So they too placed their own at the common disposal. And since they had no more than those who brought a small amount, they stopped spending a lot on relishes.

[2] When he observed once that one of his dinner companions had stopped eating bread\(^4\) and was eating the relish itself by itself,\(^5\) the talk being then about names—for what sort of work each name exists—he said, "Would we be able to say, men, with a view to what sort of work a human being is ever called a relish eater?\(^6\) For surely all eat relish on their bread, when it is available. But I think that they are not yet called relish eaters for this."


"What about this?" he said. "If someone should eat the relish itself without the bread, not because he is in training but for the sake of pleasure, would he be a relish eater according to opinion or not?"

"Scarcely anyone else would be a relish eater," he said.

And someone else of those present said, "And the one who eats a large amount of relish with a small amount of food?"

"In my opinion," Socrates said, "he too would justly be called a relish eater. And whenever other human beings pray to the gods for a large crop, it is plausible that he would pray for a large amount of relish."

[4] When Socrates said this, the youth, who held that what had been said was spoken with a view to him, did not stop eating relish but took a loaf as well. And when Socrates observed it, he said, "Those who are near this one should watch closely whether he will use the food as relish or the relish as food."

[5] When he saw another one of his dinner companions tasting more than one relish with a single morsel of bread, he said, "Could there be a more costly relish making\(^7\) or one more likely to ruin the relish than that practiced by the one who eats many at once and takes a variety of sweetenings into his mouth at once? In mixing more together than the relish makers do he adds cost; and in mixing things that they do not mix together, on the grounds that they don't fit, he errs and undoes their art, if, that is, they act correctly.

[6] "And yet how is it not ridiculous to furnish oneself with the relish makers who have the best understanding and then, though
one doesn’t even lay a claim to this art, to change around what is
done by them? And something else befalls one who has become
habituated to eating many foods at once: for, when there are not
many relishes present, he has the opinion that he is somehow worse
off, since he longs for what is habitual with him. But the one who
has become habituated to dispatching one morsel of bread with one
relish would be able painlessly to use the one when many should
not be available."

[7] He said also that "to feast" (eurocheisthai)\textsuperscript{98} was called eating
(esthiein) in the Athenian tongue. He said that the "well" (eu) was
added with a view to eating those things that pain neither the soul
nor the body and are not difficult to find. As a result he attributed
feasting, too, to those who live with a decorous way of life.
So beneficial was Socrates in every matter and in every manner that it was visible to one who examined with even limited perception\textsuperscript{a} that there was nothing more beneficial than being a companion of Socrates and spending time with him anywhere at all and in any matter whatsoever, since even remembering him when he was not present was of no small benefit to those who were accustomed to being in his company and who were receptive\textsuperscript{1} to him. In fact when he was joking he was no less profitable to those who spent time with him than when he was serious.

For while he would often say that he was in love with someone, his desire was visibly not for those whose bodies were naturally well formed for youthful bloom but rather for those whose souls were naturally well formed for virtue. And he judged the good natures from their learning quickly what they turned their minds to, remembering what they learned, and desiring all of the subjects of learning through which one can nobly manage a household and a city and, altogether, make good use\textsuperscript{2} of human beings and human matters. For he believed that, if they have been educated, those with such a nature would not only be happy them-

\textsuperscript{a} "Examined with even limited perception" is the reading of the manuscripts generally; Hude accepts the reading of Stobaeus and one of the manuscripts: "examined and perceived fairly."
selves and nobly manage their own households but they would also be able to make other human beings as well as cities happy.

[3] He did not approach all in the same manner, but those who thought they were by nature good and who were contemptuous of learning he taught that the natures opinion holds as best are most in need of education—pointing out\(^3\) that the horses with the best natures, who are high-spirited and impetuous, if broken in from a young age become most useful and best, but if unbroken become hardest to restrain and quite common;\(^4\) and that in the case of the dogs with the best natures, who love labor and are ready to attack their prey, those that have been nobly reared become best for the hunts and most useful, while without rearing they become useless and mad and most intractable.

[4] Similarly, he pointed out also that the human beings with the best natures, who are most robust in their souls and most able to accomplish whatever they attempt, if they are educated and learn what they should do, become best and most beneficial (for the good things they accomplish are very many and very great), while without education and learning they become worst and most harmful, for—not understanding how to decide what they should do—they frequently attempt wicked actions, and since they are grand and impetuous they are hard to restrain and hard to turn back, which is why the bad things they do are very many and very great.

[5] And as for those who were proud on account of their riches and held that they had no need of education besides but thought that their riches would suffice for them both in accomplishing whatever they wished and in being honored by human beings, he instructed them by saying that one is foolish if he thinks that without learning he will distinguish which things are beneficial and which harmful; and one is foolish if he thinks that without distinguishing these things, while procuring for himself whatever he wishes due to his riches, he will be able to do what is advantageous; and one is a simpleton if he thinks that, without being able to do what is advantageous, he does well and is nobly or sufficiently furnished for his life;\(^b\) and one is a simpleton also if he thinks that

\(^b\)The translation of this clause is based on Hude's reading *eu te* following Stobaeus, in place of the manuscripts' *oute*, which would be difficult to translate.
due to his riches he will, without understanding anything, be thought (dokein) to be good in anything, or, without being thought good in anything, have a good reputation.\(^5\)

\[\sim\text{ Chapter 2 }\sim\]

[1] I shall now describe how he approached those who held that they had obtained the best education and were proud on account of their wisdom. For he learned that Euthydemus the beautiful\(^6\) had collected many writings of the poets and of the sophists who were held in the highest repute, and due to these held himself to be already superior to his contemporaries on account of wisdom and had great hopes of surpassing everyone in being able to speak and take action. To begin with, perceiving that because of his youth he did not yet enter the agora but sat at one of the bridle makers' shops near the agora when he wished to have something done, he too entered this place with some of those with him.

[2] And first—when someone inquired whether it was due to keeping company with one of the wise or by nature that Themistocles\(^7\) was so superior to the citizens that the city looked to him whenever it had need of a serious man—Socrates, who wished to stir Euthydemus, said that it was naive to think, on the one hand, that in the arts hardly worth mentioning human beings don't become serious without competent teachers, but, on the other hand, presiding over a city, which is the greatest work of all, comes to them spontaneously.

[3] And once again when Euthydemus was present—seeing that he retreated from the group seated together and was on his guard lest he seem (dokein) to admire\(^8\) Socrates for his wisdom—he said, "Men, it is quite clear from his pursuits that when Euthydemus here comes of age he will not refrain from giving advice when the city proposes a discussion about something. And, in my opinion, he prepares for himself a noble opening for his public addresses by guarding against having a reputation (dokein) for having learned
anything from anyone. For it is clear that in beginning to speak he 
would make the following opening:

[4] 'From no one, ever, men of Athens, did I learn anything, nor 
when I heard that some were competent at speaking and taking 
action did I seek to meet them; nor did I attend to having one of 
those who understand become my teacher. Rather, the opposite: I 
have spent my time fleeing not only from learning anything from 
anyone but even from seeming to do so. Nevertheless, I shall give 
you whatever advice spontaneously occurs to me.'

[5] "Opening in this manner would also be fitting for those who 
wish to get medical work from the city. It would be serviceable for 
them to begin the speech from this point: 'From no one, ever, men 
of Athens, did I learn the medical art, nor did I seek that any of 
the physicians become my teacher. For I have spent my time guard­
ing not only against learning anything from the physicians but even 
against seeming to have learned this art. Nevertheless, give me the 
medical work: I shall try to learn, making my trials on you.' Then 
all who were present laughed at the speech's opening.

[6] When it was visible that Euthydemus was already turning 
his mind to what Socrates was saying, but still guarding against 
uttering anything himself and holding that by his silence he clothed 
himself with a reputation (doxa) for moderation, Socrates, wishing 
to stop him from this, then said, "It is to be wondered at why those 
who wish to play the cithara or the flute or to ride horses or to 
become competent at anything else of the sort try to do as contin­
uously as possible whatever they wish to have ability in—and not 
on their own but by the side of those thought to be (dokein) best, 
doing and enduring everything in order to do nothing without their 
judgment, on the assumption that they would not otherwise be­
come worthy of mention—while some of those who wish to become 
able to speak and to act in political affairs hold that without prepa­
ration and attentiveness to them they will spontaneously, all at 
once, be able to do them.

[7] "And yet, the latter things appear more difficult to accom­
plish than the former to the extent that those who accomplish them 
are fewer, although more people involve themselves in them. So it 
is clear that those desirous of the latter need to give them more 
and stronger attention than those desirous of the former."
[8] Now, in the beginning, Euthydemus listened\(^{10}\) when Socrates made such speeches. But when he perceived that he endured it more readily when he conversed, and listened more eagerly, he went alone to the bridle maker's. And when Euthydemus sat down next to him, he said, "Tell me, Euthydemus, have you really collected, as I hear, many writings of the men said to have been wise?"

And Euthydemus said, "Yes, by Zeus, Socrates. And in fact I am still collecting them, until I shall acquire as many as I can."

[9] "By Hera,\(^{11}\) I do admire you," said Socrates, "because you did not choose to possess treasures of silver and gold rather than of wisdom. For you clearly hold that silver and gold make human beings no better, but that the wise men's judgments make those who possess them rich in virtue."

And when he heard this Euthydemus was delighted, holding that he was pursuing wisdom correctly in Socrates' opinion. And the latter, observing that he was pleased at this praise, said, [10] "In what do you wish to become good, Euthydemus, when you gather the writings?"

When Euthydemus remained silent while he examined how he should answer, Socrates again spoke: "It is not as a physician, is it? For indeed there are also many treatises by physicians."

And Euthydemus said, "By Zeus, not I."

"You don't wish to become a master builder either? For this too requires a man of judgment."

"Not I," he said.

"You don't desire to become a good geometrician either, like Theodorus?"\(^{12}\)

"Not a geometrician, either," he said.

"You don't wish to become an astronomer either?" he said. As he denied this too, he said, "Nor a rhapsode? For they say that you possess also all the verses of Homer."

"By Zeus, not I," he said, "for indeed I know that the rhapsodes are accurate as to the verses, while being themselves quite the simpletons."

[11] And Socrates said, "Do you not, Euthydemus, desire that virtue through which human beings become fit for political affairs, fit to manage households, competent to rule, and beneficial to other human beings as well as themselves?"
And Euthydemus said, "I want this virtue exceedingly."

"By Zeus," said Socrates, "you desire the noblest virtue and greatest art, for it belongs to kings and is called kingly. Yet, have you considered," he said, "whether it is possible to be good at this without being just?"

"Yes, indeed," he said. "And it is not possible to be a good citizen without justice."

[12] "So what about this—have you in fact achieved it?" he said. "I think, at least, Socrates," he said, "that I would appear no less just than anyone."

"Then are there not works belonging to the just," he said, "as there are works belonging to builders?"

"There are, indeed," he said.

"Then," he said, "as builders are able to display their own works, would those who are just be able to explain theirs?"

"Are you afraid," said Euthydemus, "that I can’t explain the works of justice? By Zeus, for my part, I can explain also those of injustice, since it is possible every day to see and to hear not a few such things."

[13] "Then do you wish us to write a J here, and an I here," said Socrates, "and then to put under J whatever is a work of justice, in our opinion, and whatever is a work of injustice under I?"

"If, in your opinion, we have some need of this in addition," he said, "do it."

[14] And having written as he said, Socrates said, "So then, does lying exist among human beings?"

"It does indeed," he said.

"Then under which shall we put it?" he said.

"Clearly under injustice," he said.

"Accordingly, does deceiving, too, exist?" he said.

"Yes, indeed," he said.

"Then under which shall we put it?"

"Clearly this too goes under injustice."

"And what about doing mischief?"

"This too," he said.

"And enslaving?"

"This too."
None of these things will be laid by us next to justice, Euthydemus?"

"For that would be terrible," he said.

"What if someone who has been elected general should enslave an unjust and hostile city? Will we say that he does an injustice?"

"Surely not," he said.

"Will we not say that he does what is just?"

"Yes, indeed," he said.

"What if he should use deception when he is at war with them?"

"This too is just," he said.

"And if he should steal and seize their belongings, will he not do what is just?"

"Yes, indeed," he said. "But I, for my part, supposed at first that you asked about these things with regard to one's friends alone."

"And so," he said, "would one have to put next to justice, too, what we put next to injustice?"

"It seems so," he said.

Then, do you wish," he said, "after thus putting these things, that we make the additional distinction that while it is just to do such things to enemies, it is unjust to friends, but to these at least one should be as straightforward as possible?"

"Certainly," said Euthydemus.

"What about this?" said Socrates. "If some general who sees that his army is dispirited should lie and say that allies are approaching and by this lie put an end to the soldiers' lack of spirit: under which shall we put this deception?"

"Under justice, in my opinion," he said.

"And if someone, whose son needs medicine but will not allow it near him, should deceive him by giving him the medicine as food and by using the lie in this way to make him healthy: where, again, should one put this deception?"

"In my opinion," he said, "this too goes in the same place."

"What about if someone should steal or seize a friend's sword or anything else of the sort, when the friend is dispirited, out of fear he might destroy himself: again, under which should one put this?"

"This too, by Zeus," he said, "goes under justice."
"Are you saying," he said, "that one should not be straightforward even with one's friends in all circumstances?"
"By Zeus, surely not," he said. "Rather I change where I put the things mentioned, if it's permitted."
"It must indeed be permitted," Socrates said, "much more than to put them incorrectly.

But, so that we do not leave even this unexamined, who is more unjust among those who deceive their friends so as to harm them: the one who does so willingly or unwillingly?"
"But Socrates, I, for my part, no longer trust my answers. In fact all my previous answers are now otherwise in my opinion than as I thought then. Nevertheless, let it be said by me that the one who lies willingly is more unjust than the one who does so unwillingly."

"In your opinion, is there learning and understanding of the just, in the same way as there is of writing?"
"In my opinion, at least."
"Which do you decide to be more skilled in writing, the one who willingly writes and reads incorrectly, or the one who does so unwillingly?"
"For my part, the one who does so willingly. For he would be able also to do these things correctly whenever he should wish."
"Would, then, the one who willingly writes incorrectly be skilled in writing and the one who does so unwillingly unskilled?"
"How not?"
"Which knows the just things, the one who willingly lies and deceives, or the one who does so unwillingly?"
"Clearly the one who does so willingly."
"Are you saying, then, that the one who understands writing is more skilled at writing than the one who doesn't understand, and that the one who understands the just things is more just than the one who doesn't understand?"
"I appear to be: in my opinion, I am saying—I don't know how—these things as well."

What about if someone who wishes to speak the truth never says the same things about the same things; but when he points out the same road he at one time points to the east, and at another to the west; and when he declares the same calculation, he
declares it at one time as greater, and then at another as less: what is your opinion of such a person?"
"Clearly, by Zeus, he does not know what he thought he knew."
[22] "Do you know of any people who are called slavish?"
"I do, for my part."
"Is it due to wisdom or ignorance?"
"It is clear that it is due to ignorance."
"Now is it due to ignorance in smithing that they obtain this name?"
"Surely not."
"Rather, then, to ignorance in building?"
"Not due to this either."
"Rather to ignorance in shoemaking?"
"It is not due to any one of these things," he said, "but in fact the opposite: most of those who understand how to do such things are slavish."
"Then is this the name of those who do not know what the noble and good and just things are?"
"In my opinion, at any rate," he said.
[23] "Should we, then, exert ourselves in every way to escape being slaves?"
"But, by the gods, Socrates," he said, "I very much thought that I was pursuing in my philosophizing a philosophy through which, I held, I would be educated to the highest degree in what befits a man yearning for gentlemanliness (nobility and goodness). But now, how dispirited do you think I am at seeing that, for my previous pains, I am unable to answer even what is asked about things one most should know, and that I have no other road that I might travel to become better?"
[24] And Socrates said, "Tell me, Euthydemus, have you ever arrived at Delphi?"
"Yes, twice in fact, by Zeus," he said.
"Surely, you learned, then, what is written on the temple: 'Know thyself.'"
"I did indeed."
"Was the writing of no concern to you, then, or did you turn your mind to it and attempt to examine yourself regarding who you are?"
"By Zeus, certainly not," he said. "For indeed I thought that I knew this, at any rate, quite well: I could scarcely know anything else if I did not even know myself."

[25] "In your opinion, does the one know himself who knows only his own name? Or—just as horse traders don’t think they know the horse they wish to know before they examine whether it is obedient or disobedient and whether strong or weak and whether fast or slow and how it is with regard to the other qualities that make a horse suitable and unsuitable for use—is it the one who has examined himself as to how he is with regard to the use to which human beings are put and who knows his capacity?"

"That is indeed my opinion," he said, "that the one who doesn’t know his own capacity is ignorant of himself."

[26] "Is this not visible," he said, "that human beings experience most good things due to knowing themselves, and most bad ones due to being deceived about themselves? For those who know themselves know what suits them and distinguish between what they are capable of and what they are not; and by doing what they understand how to do, they procure what they need and do well, while by refraining from what they don’t understand, they remain free from error and escape doing badly. Due to this they are able to test other human beings as well, and through the use of the others procure the good things and guard against the bad ones.

[27] "Those, on the other hand, who don’t know but are utterly deceived about their own capacity are similarly disposed regarding the other human beings and the other human matters. And they know neither what they need nor whatever they are doing nor those they deal with (chrēthai); rather, erring utterly in all these respects, they fail to obtain the good things, and they encounter the bad ones.

[28] "And those who know whatever they are doing, since they succeed in what they do, come to be well reputed and honored. In addition, not only do those who are similar to them deal with (chrēthai) them with pleasure, but those who fail in their affairs desire to have them deliberate on their behalf and even to preside over themselves, and place in them their hopes for the good things and due to all of this cherish them most of all."
[29] “Those, on the other hand, who do not know what they are doing, since they choose badly and fail at the things they attempt, are penalized and punished not only in these very matters, but also due to them they are held in low opinion and ridiculed and live in contempt and dishonor. You see among cities, too, that some of those that, out of ignorance of their power, go to war against stronger cities become ruined, while others who were before free are enslaved.”

[30] And Euthydemus said, ”Know this, Socrates: that it is very much my opinion that one should place a high importance on knowing oneself. But as to where one should begin to examine oneself—for this I am looking to you, if you should want to explain it to me.”

[31] “You surely by all means know, then,” said Socrates, “what sorts of things are good and what sorts are bad?”

“By Zeus,” he said, “for if I did not know even this, I would be more common even than slaves.”

“Come, then,” he said, “explain this to me, too.”

“But it is not hard,” he said, “for, first, I hold that being healthy is itself good, being sick bad; then, as to the causes of each of these things—whether drink or food or pursuits—I hold that those are good that are conducive to being healthy, and those are bad that are conducive to being sick.”

[32] “So then, wouldn’t being healthy and being sick,” he said, “both be good whenever they should come to be the cause of something good, and bad when the cause of something bad?”

“When would being healthy ever come to be a cause of something bad or being sick a cause of something good?” he said.

“Whenever, by Zeus, there are shameful campaigns, harmful voyages, and many other things of the sort,” he said, “and they perish, those who take part in them due to might, while those left out due to feebleness are saved.”

“You speak truly,” he said. “But you see that the mighty take part also in the beneficial things, while the feeble are left out.”

“These things, then,” he said, “that are sometimes beneficial and sometimes harmful—are they more good than bad?”

[33] “Not at all, by Zeus, it appears, at least according to this
argument. But wisdom at any rate, Socrates, is indisputably good. For in what sort of matter wouldn't someone do better if he were wise than if he were ignorant?"

"What about Daedalus?" he said. "Haven't you heard that, after he was seized by Minos due to his wisdom, he was compelled to be his slave and was deprived of both his fatherland and his freedom at the same time; and that, when he attempted to escape with his son, he lost the boy and was himself unable to get away safely but was carried back to the barbarians to be a slave there again?"

"So it is said, by Zeus," he said.

"And have you not heard of the sufferings of Palamedes? For according to what all sing of him in hymns, he was destroyed by Odysseus, who envied him because of wisdom."

"This too is said," he said.

"And how many others do you think have been dragged away to the King due to their wisdom to be slaves there?"

[34] "It is probable, Socrates," he said, "that the least debatable good is being happy."

"Unless, at least, someone would compose it, Euthydemus, out of debatable goods," he said.

"Which," he said, "of the things conducive to happiness would be debatable?"

"None," he said, "unless we will include among its attributes beauty or strength or riches or reputation (doxa) or anything else of the sort."

"But, by Zeus, we will include them," he said. "For how would someone be happy without these?"

[35] "By Zeus," he said, "we will include then things from which many hard things befall human beings. For many due to their beauty are corrupted by those who are highly excited by those who are in bloom; and many due to their strength attempt greater works and encounter no small ills; and many due to their riches are destroyed when they are fussed over and plotted against; and many due to reputation and political power suffer great ills."

[36] "And yet," he said, "if I do not speak correctly even when I praise being happy, I agree that I do not know even what one should pray to the gods for."
"Well, these things, perhaps, you didn’t even examine due to your excessive trust that you knew them," said Socrates. "But since you are preparing to preside over a democratically ruled city, it is clear that you at least know democracy, what it is."

"By all means, to be sure," he said.

[37] "Now, in your opinion, is it possible to know democracy without knowing a demos?"

"By Zeus, not in my opinion, at least."

"Then you know a demos, as well, what it is?"

"I think I do, at least."

"And what do you hold a demos to be?"

"I, for my part, hold it to be the poor among the citizens."

"You know, then, the poor, as well?"

"How could I not know?"

"Do you know, then, the rich, as well?"

"No less, at least, than in fact the poor."

"What sorts do you call poor and what rich?"

"Poor, those who do not have what is sufficient to spend for what they need, I think, and rich, those who have more than is sufficient."

[38] "Have you observed, then, that for some the little that they have is not only enough, but they even put savings away from it, while for others a great amount is not sufficient?"

"Yes, by Zeus," said Euthydemus, "you are indeed correct to remind me. For I know even some tyrants who are compelled due to neediness to commit injustice—like those who are most lacking in means."[23]

[39] "Accordingly," said Socrates, "if in fact this is so, we shall include the tyrants in the demos while putting those who possess little, if they are skilled household managers, among the rich?"

And Euthydemus said, "Clearly it is my worthlessness that compels me to agree to these things too. Indeed I worry whether it may not be best for me to remain silent, for I probably know nothing at all."

And he went away very dispirited, having contempt for himself and holding that he was really a slave.

[40] Now many who were put into this state by Socrates no longer approached him, and he held these to be the more slack.
But Euthydemus supposed that he would become in no other way a man worthy of mention than if he were to be in Socrates' company as much as possible. And he no longer left him unless there was some compulsion, and even imitated some of his pursuits. And, for his part, when he recognized that this was his state, he disturbed him as little as possible and explained in the most simple and clear manner what he held he should know and what he held best for him to pursue.

[1] Now he did not rush his companions to become skilled in speaking and in taking action and in contriving, but he thought that moderation should come to be in them before these things. For he held that those who had these abilities without being moderate are more unjust and more able to do mischief.

[2] First, he tried to make his companions moderate about gods. Now others who were present have given descriptions of him associating in this manner with others. But I was present when he had a conversation with Euthydemus of the following sort.

[3] "Tell me, Euthydemus," he said, "has it ever yet occurred to you to ponder this: that the gods attentively furnish human beings with what they need?"

And he said, "By Zeus, it hasn't occurred to me, at least."

"But you surely know," he said, "that, first, we need light, which the gods provide to us?"

"By Zeus," he said, "if we did not have this, at least, we would be like those who are blind as far as our eyes are concerned."

"Furthermore, we need rest as well, and they provide us with night, a most noble resting time."

"Certainly," he said, "this too is deserving of gratitude."

[4] "Accordingly, since also the sun in its shining makes clear to us both the periods of the day and everything else, but night is rather unclear due to its darkness, they have shown forth stars in
the night that make visible to us the periods of the night; and on
this account we do many of the things we need.”

“These things are so,” he said.

“Moreover, the moon at any rate makes visible to us the parts
not only of the night but also of the month.”

“Certainly,” he said.

[5] “And since we need sustenance, what about the giving it
forth to us from the earth and the provision of seasons fitting for
this, which furnish us with an abundance and variety not only of
what we need but also of what we take delight in?”

“These things too,” he said, “are very indicative of a love of
human beings.”

[6] “And what about providing us also with water, which is so
valuable that it helps the earth and seasons in bringing forth4 and
increasing all the things useful to us, helps us also in sustaining
ourselves, and, when mixed with all that sustains us, makes these
things easier to digest and more beneficial as well as more pleasant;
and, since we need this in very great quantity, it is provided to us
most ungrudgingly?”

“This too,” he said, “is indicative of forethought.”

[7] “And what about the procuring24 for us also of fire, an ally
against cold, an ally against darkness, a coworker in every art and
for all things that human beings equip themselves with for their
benefit? For, in sum, without fire, human beings equip themselves
with nothing worth mentioning of the things useful for life.”

“This too,” he said, “belongs to a surpassing love of human be-
ings.”

[8] “And what about the sun’s approaching after it has turned
in winter, ripening some things and drying others out when their
time has passed; and when it has accomplished these things, its not
approaching any nearer, but turning away, on its guard lest it do

4“Helps in bringing forth” (sumphuein) is the reading of Stobaeus. The manu-
scripts have “plants” or “produces” (phuteuein).

4One manuscript includes at this point a passage thought to be an interpolation
(cf. Strauss, Xenophon’s Socrates, 103): “And the dispersing of air for us everywhere
so abundantly, not only a protector and co-nourisher of life but also one can traverse
the seas by means of it and by journeying procure provisions from other lands—
how is this not beyond speech? Indescribable.”
us some harm by heating us beyond what is needful; and when it again goes away and comes to the point when it is clear even to us that if it goes any farther away we will be frozen by the cold, its turning back and approaching again; and its turning to and fro in that region of the heaven where its presence would benefit us most?"

"By Zeus," he said, "these things too are altogether like things that happen for the sake of human beings."

[9] "And since this too is visible, that we could endure neither the blazing heat nor the cold if they occurred suddenly, what about the sun's both approaching so gradually and going away so gradually that we are unaware that we are being brought into each extreme?"

"I, for my part," said Euthydemus, "am already examining whether the gods have any other work than serving human beings. The only thing holding me back is that the other animals too participate in these things."

[10] "Is not this, too, visible," said Socrates, "that even these are born and sustained for the sake of human beings? For what other animal enjoys the benefits of so many good things as human beings do from goats, sheep, cattle, horses, asses, and the other animals? For, in my opinion, they enjoy more benefits from these than from the plants. At any rate, they are sustained and make wealth from the former no less than from the latter; and much of the human race does not use the plants from the earth for sustenance but lives by sustaining itself on milk, cheese, and flesh from grazing animals; and all domesticate and break in the animals that are useful and use them as helpers for war and much other work."

"I agree with you in this too," he said. "For I see even those that are much stronger than we who become subservient enough for human beings to make whatever use of them they wish."

[11] "And since there are many noble and beneficial things, but they differ from each other, what about the addition of perceptions to human beings, which are fit for each of the things and which are the means for our enjoying the benefits of all the good things? And what about the implanting of calculation in us by which, when we calculate and remember the things we perceive, we learn how
each of the things is advantageous, and contrive many ways to enjoy the benefit of the good things and ward off the bad ones?

[12] "In addition, what about the gift of explanation, through which, by teaching, we share with one another all the good things, live collectively, establish laws, and partake of political life?"

"The gods seem altogether, Socrates, to be very attentive to human beings."

"In addition, if we are unable to know in advance what is advantageous for the future, what about their helping us themselves in these matters by pointing out through divination, to those who inquire, how things will turn out, and by teaching the way in which they might best happen?"

"They seem to deal with (chrēsthai) you, Socrates, in a more friendly manner than the others," he said, "if, that is, though they are not even asked by you, they signal you in advance what you should and should not do."

[13] "And that I am speaking the truth, you, too, will know, if you do not wait until you see the shapes of the gods, but if it is enough for you, when you see their works, to revere and honor the gods. Reflect that even the gods themselves intimate so. For when the others give us the good things they do not enter into visibility when they give any of them; and the one who places together and keeps together the whole cosmos, in which all things are noble and good, and who always provides them unravaged, healthy, and ageless for our use, and who does unerring service more quickly than thought—this one, while seen to be doing the greatest things, is unseen by us as he manages them.

[14] "And reflect that even the sun, which is thought (dokein) to be visible to everyone, does not permit himself to be seen by human beings precisely, but he takes away the sight of anyone who attempts to behold him shamelessly. You will find that the servants of the gods, too, are invisible. For, that lightning at least is released from above is clear, and also that it overpowers all whom it encounters; but it is seen neither as it approaches nor as it strikes nor as it goes away. And breezes are not, themselves, seen, but what they do is visible to us, and we perceive them as they approach. Furthermore, that a human soul—which shares in the divine (theios)
if indeed anything else belonging to human beings does—is king in us is visible, but not even it is seen. Knowing these things, one should not have contempt for the things that are unseen, but, learning their power from what comes to pass, one should honor the divine (daimonion)."

[15] "I, for my part, know with certainty, Socrates," said Euthydemus, "that, not even in a small way, shall I neglect the divine (daimonion). But I am dispirited at this: that in my opinion no single human being could ever repay the gods' benefactions with the gratitude they deserve."

[16] "But don't be dispirited about that, Euthydemus," he said. "For you see that, whenever someone asks him how he would gratify the gods, the god at Delphi answers, 'By law of the city.' And surely it is law everywhere to please gods with sacrifices according to one's capacity. How, then, would one honor gods any more nobly or piously than by doing as they themselves bid? But one should in no way fall short of one's capacity.

[17] "For whenever someone does this, it is surely visible that he is not honoring gods at that point. So one should leave nothing undone in honoring the gods according to his capacity, and take heart and hope for the greatest goods. For it would not be moderate for someone to hope for more from others than from those able to benefit in the most important things, nor would it be moderate to hope for this other than if one would please them. And how would he please them more than if he obeyed them in the highest degree?"

[18] By saying such things and himself doing them he rendered his companions both more pious and more moderate.

~ Chapter 4 ~

[1] Furthermore, he did not hide the judgment he had concerning justice, at any rate, but showed it even in deed, by dealing with (chreisthai) everyone in private in a lawful and beneficial manner; and in public by being so obedient to rulers in what the laws
command, both in the city and on campaigns, that it was thoroughly clear that he was orderly beyond the others; [2] and when he presided in the assemblies he did not turn over a vote to the demos contrary to the laws, but together with the laws he opposed an onset of the demos so great that I don’t think any other human being would have endured it.30

[3] And when the Thirty31 commanded him to do something contrary to the laws he did not obey. For when they forbade conversinge with the young,32 and when they commanded him and some others to lead away one of the citizens to be put to death,33 he alone did not obey due to the fact that they were commanding him to do what was contrary to the laws.

[4] And when he was a defendant against the indictment brought by Meletus34—although the others are accustomed in the law courts to converse with the jurors in such a way as to gratify them and to flatter them and to beg them contrary to the laws, and although many are often let go by the jurors due to these sorts of things—he for his part wanted to do none of the customary things in the law court contrary to the laws; but, although he would have easily secured his release by the jurors if he had done any of these things even to a limited35 extent, he chose rather to die abiding by the laws than to live transgressing them.

[5] And while he often spoke in this manner with others too, I know that he once also had a conversation of the following sort about justice with Hippias the Elean.36 For when Hippias came to Athens after an interval of time, he was present when Socrates was saying to some people that it was a wonder that, while one who wishes to have someone taught shoemaking, building, smithing, or horsemanship is not perplexed as to where he would send him to obtain it—and some say that for one who wishes to have even a horse or cow made just, all places are full of teachers—but if one wishes either oneself to learn justice or to have one’s son or household servant taught it, he doesn’t knowf where to go to obtain this.

[6] And after listening to these things, Hippias said, as though

"Some of the manuscripts have “when they forbade him (auton) to converse.”
“'He doesn’t know where’ is the reading of Stobaeus adopted by Hude. The manuscripts have “there is no place where.”"
making fun of him, "Are you, Socrates, still saying the same things that I myself once heard from you a long time ago?"

And Socrates said, "And what is even more terrible than this, Hippias—I not only say always the same things but even say them about the same things. But you, perhaps, due to your great learning, never say the same things about the same things."

[7] "By all means," he said, "I try always to say something new."

"Even about the things you understand?" he said. "For example, if someone asks you how many and which letters are in 'Socrates,' do you try to say different things now from what you said before? Or to those who ask regarding numbers whether twice five is ten, don't you give the same answer now as you did before?"

"About these things, Socrates," he said, "I too always say the same things, just as you do. About justice, however, I altogether think that I am now able to say something against which neither you nor anyone else would be able to speak."

[8] "By Hera," he said, "great is the good you're saying that you have found, if jurors will cease being divided in their votes; citizens will cease contradicting one another, bringing lawsuits, and forming factions concerning the just things; the cities will cease disagreeing about the just things and going to war. And, for my part, I don't know how I could leave before hearing you, who has found a good of such magnitude."

[9] "But, by Zeus," he said, "you will not hear—at least, not before you yourself declare what you hold justice to be. For it is enough that you ridicule the others by asking and refuting everyone, while you yourself do not want to render an account to anyone or to declare your judgment about anything."

[10] "What's this, Hippias?" he said. "Have you not perceived that I never stop showing what things are just in my opinion?"

"And what sort is this speech of yours?" he said.

"If not by speech," he said, "I show it rather by deed. Or is it not your opinion that one's deed is more worthy testimony than one's speech?"

*Hude adopts the emendation "to contradict" (anteipein). The manuscripts and Stobaeus have "to speak" (eipein).
"Far more, by Zeus," he said. "For many who say just things do unjust ones, while no one who does just things would be unjust."

[11] "Have you ever perceived me, then, either bearing false witness or making a false accusation or casting friends or cities into civil faction or doing anything else unjust?"

"No, I have not, for my part," he said.

"And don't you believe that refraining from the unjust things is just?"

"It is clear, Socrates," he said, "that even now you are attempting to escape showing your judgment, whatever you hold justice to be. For you are saying not what the just do, but what they don't do."

[12] "But, for my part," said Socrates, "I thought, that not wanting to do injustice was a sufficient display of justice. But if you don't have the same opinion, examine whether the following pleases you more. For I say that the lawful is just."

"Are you saying, Socrates, that the same thing is both lawful and just?"

"I am, for my part," he said.

[13] "For I do not perceive what sort of thing you are saying is lawful and what sort is just."

"Do you know laws of a city?" he said.

"I certainly do," he said.

"And which do you hold these are?"

"What the citizens agreed upon and wrote as to what one must do and refrain from."

"Would, then," he said, "one who partakes of political life according to these be lawful, and one who transgresses them be lawless?"

"Certainly," he said.

"Accordingly, would the one obeying these do just things, and the one disobeying them do unjust ones?"

"Certainly."

"Then the one who does the just things is just, and the one who does the unjust things is unjust?"

"How could it not be the case?"

"Then the lawful one is just, and the lawless one is unjust."

[14] And Hippias said, "Socrates, how could anyone believe that laws or the obedience to them are a serious matter, when the very
people who set them down often change them, having rejected them after scrutiny?"

"War, too," said Socrates, "the cities have often begun only to make peace again."

"Yes indeed," he said.

"Do you think, then, that you behave differently," he said, "in disparaging those who obey the laws, because the laws might be repealed, than if you would find fault with those who were orderly in wars, because peace might come to pass? Or do you also cast blame on those who eagerly bring aid to their fatherlands in wars?"

"By Zeus, I certainly do not," he said.

[15] "Have you observed," said Socrates, "that Lycurgus the La­cedaimonian would have made Sparta no different from the other cities, had he not produced in it a special obedience to the laws? And don't you know that the best rulers in the cities are those who are most responsible for their citizens' being obedient to the laws, and that a city in which the citizens are especially obedient to the laws lives the best during peace and is the most difficult to withstand in war?

[16] "Furthermore, concord is the greatest good in the cities' opinion; and both the elder councils of the cities and the best men most often exhort the citizens to live in concord; and everywhere in Greece it is established law that the citizens take an oath that they will live in concord, and everywhere they take this oath. And I, for my part, think that these things come about, not so that the citizens should decide in favor of the same choruses, nor so that they should praise the same flute players, nor so that they should choose the same poets, nor so that they should take pleasure in the same things, but so that they should obey the laws. For when their citizens abide by these, the cities become strongest and happiest; but without concord neither would a city be well governed nor a household nobly managed.

[17] "As for the individual, how would one be less penalized by a city, and how honored more, than if he should obey the laws? And how would one be defeated less in the law courts, or how would one win there more? And whom would someone trust more to keep for him wealth or sons or daughters? And whom would
the whole city believe more worthy of trust than one who is lawful? And from whom more than him would parents or relatives or household servants or friends or citizens or strangers obtain the just things? And whom would enemies trust more in armistices or truces or treaties concerning peace? And with whom more than with one who is lawful would people want to become allies? And whom would the allies more entrust with leadership, or with command of garrisons, or with cities? And from whom would someone suppose that he is more likely to receive gratitude when he has done him a good deed than from the one who is lawful? Or for whom is someone more likely to do a good deed than for one from whom he holds that he will receive gratitude? And with whom would someone wish more to be a friend, or less to be an enemy, than with such a one? And against whom would someone be less likely to wage war than one with whom he most wishes to be a friend, and least an enemy, and with whom very many people wish to be friends and allies and very few enemies and opponents in war?

[18] "For my part, then, Hippias, I show the same thing to be both lawful and just. But if you judge the opposite to be the case, you teach it."

And Hippias said, "But, by Zeus, Socrates, I don't, in my opinion, judge the opposite of what you have said about justice to be the case."

[19] "Do you know any unwritten laws, Hippias?" he said.
"Those, at any rate, held as law in the same way in every land," he said.
"Would you be able to say, then," he said, "that human beings set them down?"
"Indeed, how?" he said. "At any rate, they would not all be able to assemble, nor do they speak the same language."
"Who, then, do you hold to have set down these laws?"
"I, for my part," he said, "think that gods set down these laws for human beings. For indeed among all human beings the first thing held as law is to revere gods."

[20] "And so, is honoring one's parents also held everywhere as law?"
"This too," he said.

"Accordingly, also that parents are not to have intercourse with their children, nor children with their parents?"

"This is no longer a god's law, in my opinion, Socrates," he said.

"Why?" he said.

"Because," he said, "I perceive that some transgress it."

[21] "Indeed they break many other laws as well," he said, "but those who transgress the laws laid down by the gods pay a penalty that a human being is unable to escape in any way, as some who transgress the laws laid down by human beings escape paying the penalty, either by going unnoticed or by using violence."

[22] "And what penalty, Socrates," he said, "are parents who have intercourse with their children, and children who do so with their parents, unable to escape?"

"The greatest one, by Zeus," he said. "For what greater penalty might human beings suffer when they beget offspring than to beget badly?"

[23] "How, then, do these beget offspring badly," he said, "when nothing prevents their being good themselves and begetting children with those who are good?"

"Because, by Zeus," he said, "not only should those who beget children with each other be good, but their bodies should also be in their prime; or is it your opinion that the seed of those in their prime is like that of those not yet in their prime or past their prime?"

"But, by Zeus," he said, "it is not plausible that it is."

"Which, then, is better?" he said.

"Clearly," he said, "the seed of those in their prime."

"Then the seed of those not in their prime is not sound?" 46

"It is not plausible, by Zeus," he said.

"And so, one should not beget children in this manner, at any rate."

"Certainly not," he said.

"Accordingly, do those, at least, who beget in this manner beget as they should not?"

"Certainly, in my opinion," he said.

"Who else, then," he said, "would beget children badly, if not these at least?"
"I agree with you in this too," he said.

[24] "What about this? Is it not lawful everywhere to do good in return to those who treat one well?"

"It is lawful," he said, "but this too is transgressed."

"Accordingly, do those who transgress this also pay the penalty, since they come to be bereft of good friends and are compelled to pursue those who hate them? Or aren’t good friends the ones who treat well those who deal with (chrēsthai) them; while those who don’t return favors to these sorts are hated by them due to their ingratitude, yet they pursue them most because it is these sorts whom it profits one most to deal with (chrēsthai)?"

"By Zeus, Socrates," he said, "all these things befit gods." For, that the laws themselves contain the punishments for those who transgress them comes, in my opinion, from a better than human legislator."

[25] "Which, then, Hippias, do you believe: that the gods legislate the just things or things other than the just things?"

"Not other things, by Zeus," he said. "For scarcely anyone else at any rate would legislate the just things, if not a god."

"Then it pleases the gods too, Hippias, that the same thing is both just and lawful."

By saying and doing such things he made those who were near him more just.

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Chapter 5

[1] I shall now say how he also made his companions more skilled in taking action.¹ For, holding that it is good for continence to be present in one who intends to do anything noble, first he

¹Hude accepts the emendation "divine things" (theious) in place of "gods" (theois), which would render the translation "all these things seem like divine things."

¹"Skilled in taking action" (praktikōterous) is the reading of all but one of the manuscripts and Hude, who reads "orderly" (eutaktōterous). Cf. Strauss, Xenophon's Socrates, 114.
made it visible to his companions that he, most of all human beings, had trained himself; then, when he conversed, he turned his companions most of all toward continence.

[2] He himself, then, always spent his time recalling the things useful for virtue, and reminding all his companions of them. And I know that once with Euthydemus too he had a conversation about continence of the following sort. "Tell me, Euthydemus," he said, "do you hold that freedom is a noble and grand possession for a man and a city?"

"As noble and grand as can be, in fact," he said.

[3] "Whoever, then, is ruled by the pleasures that come through the body and is on account of them unable to do what is best—do you hold this one to be free?"

"Least of all," he said.

"For perhaps it appears to you that it belongs to one who is free to do what is best, and so you hold that to have those who will prevent one from doing this belongs to a person lacking freedom?"

"Altogether so," he said.

[4] "Then in your opinion the incontinent lack freedom altogether?"

"And suitably so, by Zeus."

"In your opinion, are the incontinent only prevented from doing what is most noble, or are they also compelled to do what is most shameful?"

"In my opinion," he said, "they are no less compelled to do the latter things than they are prevented from doing the former."

[5] "What sort of masters do you believe prevent what is best, and compel what is worst?"

"The worst possible ones, by Zeus," he said.

"And what sort of slavery do you hold to be the worst?"

"For my part, that under the worst masters," he said.

"Then are the incontinent enslaved in the worst slavery?"

"In my opinion, at least," he said.

[6] "As for wisdom, the greatest good, isn’t it your opinion that, in debarring human beings from it, incontinence casts them into the opposite of wisdom? Or isn’t it your opinion that in dragging toward what is pleasant incontinence prevents turning one’s mind
to the beneficial things and learning them; and, often driving the
wits from those who perceive what is good and bad, it makes them
choose the worse instead of the better?”

[7] “This happens,” he said.

“As for moderation, to whom, Euthydemus, would we say that
it belongs less than to the one who is incontinent? For surely the
works of moderation and incontinence are the very opposite.”

“I agree with this too,” he said.

“As for being attentive to what it is fitting to attend to, do you
think that anything prevents one from this more than inconti-
nence?”

“No, I don’t, for my part,” he said.

“And do you think there is anything worse for a human being
than what makes one choose the harmful in place of the beneficial
and persuades one to attend to the former, while neglecting the
latter, and compels one to do the opposite of what the moderate
do?”

“Nothing,” he said.

[8] “Is it plausible, accordingly, that continence is the cause of
the opposite of what incontinence causes in human beings?”

“Certainly,” he said.

“And so, is it plausible that what causes the opposite things is
best?”

“It is, indeed, plausible,” he said.

“Does it seem, then, Euthydemus,” he said, “that continence is
best for a human being?”

“Suitably so, Socrates,” he said.

[9] “But have you ever pondered the following, Euthydemus?” he
said.

“What?” he said.

“That incontinence is unable to lead even to those things that are
all that opinion supposes it leads human beings to, the pleasures,
while it is continence most of all that makes them experience pleas-
ure.”

“How?” he said.

“Incontinence prevents one from experiencing any pleasure
worth mentioning from the things that are the most necessary
and frequent. For it does not allow one patiently to endure ei-
ther hunger or thirst or sexual desire or sleeplessness; and it is only in this way that one can pleasurably eat and drink as well as engage in sex or pleasurably rest and sleep—that is, by waiting and bearing up until these things become as pleasant as possible. But continence, the only thing that makes one patiently endure the things mentioned, is also the only thing that makes one experience pleasures worth recalling from the things mentioned."

"You speak altogether truly," he said.

[10] "Moreover, as regards learning anything noble and good and attending to any of these sorts of things—things through which one would nobly direct one's own body and nobly manage one's own household and become beneficial to friends and city and overpower enemies, and which afford not only benefits but also very great pleasures—those who are continent enjoy the benefits that come from doing these things, while the incontinent have no share in any of them. To whom would we say such things belong less than to the one least permitted to do them, in that he is held fast by his eagerness for the nearest pleasures?"

[11] "In my opinion, Socrates," he said, "you are saying that no virtue at all belongs to a man who is overcome by the pleasures that come through the body."

"For how, Euthydemus," he said, "does an incontinent human being differ from the most ignorant beast? How would one who does not examine what is best, but seeks in every way to do what is most pleasant, differ from the most thoughtless cattle? Rather, it is possible only for the continent to examine the best of the things and, by separating them in speech and deed according to classes, to choose the good things while refraining from the bad."

[12] And he said that in this manner men become best and happiest as well as most able to converse. And he said also that conversing (dialogesthai) was named from the collective deliberation of those who come together and separate (dialegein) the things according to class; and that one should accordingly try to prepare oneself as much as possible to be ready for this and attend to this most; for from this men become best and most fit for leading as well as most skilled in conversing.
[1] I shall now attempt to tell also how he also made his companions more skilled in conversing. For Socrates held that those who knew what each of the beings is would also be able to explain this to the others. And he said that it was no wonder at all that those who didn’t know faltered themselves and made others falter. For these reasons he never ceased examining with his companions what each of the beings is. It would be a lot of work, then, to go through all things as he defined them. But I will tell some in which I think his manner of examination will be clear.

[2] First, regarding piety, he examined it somewhat as follows. "Tell me, Euthydemus," he said, "what sort of thing do you hold piety to be?"

And he said, "The noblest sort, by Zeus."

"Are you able, then, to say what sort of person the pious one is?"

"In my opinion," he said, "one who honors the gods."

"Is it permitted to honor the gods in whatever manner one wishes?"

"No, but there are laws in accordance with which one should honor the gods."

[3] "And so, would the one who knows these laws know how one should honor the gods?"

"I, at least, think so," he said.

"Now, the one who knows how one should honor the gods does not think that one should do this in any way other than as he knows?"

"Certainly not," he said.

"Does anyone honor gods in a way other than as he thinks one should?"

"I don’t think so," he said.

[4] "Then the one who knows what is lawful concerning the gods would honor the gods lawfully?"

One of the manuscripts has "among" or "in the midst of" (en) instead of "with" (sun). Cf. Strauss, Xenophon’s Socrates, 116-17.
"Certainly," he said.  
"And so, does the one at least who honors lawfully honor as one should?"

"How would this not be the case?" he said.  
"And the one who honors as one should is pious?"

"Certainly," he said.  
"Then the one who knows what is lawful concerning the gods would correctly be defined by us as pious?"

"In my opinion, at any rate," he said.  
[5] "Then is it permitted to deal with (*chrēsthai*) human beings in any manner someone may wish?"

"No, but also regarding these, the one who knows what is lawful—in accordance with which people should deal with (*chrēsthai*) one another—would be lawful."

"And so, do those who deal with (*chrēsthai*) one another in accordance with what is lawful, deal with (*chrēsthai*) one another as one should?"

"How could this not be the case?" he said.  
"Accordingly, do those who deal with (*chrēsthai*) human beings as one should, deal with them nobly?"

"Certainly," he said.  
"And so, do those who deal with (*chrēsthai*) human beings nobly engage nobly in human affairs?"

"It is plausible," he said.  
"Accordingly, those who are obedient to the laws—these do what is just?"

"Certainly," he said.  
[6] "Do you know what sort of things are called just?" he said.  
"The things that the laws bid," he said.  
"Then do those who do what the laws bid, do both what is just and what one should?"

"How could this not be the case?"

"And so, are those just who do what is just?"

"For my part, I think so," he said.  
"Now do you think that any obey the laws without knowing what the laws bid?"

"For my part, I don't," he said.  
"Do you think, then, that any of those who know what one should do think that they should not do these things?"
"I don’t think so," he said.
"Do you know any who do other than what they think they should?"
"For my part, I don’t," he said.
"Then those who know what is lawful concerning human beings—these do what is just?"
"Certainly," he said.
"And so, are those just who do what is just?"
"Who else?" he said.
"Would we ever define correctly, then, in defining as just those who know what is lawful concerning human beings?"
"In my opinion, at least," he said.

[7] "As for wisdom, what would we say it is? Tell me, are the wise, in your opinion, wise in what they understand, or are some wise in what they do not understand?"
"Clearly in what they understand," he said, "for how could one be wise in what he doesn’t understand?"
"Are the wise, then, wise by dint of understanding?"
"For how else would someone be wise," he said, "if not by dint of understanding?"
"Do you think that wisdom is anything other than that by dint of which people are wise?"
"For my part, I don’t."
"Then understanding is wisdom?"
"In my opinion, at least," he said.
"Now in your opinion is a human being able to understand all the beings?"
"By Zeus, not even a small part of them, in my opinion."
"It is not possible, then, for a human being to be wise in everything?"
"By Zeus, surely not," he said.
"What each person understands, then, is that in which he is also wise?"
"In my opinion, at least."

[8] "Now, Euthydemus, should one seek also in this manner what is good?"
"How?" he said.
"In your opinion, is the same thing beneficial to all?"
"Not in my opinion, at least," he said.
"What about this? Isn’t it your opinion that what is beneficial to one is sometimes harmful to another?"
"Yes, indeed," he said.
"Would you say that anything is good other than what is beneficial?"
"For my part, I wouldn’t," he said.
"Then is the beneficial good to whomever it is beneficial?"
"In my opinion," he said.
[9] "Would we be able to speak about the noble in any other way? Or is there something you call noble—whether a body or an implement or anything else whatsoever—that you know is noble for everything?"
"By Zeus, for my part, I don’t," he said.
"Then is it noble to use each thing for what it may be useful for?"
"Certainly," he said.
"Is each thing noble for anything other than what it is noble to use it for?"
"Not for a single other thing," he said.
"Then is what is useful noble for whatever it is useful?"
"In my opinion, at least," he said.
[10] "As for courage, Euthydemus, do you hold that it is among the noble things?"
"For my part, I hold that it is very noble indeed," he said.
"Then you hold that courage is useful not for the least important things?"
"By Zeus," he said, "for the most important, certainly."
"Now, regarding the terrible and risky things, is it useful in your opinion to be ignorant of them?"
"Least of all," he said.
"Then those who aren’t frightened by such things because they don’t know what they are, aren’t courageous?"
"By Zeus," he said, "in that way, at any rate, many both of the mad and of the cowardly would be courageous."
"And what about those who are afraid even of things that are not terrible?"
"Even less, by Zeus," he said.
"Do you believe, then, that those who are good regarding the terrible and risky things are courageous, while those who are bad are cowardly?"

"Certainly," he said.

[11] "Do you hold any others to be good regarding such things than those who are able to deal with \((chrēsthai)\) them nobly?"

"No, rather these," he said.

"Then you hold as bad the sort who deal with \((chrēsthai)\) them badly?"

"Who else?" he said.

"Does each sort, then, deal with them \((chrēsthai)\) as they think one should?"

"How else?" he said.

"Do those, then, who are unable to deal with \((chrēsthai)\) them nobly know how one should deal with \((chrēsthai)\) them?"

"Perhaps not," he said.

"Those who know how one should deal with \((chrēsthai)\) them—are these, then, also able to?"

"Only these," he said.

"What about this? Do those who are not mistaken about them deal with \((chrēsthai)\) things of this sort badly?"

"I don't think so," he said.

"Then those who deal with \((chrēsthai)\) them badly are mistaken about them?"

"It is plausible, at any rate," he said.

"Those who understand how nobly to deal with \((chrēsthai)\) the terrible and risky things are courageous, then, and those who are mistaken about this are cowardly?"

"They are, at least in my opinion," he said.

[12] He believed that kingship and tyranny were both types of rule, but he held that they differed from each other. For he believed that rule over the human beings who are willing and according to laws of the cities, was kingship, while rule over the unwilling and not according to laws, but however the ruler wished, was tyranny. And wherever ruling offices are filled from those who perfect the lawful,\(^{56}\) he held that regime to be an aristocracy; and wherever on
the basis of property assessments, a plutocracy; and wherever from all, a democracy.

[13] If someone should contradict him about something without having anything clear to say, but claim without showing it that the one he mentioned himself was wiser or more skilled at political affairs or more courageous or anything else of the sort, he would bring the entire argument back to its hypothesis somewhat as follows:

[14] "Do you assert that the one whom you praise is a better citizen than the one I praise?"
   "I do indeed assert it."
   "Why then didn't we examine first what a good citizen's work is?"
   "Let's do this."
   "In the management of wealth, accordingly, would he prevail who makes the city better provided with wealth?"
   "Certainly."
   "And in war indeed the one at any rate who makes it superior to its adversaries?"
   "How could this not be the case?"
   "And in diplomacy, is it whoever furnishes friends in place of enemies?"
   "It is plausible, at any rate."
   "And so, in public speaking as well, the one who puts an end to civil faction and produces in it concord?"
   "In my opinion, at least."

When the arguments were brought back in this manner the truth became visible even to the contradictors themselves.

[15] But whenever he went through something in argument (logos) by himself, he proceeded via what was most agreed upon, holding this to be safety in argument. Therefore, of those I know, he, when he spoke, produced by far the most agreement in his listeners. And he said that Homer, too, applied to Odysseus the attribute of being a safe orator on the grounds that he was competent to lead his arguments through the opinions of human beings.
[1] It is clear, then, from what has been said, in my opinion, that Socrates declared his own judgment simply to those who associated with him.\textsuperscript{60} I shall now tell how he was attentive also to their being self-sufficient in the activities that were fit for them. For, of all those I know, he was most concerned with knowing what any of his companions had understanding of. And he taught most eagerly of all whatever he himself knew of the things it is fitting for a man who is a gentleman (noble and good) to know. And whatever he himself lacked experience in, he led them to those who understood it.

[2] He taught also how far one who has been correctly educated should be experienced in each matter. For example, he said that one should learn geometry up to the point of being competent, if there should ever be need, to receive or to transfer or to apportion land by correctly measuring it, or to assign work. And he said that this was so easy to learn that the one who turned his mind to measuring would know how much land there was and at the same time go away understanding how it is measured.

[3] But he disapproved of learning geometry as far as the diagrams that are hard to comprehend. For what benefit these might have, he said he did not see (and yet he did not lack experience of them), and he said that they were sufficient to exhaust the life of a human being and to hinder one from many other beneficial studies.

[4] He bid them also to become experienced in studying the stars—in this too, however, up to the point of being able to judge the time of night, month, and year, for the sake of traveling, sailing, and guarding, and as for the other things that are done by night or by month or by year to have marks\textsuperscript{61} to use in distinguishing the periods of the things mentioned. And he said that\textsuperscript{62} these things were easy to learn from night hunters and ship pilots as well as many others whose concern it is to know them.

[5] But he turned them strongly away from learning astronomy as far as knowing also the beings that do not keep to the same path of revolution, both the planets and the unstable stars, or exhausting themselves by seeking their distances from the earth, their orbits,
and the causes of these things. For he said that he did not see any benefit in these things either (and yet even in these he was not uninstructed), and he said that they too were sufficient to exhaust the life of a human being and to hinder one from many beneficial things.

[6] And he turned one away wholly from becoming a worrier about the way in which the god contrives each of the heavenly things. For he held that these things are not discoverable by human beings, and he believed that the one who sought what the gods did not wish to make clear would not gratify them. And he said that the one who was anxious about these things ran the risk of going out of his mind no less than Anaxagoras went out of his mind, he who took the greatest pride in explaining the contrivances of the gods.

[7] For when he said that fire and sun were the same thing he was ignorant of the fact that human beings easily gaze upon the fire but are unable to look directly at the sun; and that those who have the sun shine upon them have darker skin, but not those who have fire shine on them. And he was ignorant also of the fact that none of the things growing from the earth could nobly increase in size without the sun's ray, but that they all perish when heated by fire. And when he asserted that the sun is a glowing stone he was ignorant also of this, that a stone in fire neither shines nor holds out for a long time, while the sun persists through all time while shining most brightly of all.

[8] He bade them also to learn calculations. And in these, similarly to the others, he bade them to be on their guard against vain involvement in the matter, but as far as what was beneficial, he himself both examined and went through everything with his companions.

[9] He also vehemently turned his companions toward attending to their health by learning from those who know how, as much as was possible, and by each one turning his mind to himself through his whole life, that is, to which food or which drink or what sort of labor was to his advantage and how he might live most healthfully by making use of these things. For he said that someone who turned his mind toward himself in this way would
have to work to find a doctor who discerned better than himself what was advantageous for his health.

[10] And if someone wished to be benefited more than in accord with human wisdom, his advice was to attend to divination. For he said that one who knows those things through which the gods give signs to human beings about their affairs would never be bereft of the advice of gods.

~ Chapter 8 ~

[1] And if someone thinks that he was proven to be lying about the divine thing (daimonion), since he was condemned to death by the jurors although he claimed that the divine thing (daimonion) signified to him beforehand what he should and should not do, let him reflect first that he was already at the time so far advanced in age that his life would have ended not much later, even if not then; and next, that he left behind both the part of life that is most burdensome and in which everyone diminishes in their power of thought and that, in place of this, he acquired additional fame by displaying the strength of his soul, both by stating his case most truthfully, most freely, and most justly of all human beings and by bearing his condemnation to death most gently and most courageously.

[2] For it is agreed that no human being within memory has borne death more nobly. For it was necessary for him to live thirty days after the judgment—due to the Delian festival being during that month and the law allowing no one to be put to death by the public until the mission returned from Delos—and during this time he was visible to all his acquaintances living in no way other than during the previous time. And yet previously, of all human beings, he was most admired for living in good spirits and contentedly.

[3] And how could someone die more nobly than in this manner? Or what sort of death would be more noble than the death
one dies most nobly? What sort of death would be happier than the most noble? Or what sort would be dearer to the gods than the happiest?

[4] I shall tell also what I heard about him from Hermogenes the son of Hipponicus. For he said that after Meletus had already entered the charge against him and he himself heard him conversing about everything other than the trial, he said to him that he should be examining what his defense would be. At first, he said, "Haven't I been practicing this all my life, in your opinion?" And when he asked him, "How?" he said that he had continuously done nothing other than thoroughly examine what the just and the unjust things are, while doing the just and refraining from the unjust—which he held to be the noblest practice for a defense.

[5] And, once again, he himself said, "Don't you see, Socrates, that the Athenian jurors, when annoyed by speech, have already put to death many who committed no injustice and released many who did commit injustice?"

"But, by Zeus, Hermogenes," he said, "I have already attempted to worry about my defense to the jurors, but the divine thing (daimonion) opposed it."

[6] And he himself said, "You say things to be marveled at." He said, "Do you marvel if it is better in the god's opinion that I end my life now? Don't you know that up to this time I, for my part, would not have yielded to any human being that he lived either a better or more pleasant life than mine? For I think that those live best who best attend to becoming as good as possible, and that those live most pleasantly who most perceive that they are becoming better.

[7] "These things I, for my part, perceived up to this time befalling me, and, encountering the other human beings and comparing myself to the others, I have continued in this judgment about myself. And not only I, but my friends also continue to judge

k""Annoyed" (achthesthentes) is the reading of the majority of the manuscripts. Hude adopts the emendation "led astray" (parachthentes).

Hude adopts the reading "most" (malista) instead of "best" (arista), which is found in the manuscripts.
likewise about me, not because they love me (for those who love the others could also make the same judgment about their own friends), but for the very reason that they think that by being in my company they themselves, too, would become best.

[8] "But if I should live longer, perhaps it will be necessary to pay the price of old age, both seeing and hearing less, and thinking more poorly, and ending by being less capable of learning and more forgetful, and becoming worse in the things at which I was better before. Moreover, for one who did not perceive these things life would not be worth living, while for one who did perceive them, how could it not be necessary that he live worse and more unpleasantly?

[9] "Moreover, if indeed I will die unjustly, this would be shameful for those who killed me unjustly. For if committing injustice is shameful, how is it not shameful as well to do anything whatsoever unjustly? But, for me, what is shameful in the inability of others to judge or to do what is just concerning me?

[10] "And, for my part, I see also that the opinion held of the human beings who have come before, among those who come after, is not alike for those who have committed injustice and for those who suffered injustice. And I know that I shall indeed obtain attentiveness from human beings, even if I die now, which is not the same as there will be for those who kill me. For I know that it will always be witnessed on my behalf that I, for my part, never committed an injustice against any human being, nor made one worse, but that I always tried to make my companions better."

These were the sort of things he conversed about both with Hermogenes and with the others.71

[11] Of those who knew Socrates—what sort he was—all who desired virtue even now still continue to long for him most of all, on the grounds that he was most beneficial with regard to attending to virtue. In my opinion, to be sure, inasmuch as he was such as I have described—so pious as to do nothing without the gods' judgment; so just as to harm no one, not even a little, and to benefit to the greatest extent72 those who dealt with (chrēsthai) him; so continent as never to choose what was more pleasant in place of what was better; so prudent as not to make mistakes in deciding what was better and worse, nor to need another in addition, but to be
self-sufficient in his judgment of these matters; and competent also to say and to define such things in speech; and competent as well to test others and to refute them when they made mistakes, and to turn them toward virtue and gentlemanliness (nobility and goodness)—he was such as a most good and happy man would be. And if these things do not please someone, let him decide by comparing the character of others with these things.
Notes

NOTES TO BOOK I

1. The "city" (polis) in ancient Greece was an independent political community with its own military force and laws, in these respects more like a modern country than a city. Meletus, Anytus, and Lycon brought the charges against Socrates in 399 B.C. In accordance with Athenian democratic practice, the jurors were selected by lot and had full judicial powers, that is, no independent judge presided over the trial and instructed the jurors or limited their power. Xenophon was not in Athens at the time of the trial.

2. Nomizein is generally translated as "to hold," but as "to believe in" when necessary for sense, particularly when its object is a god. One might render it also as "to worship" or "to acknowledge."

3. "New" (kainos) or "novel" can also mean "strange," particularly in a context in which innovation is strictly prohibited.

4. Daimonion is sometimes rendered by other translators as "demonic." The "demons" were lesser deities, a sort of link between gods and men. Socrates sometimes refers to a "divine voice" or "divine thing" that indicated what he should do. See below at I.1.4, 3.4, IV.8.1, 5, Apology 4, 13; Plato Republic 486c, Apology 27d-e, 31d, 33a, 40a, Theages 128d. Since theios, the adjective related to "god" (theos), is also translated as "divine," the Greek terms will be included in the text in parentheses.


6. Chresthai is an important term for Xenophon (see III.8). Generally, it will be translated according to its primary meaning in his writing, that is, "to use." However, he often employs the term in reference to human and other beings, where it could also be taken to mean "to deal with" or "to treat." In such contexts, "to use" has a jarring effect in English, an effect which may not have been entirely unintended for some of Xenophon's ancient Greek readers as well, but which would not have been as prominent due to other meanings of the verb. For example, a predominant usage of chresthai is in reference to oracles or gods, as at I.1.3, where it means "to consult" or "to seek what is needful from." In passages where the verb is translated other than as "to use" chresthai will be found in parentheses.
7. "Common" (koina) is usually translated as "collective" below. It might also be rendered as "public."

8. Mantike [technē] is the art or skill of the diviner, seer, or prophet (mantis).

9. "To be in one's opinion" is the translation of the verb dokein, which is related to doxa, "opinion" or "reputation." Unless noted, these terms and their cognates will be rendered consistently by some form of the word "opinion," or included in the text in parentheses after alternate translations such as "to be reputed," "to seem," or "to be thought."

10. See n. 2 to I.1.1 on "to believe in" (nomizein). In the next sentence the verb is translated as "to hold."

11. The ancients took as omens chance meetings of people, the actions of birds, and sudden changes in weather.

12. Unless otherwise noted, the slightly awkward "to turn back (or away)" is used for apotrepesthai and "to turn forward (or toward)" for protrepesthai. These terms of general interest in Socratic philosophy are difficult to capture fully with a single English word, although "to deter" and "to encourage" are close. Socrates was well known for his "protreptics," speeches of exhortation regarding virtue (1.4.1 below, and Plato Cleitophon).

13. "To obey" (peithesθai) is the middle or passive form of the verb translated as "to persuade" in the active (peithein).

14. "Friend" here is a translation of epitēdeios, literally "one who is serviceable." Elsewhere "friend" is used to translate philos, "one who is dear."

15. Cf. Xenophon Anabasis III.1.4-5, where Socrates sends Xenophon to consult the oracle at Delphi as to whether he should join the military expedition described in that work.

16. "Nobly" (kalos) is the adverb formed from kalos, an important adjective in Xenophon (III.8 below), as in Plato (Hippias major). It is difficult to render it consistently with any single English word. It can refer to both physical and moral beauty and hence means "beautiful," "noble," or "fine" in different contexts. It will be translated primarily as "noble," secondarily as "beautiful," where it clearly refers to physical beauty, and occasionally as "fine" or "well," when it occurs in response to statements in a conversation. Translations other than "noble" will be followed by the word kalos in parentheses in the text or will be noted.

17. "Work" (ergon) is plural in the text. The word is prominent in the Memoriae and will be translated as either "work" or "deed," unless otherwise noted. It is often contrasted with "speech" or "argument" (logos), as in the phrase "both in speech and in deed."

18. A "skilled statesman" (politikos) is one who possesses the political art or skill (politike technē), the art concerning the polis (see n. 1 to I.1.1).

19. See n. 16 to I.1.7 on kalos.

20. "To be crazy" (daimonan) is from the same root as daimonion (see n. 4 to I.1.1) and means "to be possessed by a divinity."

21. "Unlawful" (athemista) here might also be translated as "gravely improper." It is the opposite of thesmostos, which means lawful in the sense of that which is laid down (perhaps related to tithēmi), as distinguished from nomos, which is lawful in the sense of that which is held or recognized. Thesmostos is a word with religious
overtones. The goddesses Demeter and Persephone were called the Thesmophorae, "the bringers of law."

22. The gymnasia were primarily for athletic training, but they also served as schools.

23. The agora was the Athenian marketplace.

24. I translate *hosios* and *anosios* as "holy" and "unholy," but there is some question as to whether these terms are properly used in reference to ancient Greek piety (see Pangle, *Laws of Plato*, 518 n. 7).

25. "Sophist" (sophistēs) derives from the word meaning "wise" (sophos). It was a term applied, often with derogatory connotation, to teachers who offered education (especially in rhetoric) in exchange for pay (cf. 1.6.13). Among the best-known were Gorgias, Prodicus, Protagoras, and Hippias. They might be considered as roughly equivalent to today's "professors." At Plato *Apology* 19d Socrates denies that he was a teacher and that he took pay for talking to the young.

26. Except for "adornment" at 1.2.61, I transliterate "cosmos" (kosmos). It primarily means "order" or "arrangement" and is related to the verb translated as "to adorn" or "to decorate" and the adjective translated as "decorous."

27. Natural philosophers or scientists in the ancient world, such as Anaxagoras, came under suspicion for impiety. Compare Plato *Apology* 18c, where Socrates defends himself against the implication, and Aristophanes *Clouds*, in which Socrates himself is portrayed as a natural philosopher.

28. "To worry" (phrontizein) can mean either "to give heed to" or "to be anxious about."

29. "Sufficiently" (hikanos) is elsewhere translated as "competently."

30. "He thought that" is not in the text, but it, or something like it (e.g., "he said"), is implied in sections 13 and 14, since they are written in indirect discourse.

31. "To do" (poiein) might also be translated as "to make."

32. Due to the importance of the terms "noble" (kalos) and "good" (agathos) in the *Memorabilia* (see III.8), the literal rendering of kalos kagathos is indicated in parentheses. Leo Strauss often renders kalos kagathos as "perfect gentleman" in his commentaries on Xenophon. The term denotes membership in a social, moral, and/or political higher class. The Latin equivalent is optimates. "Gentleman" captures well the sense of the term for most practical purposes, although it should be understood that "man" (aner) is not necessarily implied in every instance, since the adjective might also apply to a human being generally (e.g., kalos kagathos anthrōpos in Xenophon *Symposium* IX.1) as well as to actions and things.

33. The dēmos, "the people," is used here as synonymous with the ekklēsia, the official assembly of the male citizens as the governing body in the Athenian democracy.

34. The Athenian Council (boulē) was a body of five hundred male citizens, with ten divisions of fifty (prutanes) chosen from each of the ten Athenian tribes (phula). It functioned as a committee to prepare measures on which a vote would be taken during the meeting of the full assembly (ekklēsia) of the male population (dēmos). Each of the ten prutanes served as an executive committee for approximately thirty-five days per year. Each day one man was chosen by lot to act as presiding officer (epistatēs) in conducting debate and putting questions to vote.
35. *Nomos* will be translated consistently as “law.” One might also render it as “custom.” Frequently in philosophic discussions it is contrasted with “nature” (*phusis*).

36. In 406 B.C. the Athenians won an important naval victory against the Lacedaemonians near Arginusae. Afterward, however, the Athenian generals in command were held responsible for having committed a crime of impiety because, due to a violent storm that came up, they neglected to collect bodies of the dead for burial. The demos condemned all the generals to death by one vote, when legally there ought to have been a separate trial and vote for each. See *Hellenica* I.6–7 for Xenophon’s account of this event (Socrates is mentioned at I.7.15). There Xenophon speaks of eight generals who were condemned (I.7.2, 32), rather than nine as here. Only six were executed, since two did not return to Athens after the battle. On Erasistrus see *Hellenica* I.5.16, 6.16, 29, 7.2, 29; Aristophanes *Frogs* 1196. On Thrasyllus, *Hellenica* I.1.8, 33, 34, 2.1, 3.6, 4.10, 5.16, 6.30, 7.2, 29.

37. This sentence might also be translated “But he thought more highly of keeping his oath and protecting himself against those threatening than of gratifying the demos contrary to what is just” (although this may not be the natural way to read it, given its word order).

38. The phrase “the many” (*hoi polloi*) used here and elsewhere often means “the people” or “the multitude.”

39. “Continent” (*engkratia*) might also be translated as “self-controlled.”

40. On Socrates’ celebrated endurance of heat, cold, and other physical discomforts, see Plato *Symposium* 22ob.

41. “He had educated himself” (*pepaideumenos*) might also be translated as “he had been so educated.”

42. “Sufficiently” (*hikanos*) and “sufficient” (*hikanos*) are elsewhere translated as “competently” and “competent.”

43. “Wealth” (*chrēmata*) is related to the verb “to use” (*chrēsthai*) and might be literally translated as “useful things” or “assets.” “Money” in the sense of “cash” is the translation used for *argurion*, which will be rendered literally by “silver” occasionally. *Ploutos* will be translated as “riches.”

44. See n. 25 to I.1.11 on the sophists.

45. “To marvel” (*thaumazein*) is elsewhere translated as “to wonder.”

46. “One who had done him the greatest good deeds” might also be translated as “one who had done him good deeds with respect to the most important (greatest) things.”

47. “To be receptive to” is the translation of *apodechō* here and at IV.1.1, but Xenophon also uses it to mean “to grasp” or “to understand” (see III.10.15). The verb is commonly used in reference to followers of teachers.

48. The word *anēr* can have the connotation of a “real man.” It is the root of the adjective meaning “courageous” (*andreios*). One of its primary meanings is “husband,” just as *gunaikos* means both “woman” and “wife.” In this translation the term “man” and its derivatives are used exclusively for the word *anēr*, unless otherwise noted. But note that “he” is used as the subject pronoun of indefinite gender rather than “he or she” or other current alternatives, which would not be appropriate to the historical context within which Xenophon wrote.
49. "By lot" is literally "by the bean" (*apo kuamon*) and refers to the very democratic process by which the Athenians selected certain public officials.

50. *Phronesis* is translated as "good sense" here, although occasionally it will be rendered by "prudence" as well. Similarly, the adjective *phronimos* is translated both as "sensible" or "of good sense" and as "prudent."

51. Critias and Alcibiades were two infamous Athenian statesmen. Alcibiades (c. 450-404 B.C.), the son of Cleinias, was raised by his relative, the famous statesman Pericles (see I.2.40 and n. 89). He had a brilliant political career in Athens that was interrupted when the Athenians recalled him from the great campaign in Sicily to face charges of violating sacred religious mysteries. Instead of returning and facing certain condemnation, he betrayed Athens by going over to the Lacedaimonians and giving them advice and information that led to the Athenian defeat in Sicily (Thucydides 6–8; see 6.15 for a description of Alcibiades' character). After losing the confidence of the Lacedaimonians he fled to Persia, where he enjoyed some influence, and from there once again became active in Athenian military command. In 407 the Athenians recalled him from exile and gave him extraordinary powers, but he was forced to withdraw once again after a naval defeat in 406. He was murdered by assassins in Phrygia in 404. Plato devotes a good deal of attention to the relationship between Socrates and Alcibiades in his dialogues. See especially *Alcibiades I, Alcibiades II, Protagoras, Symposium*. Xenophon describes some of his political actions in *Hellenica* I.1.5, 9ff., 3.3, 10, 20, 4.8ff., 13, 18, 5.9ff.; II.1.25–26, 3.42.

Critias (c. 460–403 B.C.), son of Callaeschrus, was a cousin to Plato on his mother's side. He took part in the revolution of the Four Hundred oligarchs in Athens in 411 and was exiled when the democracy was restored. In 404 he returned to become one of the notorious Thirty Tyrants, a puppet regime that presided over an eight-month reign of terror after being installed by the victorious Lacedaimonians at the end of the Peloponnesian War. Apparently he too was implicated in the charges of impiety mentioned above, and was instrumental in the return of Alcibiades to Athens in 407. He is present in Plato's *Charmides, Protagoras, Timaeus*, and *Critias*. See also *Hellenica* II.3.2, 15, 18, 24-56, 4.8–9, 19.

52. "Insolence" (*hubris*) is wanton violence, insolence, or outrage stemming from excessive pride.

53. The adjectives and verbs here and in subsequent paragraphs are in the dual form, indicating that both Critias and Alcibiades are the subjects, although the word "two" is not actually present in the Greek.

54. The word translated "to defend" (*apologeisthai*), is related to the titles of both Plato's and Xenophon's *Apology of Socrates*. This verb does not have the same meaning as the English "to apologize," for it is a legal term referring to the formal defense speech delivered by a defendant at his trial.

55. "How their companionship with Socrates was" might also be translated as "how their companionship with Socrates came about."

56. "Most honor-loving" (*philotimotatos*) might also be translated as "most ambitious."

57. *Logos* will usually be translated as "speech," and secondarily as "argument."

58. "Superior" (*kreitton*) can mean both "better" and "stronger."

59. "Noble" in this and in the following quote is not *kalos* but *esthlos*, a term
used in Homer to describe someone or something good in its class. It came to mean "noble" in reference to people, as well as "stout," "brave," or "rich."

60. From Theognis (c. 530 B.C.), a poet with apparently aristocratic sympathies. Socrates uses these verses at Xenophon Symposium II.4 to answer the question of how nobility can be learned, and at Plato Meno 95d as proof that virtue can be learned.

61. The source of this quote is unknown. It is used at Plato Protagoras 344d to confirm the assertion that it is possible for the noble person to become bad (kakos).

62. In each case "again" (authis) may mean "later" in this sentence.

63. In 407 B.C. Critias was banished from Athens by the democracy (Hellenica II.3.15) and went to Thessaly (at Hellenica II.3.36 Theramenes claims Critias set up a democracy there and armed slaves against their masters). He returned with other exiles to Athens in 404 when the city surrendered to the Lacedaimonians.

64. "Beauty" (kallos) is a noun related to the adjective kalos, which is translated as "noble" or "beautiful." See n. 16 to I.1.7.

65. "Stately" (semnos) can be translated in a good sense as "august" or "revered," or in a bad sense as "proud" or "haughty."

66. See n. 53 to I.2.13 on dual forms.

67. The cithara was a stringed instrument sounded by plucking.

68. "Low" (phaulos) is also elsewhere translated as "poor" or "common."

69. "Suitably" (eikos) is elsewhere translated as "plausibly." Perhaps "fairly" or "reasonably" would capture the sense here.

70. An account of Socrates' education of Euthydemus "the noble (beautiful)" is given in Book IV.

71. "Sex" (ta aphrodisia) would be more literally translated by the euphemism "the things of Aphrodite."

72. "To deter" (apotrepein) is elsewhere translated as "to turn away." See n. 12 to I.1.4.

73. "To bear it in mind against" is apomnëmoneuein, "to recollect," from which the title of the book, Memorabilia or Recollections (Aponmëmoneumata), is derived. This is Xenophon's only use of the word in this book.

74. Charicles was a prominent member of the regime of the Thirty Tyrants (see n. 51 to I.2.12 above, and Hellenica II.3.2). Aristotle (Politics 1305b26) identifies him as the leader of the tyrants.

75. "Speeches" (logoi) might also be translated as "arguments."

76. Cf. Symposium VI.6, Oeconomicus XI.3; Aristophanes Clouds 100ff.; Plato Apology 18b, 23d.

77. Socrates made frequent use of such artisans as or in his examples.

78. The whole conversation that follows is reported as secondhand. "It is said that..." should be understood throughout.

79. Cf. III.6.1 below, where Plato's brother Glaucon wished to address the demos when he was "not yet twenty years old."

80. Pericles (c. 495-429 B.C.), son of Xanthippus and Agariste, was Athens's preeminent statesman during the growth of the Athenian empire and at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War. See also Memorabilia II.6.13, III.5.1; Symposium VIII.39. For accounts of his life see Thucydides 1.24-2.65; Plutarch Life of Pericles.
81. "To make sophisticated arguments" (sophizesthai) is related to the word translated as "sophist" (sophistēs).

82. On Crito see n. 74 to II.9.1. On the brothers Chaerephon and Chairecrates see n. 31 to II.3.1. On Hermogenes, son of Hipponicus, see n. 82 to II.10.3. Simmias and Cebes (see also III.11.17) and Phaidondas were Thebans who were present at Socrates' death (according to Plato Phaedo 59c).

83. Cf. Aristophanes Clouds 1321ff., where Pheidippides, after studying with Socrates, beats his father and claims he was right to do so.


85. "To do mischief" or "to harm" (kakourgein) is a compound word used with some frequency, which might be more literally translated as "to do (ergein) bad (kakos)" or "to do ill."

86. Works and Days 311.

87. "Unprofitable" or "harmful" (epizēmios) might be translated more literally as "causing loss."

88. "Coward" (kakos) might also be translated as "a bad [man]."


90. "Meant" (legein) might also be translated "said," as it is elsewhere.

91. The Gymnopaedia was a festival involving youths dancing around a statue to Apollo in honor of Spartans who fell at the battle of Thyrea.

92. The Pythia was the priestess of Apollo at Delphi.

93. Or "he used to pray to the gods simply that they give him the good things." "Simply" (haplōs) is sometimes translated elsewhere as "straightforwardly."

94. The phrase "no differently than" (ouden diaphoron ἐ̣) can also mean "no better than."

95. Hesiod Works and Days 336.

96. "Losing their reputation" (adoxia) is related to the word translated elsewhere as "opinion" (doxa).

97. "Regimen" (diaite) is translated elsewhere as "way of life."

98. "To lack resources," that is, to be poor, is a literal meaning of aporeuein, which is usually translated as "to be perplexed."

99. "Food" (sitos) is "grain" (including corn, barley, and wheat) or the food made from it. The ancient Greeks ate bread or grain products (sitos or sition) as a staple with smaller amounts of "relish" (opson), which was properly "cooked meat" but could also mean "sauce," or "condiment."

100. Circe is a sorceress who uses magic to change the companions of Odysseus into beasts. Odysseus resists the spell with the help of the god Hermes, who gives him the herb moly. Hermes is one of the lesser Olympian gods, often portrayed as a messenger for the gods. See Homer Odyssey 10.210ff. and Hesiod Theogony 1011ff.


102. Heracles receives a moral education from Virtue and Vice below (see II.1.21 and n. 16).

103. An obol was a small Athenian coin of the lowest value.

104. Erōs (passionate love) is in the plural here.
105. See n. 12 to I.1.4 on "to turn toward" (protrepein).
106. An Aristodemus described as "small" is mentioned by Apollodorus at Plato Symposium (esp. 173b) as a companion who loves and imitates Socrates. Aristodemus recounted to Apollodorus the events that are described in that dialogue.
107. Words translated as "to admire" in this chapter are forms of the verb elsewhere translated as "to wonder" (thaumazein).
108. Greek dithyrambs were choral songs often irregular in form and vehement or wild in character, originally in honor of the god Dionysus. Melanippides (c. late fifth century) was a lyric poet from Macedon; Sophocles (c. 496–406 B.C.) the famous tragic poet of Athens; Polycleitus (c. late fifth century) a sculptor from Argos known for his statues of athletes; Zeuxis (c. late fifth century) a painter from Heraclea in Magna Graecia, also mentioned at Oeconomicus X.1.
109. "Design" (gnōmē) is elsewhere translated as "judgment" and is related to the word translated as "judge" (gnomon) in section 5 below.
110. The word translated as "erotic desire" is erōs.
111. "By all means" translates the imperative amelei, which could also mean "never mind" or "don't worry."
112. See n. 28 to I.1.11 on "to worry" (phrontizein).
113. "To obtain" (tuchanein) is closely related to the word that can mean "chance" (tuchē).
114. A stadion is a distance of approximately 600 feet.
115. "To train oneself" (meletan) is elsewhere translated as "to practice."
116. Hera, the wife and sister of Zeus, is primarily the goddess of marriage and women. This oath would normally be used by women (cf. Aristophanes Ecclesiazusae 155–56, 189–90, where women attempting to disguise themselves as men are chastised for continuing to use it.) But Socrates frequently, and others occasionally, use it in Xenophon (for Socrates see below at III.10.9, 11.5, IV.2.9, 4.8; Oeconomicus X.1, XI.19; Symposium IV.54; Cyrus, according to some manuscripts, and Hystaspes use it at Cyropaedeia I.4.12, VIII.4.12, respectively; and Callias, Hermogenes, and Lycon at Symposium IV.45, VIII.12, IX.1, respectively).
117. Some fragments of Antiphon's writings are extant: see fragment 87 in Hermann Diels and Walther Kranz, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 7th ed. (Berlin, 1934–37). The following treatises are attributed to him: Truth, Concerning Concord, Statesman, Concerning the Judgment of Dreams. Xenophon has Theramenes mention a certain Antiphon who was put to death by the Thirty (Hellenica II.3.40), but it may not be the same man. Modern classical scholars distinguish Antiphon the sophist, mentioned here, from the highly intelligent orator who appears in Thucydides (8.68, 90–91) as a key figure in the 411 B.C. oligarchic revolution of the Four Hundred in Athens (cf. Plato Menexenus 236a, where he is mentioned by Socrates). However, ancient critics often identified the two. For a brief summary of the debate see A.W. Gomme, A. Andrewes, and K.J. Dover, Historical Commentary on Thucydides (Oxford, 1981), 5:170–71.
118. "Good reputation" (eudoxia) and "bad reputation" (kakodoxia) below are related to the word translated elsewhere as "opinion" (doxa).
119. "Courageous" (andreios) might also be translated as "manly."
120. "Of this sort" might also be translated as "of the following sort." See Strauss, Xenophon's Socrates, 39.
1. Aristippus of Cyrene reportedly wrote treatises on education and virtue, and he (or, according to some, his grandson of the same name) may have been the founder of the Cyrenaic school of hedonistic philosophy (active c. 300–275 B.C.), which is said to have held that immediate pleasure is the goal of action, knowledge is based on sensation, and the present moment is the only reality. We have little certain knowledge of Aristippus other than that he was a disciple of Socrates. They converse together again at III.8 on the good and the noble. See Diogenes Laertius 2.65ff.

2. “To take” (haptesthai) is elsewhere translated as “to touch.”

3. “Women’s quarters” (eirktai) were the “enclosed” or inner portions of houses.

4. Ravaging the crops of enemies during war was common military practice.

5. “Courageous” (andreios) might also be translated as “manly.”

6. Xenos means “stranger” or “foreigner” but can also have the meaning “guest,” since those considered to be civilized by the Greeks treated strangers as guests.

7. “Clever trick” (palaisma) is originally a wrestling term meaning “bout” or “fall,” but also “artifice.”

8. Sinis, Sciron, and Procrustes were three legendary robbers notorious for their cruel treatment of travelers. For a description of their deeds and their death at the hands of the heroic Athenian king Theseus, see Plutarch Life of Theseus.

9. “Necessary ones” (hoi anankaioi) refers to relatives.

10. “Kingly” (basilike) might be translated simply as “royal.”

11. The participle translated as “gladly” (theloi) is from the verb translated elsewhere as “to want to” (ethelein).

12. “Understanding” (episteme) might also be translated as “knowledge” or “science.”

13. Works and Days 287ff. The phrase “although it was hard” (chalepe per eousa) might also mean “although it is hard.”

14. Epicharmus (c. 530–440 B.C.) of Sicily has been called the inventor of comedy. He was known for writing with beauty and elegance. According to Diogenes Laertius 8.78 he was a Pythagorean philosopher. See Aristotle Poetics 3.5, 5.5. These are fragments 36 and 37 in Diels and Kranz.

15. Prodicus of Ceos (c. fifth century) was a sophist and older companion of Socrates. Aristophanes associates the two of them at Clouds 360ff. where the chorus of cloud goddesses greets Socrates in the following manner: “Point out to us whatever you need, you priest of the most subtle nonsense, for we would not listen to any other of the current sophists concerned with heavens (meteoroosophistoi) except for Prodicus, to him because of his wisdom and judgment, to you because you bear yourself haughtily in the streets, turn your eyes sideways, endure many ills barefooted, and assume a solemn countenance on our account.” Prodicus is mentioned at Xenophon Symposium I.5 (where it is said that he teaches for money) and IV.62 (where he is again called “the wise”). See also Plato Hippias major 282c, Protagoras 315c–16a, and 337a–c, where he is referred to as Socrates’ teacher. In Plato Meno 96d Socrates refers to him as his teacher. Socrates apparently followed him in his stress on the right use of words and accurate discrimination between
synonyms (Euthydemus 277, Cratylus 384). The treatise on Heracles was part of a larger work entitled "Times" or "Seasons" (Horai). This account is all that remains of it.

16. Heracles, who later became a god, was admired for his courage and physical strength. He is ridiculed in Aristophanes Birds and Frogs for his lack of continence with respect to food.

17. Except where noted below, the rest of the story is written in indirect speech, requiring us to understand "he says that . . . / as is stated explicitly here.

18. "Freeborn" (eleutherios) might also be translated as "liberal."

19. "To feed" (trephein) is elsewhere translated as "to sustain." See n. 28 to II.2.5.

20. The phrase "Heracles, after hearing these things, said" is written in direct rather than indirect speech, that is, Socrates says this himself rather than reporting what Prodicus said. See n. 17 to II.1.21 above.

21. The phrase "she said" is written in direct rather than indirect speech. See n. 17 to II.1.21.

22. "To nickname" (hupokorizein) can also mean "to talk in child's language."

23. The phrase "at this point the other woman approached and said" is written in direct rather than indirect speech. See n. 17 to II.1.21.

24. "The things that are" (ta ousia) might also be rendered "the beings."

25. The phrase "and Vice interrupted her and said" is written in direct rather than indirect speech. See n. 17 to II.1.21.

26. "Former" (palaios) might also be translated as "long ago" or "ancient," as it is elsewhere.

27. "To receive benefactions" is a passive form of the verb translated as "to benefit" or "to do good deeds" (euergetein).

28. "To sustain" (trephein) can also mean "to foster," "to rear," or "to cherish."

29. "To refute" (elenchein) might be translated also as "to cross-examine."

30. Those elected to public positions in Athens were examined or "scrutinized" (dokimazein) to see if they fulfilled the legal requirements for holding office, such as full citizenship.

31. Chairephon and Chairecrates are mentioned at I.2.48 as companions of Socrates. Chairecrates is otherwise unknown, but Chairephon was a close follower of Socrates. He appears in Aristophanes Clouds as one of the students in Socrates' "think tank." Socrates reports in Plato Apology of Socrates that Chairephon once asked the Delphic oracle if there was anyone wiser than Socrates. See also Xenophon Apology of Socrates 14.

32. "To rear" (trephein) is elsewhere translated as "to sustain."

33. See n. 3 to I.1.1 on kainos.

34. "A fathom" (orguia) is the length of the outstretched arms.

35. "Best" (kratistos) might also be translated as "strongest." It is the superlative of the adjective translated as "superior" (see n. 58 to I.2.16 on kreitton).

36. See n. 28 to I.1.11 on "to worry" (phrontizein).

37. "To care for" (therapeuein) is elsewhere translated as "to serve."

38. Antisthenes (c. 455-360 B.C.) established the philosophic school of Cynics (see Diogenes Laertius 1.15, 6.13) in Athens after Socrates' death (399 B.C.). In his youth, apparently, he was a student of Gorgias and taught as a sophist himself for a period of time. But later he became a devoted follower of Socrates, as he is portrayed at
III.11.17 below and in Xenophon's Symposion (see esp. IV.34-44 and VIII.4-6, also I.3, II.10-13, III.4-8, 61-64). See, in addition, III.4.1 and n. 17.

39. "In front of the one neglecting him" might also be translated "in front of the neglectful one himself."

40. A mina was a measure of weight and currency. It was equal to one hundred drachma, a silver coin worth six obols. At about this time an Athenian man received a three-obol daily stipend for sitting on a jury or attending the assembly. Socrates valued the worth of his household at five mina (Oeconomicus II.3).

41. Nicias (c. 470-413 B.C.) the son of Niceratus was a famous Athenian general known for his virtue and his caution. He was a commander of the disastrous Sicilian expedition during the Peloponnesian War when he was captured and executed in 413 B.C. His family was famous for its wealth, and he had some silver mines at Laurium in Attica. On his wealth see also Xenophon On the Revenues of Athens IV.14. Cf. Thucydides 7.86 and Aristophanes Knights (which parodies his caution).

42. A talent was the largest unit of weight in Greek measure. In currency it was equal to sixty minas.

43. On Critobulus see I.3.8 and n. 101.

44. "To do well" (eu poiein) is the same phrase translated as "to treat well" in this chapter and elsewhere with regard to human beings.

45. Odyssey 12.184.

46. "To those who love the honor accorded to virtue" (tois ep' arete philotimomenois) might also be rendered "to those ambitious regarding virtue."

47. On Pericles, see I.2.40-46 and n. 80. He is mentioned along with Themistocles also at Symposium VIII.39.

48. Themistocles (c. 528-462 B.C.) is mentioned also at III.6.2 and IV.2.2 and Symposion VIII. 39 (see previous note). He was an Athenian statesman, highly regarded for his prudence, who was influential during and immediately following the Persian Wars. See Herodotus 8.56ff. and Thucydides 1.136-38.

49. "To acquire an excess" (pleonektein) is translated in II.6.23 just below and elsewhere as "to be greedy."

50. "Both noble and good" (kalois te kagathos) is almost the same phrase as that translated as "gentleman" (kalois kagathos). See n. 32 to I.1.16.

51. See n. 35 to II.4.1 on "best" (kratistos).

52. "Best" here is a translation of beltistos, the superlative form of "good" (agathos), rather than kratistos, as in the previous two uses.

53. "Understanding" (episteme) might also be translated as "knowledge" or "science."

54. Throughout the present discussion kalos is translated as "beautiful" rather than "noble."

55. On Scylla see Homer Odyssey 12.85ff.

56. See n. 45 to II.6.11 on Sirens.

57. "To kiss" (philein) might also be translated "to love" or "to regard with affection."

58. "Serviceable" is epitedeios, which is translated as "friend" at I.1.6.

59. Aspasia of Miletus was the mistress of Pericles (I.2.40). He divorced his high-born Athenian wife and lived the rest of his life with Aspasia (marriage with foreigners was forbidden). Their son, the younger Pericles (III.5.1), with whom Socrates
converses below, was legitimated by a special decree of the Athenian people. At one point Aspasia was indicted on charges of impiety and of corrupting Athenian women, but Pericles saved her by drawing on his influence with the people. Socrates claims in Plato's *Menexenus* (235e, 249c) that she taught him the art of rhetoric (see also Xenophon *Oeconomicus* III.14, where Socrates refers Critobulus to Aspasia for her superior understanding on the subject of the education of wives).

60. *Koinei* means "in common" or "in public.") It is the opposite of *idai* (privately), which is used in the next sentence.

61. Aristarchus is otherwise unknown.

62. The Piraeus was Athens's port city, connected by the so-called long walls. On the civil unrest in Athens at the end of the Peloponnesian War see *Hellenica* II.3.4.

63. Ceramon is otherwise unknown.

64. "Provisions" (ta epitēdeia) is a form of epitēdeios, which is translated elsewhere as "serviceable." It is not related to the word translated as "to provide" (parechein).

65. "Worse" (ponēros) is elsewhere translated as "wicked."'

66. Perhaps this is the same Nausicydes mentioned at Aristophanes *Ecclesiazusae* 426. Otherwise Nausicydes is unknown, as are the others in this paragraph.

67. Wealthy people in Athens were called upon to undertake public works at their own expense, for instance, producing a play at one of the public drama festivals or fitting out a battleship.

68. Collytus is a deme of Attica.

69. "Inattentiveness" (ameleia) is elsewhere translated as "neglect."

70. "Friendly" (philikos) is related to the verb translated as "to love" (philein) just above.

71. "Suitable" (eikos) is frequently translated as "plausible" elsewhere.

72. "Astonishing" (thaumaston) is related to thaumazein, which is usually rendered as "to wonder," occasionally as "to marvel."

73. Eutherus is otherwise unknown.

74. Crito is mentioned at I.2.48 as among Socrates' associates. The father of Critobulus (see I.3.8 and n. 101, also *Symposium* IV.24), he was wealthy (*Oeconomicus* II.3; Plato *Euthydemus* 304) and a generous supporter of Socrates. In Plato's *Crito* he converses with Socrates alone in prison, trying to persuade him to escape. In *Phaedo* 118a he closes the eyes of the dying Socrates.

75. "To mind his own business" (ta heautou prattein) is literally "to do his own things."

76. "Very much love the honor of dealing with you as a friend" might also be translated as "be very ambitious to deal with you as a friend."

77. "Sycophant" translates sukophantos. It does not have the modern meaning of "flatterer," except perhaps indirectly (Bloom, *Republic of Plato*, 445). In Athens the sycophants are the persons described just above at II.9.1: false accusers or slanderers who extorted money from others by taking them to court, or by threatening to do so. In the Athenian system there were no public officials who acted as prosecutors for the city, but individuals brought others to trial on what we would call criminal charges concerning the public interest, as well as for "civil" matters.

78. "Of one" is an emendation accepted by Hude without which it would be difficult to comprehend the sentence's meaning.

79. It is unclear in the Greek whether "him" is Crito or Archedemus.
80. On “to receive benefactions from” see n. 27 to II.2.3 on _euergetein_.
81. Diodorus is otherwise unknown.
82. Hermogenes was the son of a wealthy man, Hipponicus, but his father’s fortune was inherited by his older half brother Callias. He is mentioned among the companions of Socrates at I.2.48. He converses with Socrates before his death at IV.8.4ff. and in Xenophon’s _Apology of Socrates_. See also Xenophon Symposium I.3, III.8, 14, IV.23, 46–49, VI.1–4, VIII.3, 12, _Hellenica_ IV.8.13, _Letters_ I.1; and Plato _Cratylus_ 384c, 391c.

**NOTES TO BOOK III**

1. Dionysodorus was a sophist from Chios who, together with his brother Euthydemus, taught rhetoric and the art of war. In Plato _Euthydemus_ (see especially 273c) Socrates reports a conversation he had with the two of them.
2. “Honor” (time) might also be translated as “office.” Each year the Athenians elected ten generals.
3. See _Iliad_ 3.169–70. Agamemnon was the king of Mycenae and leader of the Greek army against Troy.
4. A “squadron commander” (taxiarchos) commanded a division (taxis) of soldiers, which in Athens was the quota of infantry furnished by each tribe (phule).
5. A “company leader” (lochagos) led a company (lochos) of one hundred men.
6. “Tactics” translates _ta taktika_, a form of an adjective related to the verb translated in this chapter and elsewhere as “to order” or “to put in order” (tattein).
7. “Understanding” (episteme) might also be translated as “science.”
8. “To distinguish” (krinein) is elsewhere translated as “to decide.”
9. “Those most in love with honor” (philotimotatos) might also be translated as “those who are most ambitious.”
10. _Iliad_ 2.243.
11. _Iliad_ 3.179.
12. “To be elected to command the cavalry” (hipparchein hērēmenos) is more literally “to be elected as hipparch.” In addition to the ten generals, Athens had two general cavalry commanders (hipparchoi) with ten lower cavalry commanders (phularchoi) under them, one from each of the ten tribes (phule). Xenophon wrote a treatise on this office entitled _Hipparchicus_ or _The Skilled Cavalry Commander_.
13. The racecourses were sandy.
14. Delos is an island in the Aegean thought to be the birthplace of the gods Artemis and Apollo. Every four years the Greek cities sent delegations to a festival in their honor.
15. “Love of honor” (philotimia) might also be translated as “ambition.”
16. Nicomachides is otherwise unknown.
17. Perhaps not the same Antisthenes as the one above with whom Socrates converses on the worth of friends (see II.5 and n. 38).
18. A hoplite was a member of the heavily armed infantry, the middle class of the army.
19. Most of the manuscripts have "lover of contention" (philoneikos) in place of "lover of victory" (philonikos).

20. "To sponsor a chorus" (chorēgein) is literally "to be a leader of a chorus." The chorēgos outfitted and trained a chorus at his own expense to compete for his tribe (phule) in the public dramatic festivals. The office was one of the duties performed by wealthy Athenian citizens.

21. "Task" (ergon) is translated elsewhere as "work" or "deed."

22. "Public" (koinos) is translated elsewhere as "collective" or "common."

23. Pericles, the illegitimate, but adopted, son of the famous Athenian statesman Pericles (cf. I.2.40ff. and n. 80, also II.6.13) and his mistress Aspasia (cf. II.6.36 and n. 59). This younger Pericles was later to be one of the six generals executed from among the nine tried illegally as a group for failing to rescue sailors' bodies after the victorious naval battle at Arginusae (cf. I.1.18 and n. 36). He is mentioned at Hellenica I.5.16, 6.29, 7.2, 16, 21.

24. Words translated by "reputation" are related to the words generally translated as "opinion" (doxa) and "to have an opinion" (dokein).

25. "Most honor-loving" (philotimotatoi) might also be translated as "most ambitious."

26. After 456 B.C. the Athenians had dominated Boeotia (the country to the northwest of Attica) and established a number of democracies there. The banished oligarchs later defeated an Athenian army under Tolmides in the battle of Coronea near Lebedeia in Boeotia in 447 B.C. (see Thucydides 1.108, 113). In 424 B.C., in the battle of Delium (on the border between Attica and Boeotia), the Athenian army under Hippocrates was defeated. According to Plato (Symposium 221a, Laches 181b), Socrates himself took part in this battle.

27. Cecrops was a legendary king of Athens who decided the contest between Athena and Poseidon, concerning which of the two would be the patron deity of Athens.

28. "Rearing" (trophe) is elsewhere translated as "sustenance."

29. Erechtheus was the fourth legendary king of Athens, son of the gods Hephaestus and Gaia and raised by Athena. See Iliad 2.547. The war was against the Thracians and Eleusinians at a time when Thrace bordered on Attica.

30. According to legend the Athenians gave aid to the Heracleides, descendants of the god Heracles, against Eurystheus, king of Argos in the Peloponnese.

31. The heroic Athenian king Theseus fought a series of wars against the Amazons, Centaurs, and Thracians (Isocrates 4.65, 68; Herodotus 9.27; Thucydides 2.15). He is also mentioned in Xenophon Symposium VIII.31.

32. Socrates refers to events during the Persian Wars.

33. The antecedent of "they" could be "the Peloponnesians."


35. Koinos is translated as both "public (gatherings)" and "common (property)" in this sentence. Elsewhere it is translated as "collective."

36. The Council of the Areopagus in Athens presided over murder cases as well as certain other crimes. It was composed from among those who had held the office of archon and had passed the process of scrutiny.

37. Pancratics was a combination of boxing and wrestling.

38. "To make things up as one goes along" (autoschediazein) might also be trans-
lated as "to extemporize"; often it has the bad connotations of "to act unadvisedly" or "to try rash experiments."

39. Cf. Thucydides 1.138.3 (where Themistocles is praised—cf. also below, III.6.2).
40. The "King's land" (basileos chōra) is Persia.
41. Glaucön was the brother of Plato and the nephew of Charmides (see n. 48 to III.7.1). His father was Ariston and mother Perictione (the daughter of the older Glaucön mentioned below and Charmides' sister). Glaucön and his brother Adeimantus are Socrates' chief interlocutors in Plato's Republic.
42. This is the only mention of Plato in Xenophon's writings.
43. See n. 48 to II.6.13 on Themistocles.
44. "Off the top of my head" (apo stomatos) is literally "from my tongue."
45. A talent was the largest unit of weight in Greek measure.
46. See n. 24 to III.5.1 on "reputation."
47. The verb translated as "to wonder" (thaumazein) here and elsewhere is translated as "to admire" just above.
48. Charmides is the brother of Perictione (see n. 41 to III.6.1 above), and hence uncle to Glaucön and Plato. In Plato's dialogue Charmides (see esp. 154b) he converses with Socrates in the company of Critias (see n. 51 to I.2.12) after the siege of Potidaea in 432 B.C. He was one of the Ten who ruled in the Piraeus under the Thirty Tyrants and was killed in the battle there in 403 B.C. (Hellenica II.4.19). He is prominent in Xenophon's Symposium (I.3, II.15, 19, III.1, 9, IV.8, 27, 29-33, VIII.2).
49. "Amateur" (idiōtēs) might be translated as "private individual," as elsewhere.
50. "To go well" (kalos echein) might also be translated "to be in a noble condition."
51. See n. 1 to I.1.1 on Aristippus.
52. Kalos in this passage might also be translated as "fine" (see n. 16 to I.1.7).
53. See n. 94 to I.3.2 on "no different than" (ouden diaphoron) .
54. "Noble and good" (kalos kagathos) might also be translated as "gentlemen" here (see n. 32 to I.1.16).
55. "To be born" (phuein) is related to the word meaning "natural" (phusikon) in this sentence.
56. The verb translated as "to rear" (trephein) is elsewhere translated as "to sustain."
57. "He said that" is implied throughout section 5.
58. The word translated as "checkers" (pettoi) was a game played on a board of thirty-six squares.
59. "Just anybody" (hoi tuchontoi) is literally "those that one chances upon."
60. "To point out" (epideiknunai) is elsewhere translated as "to display." It may mean "to lecture" here. Sophists delivered "lectures" or "display speeches" (epideixeis) in private gatherings (Plato Hippias minor 364b, Hippias major 282b, Gorgias 447b).
61. The noun "doing well" (eupraxia, related to the verb eu prattein) seems to mean here "acting well" or "good conduct," but it is an ambiguous term that can imply "success"; cf. section 8 just above.
62. "To chance upon" (epituchein) is related to "good fortune" (eutuchia).
63. "To do well" (eu poiein) is frequently translated elsewhere as "to treat well," e.g., II.3.8.
64. "Political life" (politeia) can also mean "regime." It is the title of Plato's dialogue the Republic.

65. Parrasius (c. 397 B.C.), son of the painter Evenor of Ephesus.

66. "Liberal" (eleutherios) is elsewhere translated as "freeborn."

67. "Inexperienced in the beautiful (noble)" is a literal rendering of apeirokalos, which might also be translated as "vulgar."

68. Cleiton is otherwise unknown.

69. See n. 37 to III.5.21 on pancratics.

70. "Passions" (ta pathê) might also be translated "experiences" or "states."

71. The meaning "to liken to" or "to assimilate" given for proseikazein by Liddell and Scott suggests an alternative translation: "Then the sculptor must liken the passions (deeds) of the soul to the form." But the meaning is unclear. How could the sculptor fashion the passions or deeds of the soul?

72. Pistias is otherwise unknown.

73. On the oath "by Hera" see n. 116 to I.5.5.

74. A celebrated Athenian courtesan, later the mistress of Alcibiades (see n. 51 to I.2.1.2). According to some, she buried him after he was murdered in Phrygia.

75. "To keep company with" is the translation used elsewhere for suneinai; cf. Socrates' "companions" (sunontes). Literally it means "to be with" or "to have intercourse with."

76. The adjective translated as "surpassed" (kreittôn) is elsewhere translated as "stronger," "superior," or "better."

77. "To learn" (katamathein) is elsewhere translated as "to observe."

78. On the oath "by Hera" see n. 116 to I.5.5.

79. "To require that" (axioun) might also be translated as "to expect," "to demand," or "to think that one deserves."

80. "To confer benefactions" (euergetein) is translated elsewhere as "to do good deeds."

81. "Most decorous intimacy" (kosmitôtate homilia) might also be translated as "most adorned association."

82. Apollodorus was a devoted follower of Socrates and according to Plato was present at his trial (Apology 34a) and death (Phaedo 117d). It is he who relates the story of the banquet, as related to him by Aristodemus, in Plato's Symposium. See also Xenophon Apology of Socrates 28, where he is said by Xenophon to have been a strong desirer of Socrates, but otherwise simpleminded.

83. On Antisthenes, see n. 38 to II.5.1.

84. On Cebes and Simmias, see n. 82 to I.2.48.

85. The iunx (spell) was a small bird that was attached to a revolving wheel for the effect that its cries were believed to have on human beings. The bird's name came to be applied to the wheel, and the term has the metaphorical meaning of "spell" or "charm."

86. Epigenes, the son of Antiphon, was with Socrates at his death, according to Plato (Phaedo 59b, also Plato Apology 33e).

87. Or "how unathletically" (idiôtikos). An idiôtes is a private individual or lay-person as opposed to one who takes part in public affairs or who has a professional knowledge or skill (in this case athletic skill).

88. "Life" (psuchê) is elsewhere translated as "soul."
89. "Science" (epistêmê) is elsewhere translated as "understanding."

90. Acumenus was an Athenian physician who is mentioned as a friend of Socrates in Plato Phaedrus 227a, 268a–b. He was the father of Eryximachus, also a physician, who speaks on love in Plato Symposium (176c; cf. Protagoras 315c).

91. Asclepius, a deity of physicians who is mentioned by Socrates in his last words before dying (Plato Phaedo 118a), was said to have been a disciple of Hermes and was regarded as the father of all wisdom and knowledge. His temple was on the Acropolis in Athens. He is mentioned in Xenophon On Hunting (I.2, 6).

92. Amphiaraus received immortality from the gods and was revered as having prophetic powers. His temple was at Oropus in Boeotia. He is mentioned in Xenophon On Hunting (I.2, 8).

93. “Eater of relishes” (opsophagos) might also be translated as “gourmand” (see n. 99 to I.3.5 on opsos).

94. “Bread” (sitós) might also be translated as “food” (see n. 99 to I.3.5).

95. The phrase “itself by itself” (auto kat' auto) is used in reference to Socrates’ theory of the "ideas" (e.g., Plato Parmenides 130b1-10, Phaedo 100b3–7).

96. See n. 93 to III.13.4 on opsophagos.

97. “Relish making” (opsopoiein) might also be translated as “cookery.”

98. Euôcheisthai is a form of the verb related to euôchia, a “feast” or “banquet.” The etymology of the word is uncertain, but it may derive from eu (“well”) and echein (“to fare”).

NOTES TO BOOK IV

1. On “to be receptive” (apudechthai) see n. 47 to at I.2.8.
2. See n. 6 to I.1.2 on “to use” (chresthai).
3. On “to point out” (epideiknunaz) see n. 60 to III.9.11.
4. "Common" (phaulos) might also be translated as “paltry,” “low,” or “inferior.”
5. See n. 24 to III.5.1 on “reputation.”
6. Euthydemus is mentioned at I.2.29 and is prominent in chapters 3, 5, and 6 below. Perhaps he is the same man mentioned by Alcibiades in Plato Symposium 222b: “These are the things, men, for which I praise Socrates; and, having mixed in the things for which I blame him, I told you how he treated me with hubris. And indeed he did these things not only to me but also to Charmides, the son of Glauccon, and to Euthydemus, the son of Diocles, and to very many others whom he deceived on the grounds that he was a lover, but established himself as a favorite instead of a lover.”
7. See n. 48 to II.6.13 on Themistocles.
8. “To admire” (thaumazein) is elsewhere translated as “to wonder.”
9. “To make my trials on you” (en humin apokinduneuein) might also be translated as “to put you at risk.”
11. See n. 116 to I.5.5 on this oath.
12. Theodorus of Cyrene, a Pythagorean philosopher, was eminent as a mathematician. See Plato *Theaetetus* and *Sophist*. On geometry, cf. IV.7.23.

13. "Kings" (*basileis*) and "kingly" (*basilike*) might be translated as "royalty" and "royal."

14. "Are you afraid that," "Do you think that," or some similar phrase is implied in the Greek.

15. "To do mischief (bad things)" is a translation of *kakourgein* (see n. 85 to I.2.56).

16. "Understanding" (*epistēmē*) might also be translated as "knowledge" or "science."

17. See n. 24 to III.5.1 on "reputation."

18. "Power" (*dunamis*) is translated as "capacity" or "ability" elsewhere.

19. Daedalus was a mythical Athenian sculptor and architect of the heroic age of Theseus, who built the Labyrinth for Minos, king of Crete, to contain the monstrous Minotaur. His son, Icarus, fell into the sea and drowned when he flew too close to the sun during their escape from Crete, causing the wax to melt that fastened on his wings. Socrates refers to Daedalus as his own ancestor in Plato (*Alcibiades I* 121a, *Euthyphro* 11c; see also *Meno* 97d, *Hippias major* 382a, *Ion* 553).

20. "To lose" (*apoliunai*) is translated as "to be destroyed" just below where it occurs in a different form.

21. Palamedes fought with the Greeks against Troy and was the mythical inventor of the alphabet, among other things. In some accounts, due to the envy of Odysseus and others, he was falsely accused of treachery after a counterfeit note from the enemy was planted in his tent. See Xenophon *Apology of Socrates* 26, where Socrates compares his own condemnation to that of Palamedes and blames Odysseus for the death; compare Xenophon *On Hunting* I.11, where bad men are blamed rather than Odysseus; see also Plato *Apology of Socrates* 41b, where Socrates places himself among Palamedes and others who died due to an unjust judgment; and Aristophanes *Thesmophoriazusae* 765–76, which has a brief parody of a scene from Euripides' lost *Palamedes*. It has been said that the sophists and Euripides portray Palamedes as a wise man and a poet and considered his life as something of a pattern for their own.

22. "On "power" (*dunamis*) see n. 18 to IV.2.29.

23. "Lacking in means" (*aporos*) is usually translated as "perplexed."

24. Note the change of verb here from "to provide" (*parechein*) to "to procure" (*porizein*). According to Greek legend fire was stolen from the gods and given to human beings by Prometheus.

25. "In which all things are noble and good" (en hōi panta kala kai agatha esti) might also be translated as "in which all noble and good things are."

26. "To benefit in the most important (or greatest) things" (*ta megista ophelein*) might also be translated as "to benefit to the greatest extent."

27. Elsewhere "to render" (*paraskeuazein*) is translated as "to furnish" or "to prepare."

28. "Justice" (*ho dikaios*) is literally "the just" here and elsewhere in this chapter.

29. "In public" (*koinē*) is elsewhere translated as "collectively."

30. See I.1.18 and n. 36, and the account at *Hellenica* I.7.

31. See n. 51 to I.2.36 and the account at *Critias* and the Thirty above.

32. See I.2.32–38.
33. Socrates refused when he was commanded along with four others to arrest a wealthy man named Leon who fled to Salamis to escape death (Hellenica II.3.39; Plato Apology 32c-d).

34. Meletus was a tragic poet and one of the three accusers of Socrates. See n. 1 to I.1.1, where Xenophon refers to "those who indicted Socrates." Meletus is mentioned also at IV.8.4 and Xenophon Apology of Socrates 11, 19, and 20ff.; Plato Euthyphro 2-3, Apology of Socrates 24-26.

35. "Limited" (metriōs) might also be translated as "measured."

36. Hippias of Elis (c. 481-411 B.C.) was a famous sophist who taught rhetoric. Plato wrote two dialogues showing Socrates converse with Hippias: Hippias major, in which they discuss what the noble is; and Hippias minor, in which they discuss what lying is. In Xenophon's Symposium (IV.62), Socrates mentions Hippias as a teacher of the art of memory.

37. See n. 111 to I.4.7 on "by all means" (amelei).

38. See n. 116 to I.5.5 on this oath.

39. "To make a false accusation" (sukophantein) might also be translated as "to act the sycophant." See n. 77 to II.9.4 on sycophants.

40. On Lycurgus see Xenophon Constitution of the Lacedaimonians and Plutarch's account of the life of this famous legislator.

41. See n. 94 to I.3.2 on ouden diaphoron.

42. "Concord" (homonoia) might also be translated as "like-mindedness" or "unity."

43. "As for the individual" (idiai) might also be translated "privately," as opposed to "publicly."

44. "To judge" (gignōskein), here and in the next sentence, might also be translated as "to know."

45. "To hold as law" (nomizein), translated elsewhere simply as "to hold," is related to "law" (nomos).

46. Elsewhere "sound" (spoudaios) is translated as "serious."

47. The masculine gender of the participle translated as "those who will prevent" (tous kolusontas) implies that the ones preventing are human beings or other living beings.

48. "Suitably" (eikōs) is elsewhere translated as "plausibly."

49. "Things" (ta pragmata) might also be translated as "practical matters," "business," or "affairs."

50. Genos can mean "class," "sort," or "kind" in Xenophon. Its root meaning is "race," "stock," or "family."

51. "To converse" (dialegesthai) is the deponent form of the active verb meaning "to separate" (dialegein).

52. See n. 49 to IV.5.11 on ta pragmata.

53. "Piety" (eusebeia) is related to sebein, which is elsewhere translated as "to revere."

54. "Understanding" (epistēmē) might also be translated as "knowledge" or "science." It is related to the verb translated as "to understand" (epistasthai).

55. "All the beings" (ta onta panta) might also be translated as "all the things that are."

56. "Those who perfect the lawful" (hoi ta nomima epitelountoi) might also be
translated as "those who accomplish (discharge or fulfill) the things that are conformable to law."

57. Here and through the end of this chapter "argument" (logos) might also be translated as "speech."

58. "Hypothesis" is a transliteration of hupothesis, which might also be translated as "assumption."


60. "To those who associated with him" (pros tous homilountas autòi) might also be translated as "with a view to those who associated with him." Haplòs is translated as "simply" in this sentence and at IV.2.40. Elsewhere it has been translated as "straightforwardly."

61. A "mark" (tekmerion) is a sure sign, token, or proof.

62. "He said that" is implied by indirect discourse.

63. The philosopher Anaxagoras of Clazomenae (born c. 499 B.C.) left Ionia and went to Athens as a young man, where he was the friend and teacher of Pericles and Euripides, among others. At the instigation of Pericles' opponents, he was charged with impiety and banished from Athens. He is said to have departed from his predecessors, the Ionic philosophers, in seeking a cause other than matter to explain nature.

64. "Vehemently" (sphodra) is elsewhere translated as "impetuously."

65. Representatives from Athens were sent every year to the island of Delos with offerings to Apollo to commemorate Theseus' legendary victory over the Minotaur.

66. "To admire" (thaumaz ein) is translated elsewhere as "to wonder."

67. See n. 82 to II.10.3 on Hermogenes.

68. The phrase "he said that" is explicitly used here and implied through section 6 by the use of indirect discourse.

69. See n. 34 to IV.4.4 on Meletus.

70. Thaumaz e in, translated here and in the next sentence as "to marvel," is elsewhere translated as "to wonder."

71. "With Hermogenes and with the others" (pros Hermogenë te kai pros tous allous) might also be translated as "with a view to Hermogenes and with a view to the others."

72. "To benefit to the greatest extent" (ophelein ta megista) might also be translated as "to benefit in the most important things," as at IV.3.17 above.
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